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Abstract 
Digitalization is a contemporary societal topic among businessmen, scholars, politi-
cians, and citizens. The way Uber has changed the taxi business and subsequently is 
providing new models for the entire transportation industry or even changing urban 
planning principles is a practical example of the impact of digitalization. This example 
illustrates that digitalization offers major returns for some and ultimate losses for others, 
which is similar to Schumpeter’s “Creative Destruction” that he coined in 1942. Digitali-
zation does not refer to a product or service; it is multiple technology-based products, 
services, and concepts as a systemic whole. Many of the impacts of digitalization are 
difficult to observe beforehand, as the impact rendered is systemic rather than a 
straightforward causal relation. Traditional strategic management theories and frame-
works are used to analyze company performance and to explain which strategies indi-
vidual firms or group of firms should implement to succeed. Many of the tools for top 
management aid in understanding changes in business environments and offer guid-
ance for making the correct strategic choices, but in many cases, they fail to aid in the 
detection of systemic phenomena. At the same time, making these strategic choices is 
difficult, as explained by behavioral economics and management cognition, as the 
choices involve changing the status quo. 
This dissertation examines the digitalization impact on the machine-building industry 
that serves global container handling customers - ports and terminals. It is a traditional 
capital intensive business-to-business industry that has a relatively small number of 
global players. The investigation adopted a value chain view in which machine builders 
are actors, actors apply digital technologies provided by enablers. The end customers, 
ports and terminals are referred as users. The objective of the research was to in-
crease understanding of digitalization’s potential for disruption or paradigm change as 
well as to identify the most important concepts that drive and inhibit this change. As the 
change brought about by digitalization is underway, it is necessary to understand 
whether the views regarding its impact differ between enablers, actors, and users. 
Mixed methods were applied that partly overlapped for triangulation purposes. The 
primary methodology included two rounds of Delphi interviews that were complement-
ed by a survey and three case descriptions. 
Big Data/Artificial Intelligence emerged as the most prominent digital technology that 
can enable disruption in machine-building. Empirical results have shown that Big Da-
ta/Artificial Intelligence challenges the ways knowledge is created; it is more effective 
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when machines and their components are connected to data networks, and the tech-
nology is both rapidly advancing and becoming more affordable. The cost, speed, 
availability, and features of Big Data/Artificial Intelligence development are driven by 
multiple industries where machine builders can have a relatively small impact.   
Empirical results have also shown that discipline and industry-based platforms are the 
most powerful economic drivers. The current management of the incumbents has little 
experience with these new elements, which have a major influence on industry dynam-
ics. The platforms are especially powerful for change, as they enable a global network 
economy in which entrepreneurial knowledge workers can contribute to value creation 
in collaboration with startups and multinational corporations. Platform development 
cannot be stopped or delayed by incumbents in machine-building. They can ignore the 
development, adapt to it, or pursue a platform strategy of their own if the opportunities 
match the companies’ capabilities.  
Examples of the sub-drivers pushing the digital concepts forward are classical and ra-
tional productivity, lead times, features, quality, and cost. In addition, some of the inhib-
itive sub-drivers are relatively easy to identify, such as 3D printing speed or users 
providing access to their data. Concerns regarding data security delay investment, and 
changing legacy processes and systems requires time; however, empirical results have 
indicated that the strongest inertia is related directly to people and decision making. 
Three of the strongest people-related inhibitive sub-drivers are lack of systemic under-
standing, management beliefs, and lack of capabilities. The practical contribution for 
management is twofold. First, it must be believed that digitalization will somehow dis-
rupt the current business, and second that the transformation is too complex to be only 
planned, but instead requires also experimental learning. A successful combination that 
has been suggested by books and articles as well as the results and comments from 
the Delphi interviews is developing an entrepreneurial mindset, conducting multiple 
small experiments, and applying the knowledge of external networks. This enables 
strategy formation through learning, which simultaneously develops the capabilities that 
are needed in data and user-centric business environments. 
 
 
Keywords Digitalization, Industrial Internet, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, platforms, open 
innovation, industry disruption, strategic management, Delphi, container handling 
industry
  
3 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Digitalisaatio on ajankohtainen aihe liikemiesten, tutkijoiden, poliitikkojen ja yksittäisten 
ihmisten keskuudessa. Yksi käytännön esimerkki digitalisaation vaikutuksista on Uber, 
jonka toimintatapa muuttaa taksiliiketoimintaa luoden samalla malleja koko kuljetustoi-
mialalle ja vaikuttaen jopa kaupunkisuunnitteluun. Esimerkki valaisee myös sitä, miten 
digitalisaatio tarjoaa merkittäviä voittoja yksille ja kohtalokkaita tappioita toisille, kuten 
Schumpeter kuvasi ”luovan tuhon” ajatuksessaan jo vuonna 1942. Digitalisaatio ei ole 
yksittäinen tuote tai palvelu, vaan se on tuotteita, palveluita ja konsepteja, joita useat 
digitaaliset teknologiat systeemisesti mahdollistavat. Systeemisyys yksinkertaisten 
syy–seuraus-suhteiden sijaan tekee vaikutusten ymmärtämisen ja ennustamisen vai-
keaksi. Perinteisiä strategisen johtamisen teorioita ja viitekehyksiä käytetään yritysten 
suorituskyvyn analysointiin ja sen ymmärtämiseksi, millä toimenpiteillä yritykset menes-
tyisivät. Lisäksi monet ylimmät johdon työkalut helpottavat näkemään liiketoimintaym-
päristön muutoksia ja tarjoavat tukea oikeiden strategisten valintojen tekemiseen, mut-
ta niissä on heikkouksia systeemisten ilmiöiden havaitsemiseksi. Behavioristinen talo-
ustiede ja johtamisen kognitiotieteet auttavat ymmärtämään, miksi oikeat strategiset 
valinnat, jotka muuttavat vallitsevia uskomuksia, ovat vaikeita yksilötasolla. 
Tämä väitöstutkimus tutki digitalisaation vaikutusta koneenrakennustoimialaan, joka 
palvelee maailmanlaajuista kontinkäsittelyä – satamia ja terminaaleja. Toimiala on pe-
rinteinen, siinä on suhteellisen vähän globaaleja toimijoita ja se sitoo paljon pääomaa. 
Tutkimus lähestyi ongelmaa arvoketjun näkökulmasta siten, että koneenrakentajat ovat 
toimijoita, jotka soveltavat digitaalisia teknologioita, joita puolestaan mahdollistajat toi-
mittavat. Arvo syntyy lopullisesti käyttäjille, joita ovat satamat ja terminaalit. Tutkimuk-
sen tavoitteena oli lisätä ymmärrystä digitalisaation mahdollisesti aiheuttamasta mur-
roksesta tai muutoksesta nykyiseen arvonluontimalliin sekä siitä, mitkä tekijät hidasta-
vat tätä kehitystä. Koska mahdollinen muutos on meneillään, käsitysten erovaisuuksien 
ymmärtäminen arvoketjussa mahdollistajien, toimijoiden ja käyttäjien kesken on tärke-
ää. Tutkimuksen päämenetelmä oli kahden haastattelukierroksen Delfoi-tekniikka sekä 
tulosten validiteetin parantamiseksi käytetyt kyselytutkimus sekä kolme case-kuvausta. 
Tietomassojen suurtehokäsittely (Big Data) yhdessä tekoälyn (Artificial Intelligence) 
kanssa nousi tärkeimmäksi mahdollisen murroksen aikaansaavaksi digitaaliseksi tek-
nologiaksi. Empiiriset tulokset osoittivat, että kyseiset teknologiat vaikuttavat uuden 
tietämyksen syntyyn ja että ilmiö kiihtyy, koska koneet ja niiden komponentit liittyvät 
kiihtyvässä tahdissa tietoverkkoihin. Kyseiset teknologiat kehittyvät edelleen samalla 
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kun niiden käytön kustannukset laskevat. Nämä teknologiat palvelevat useita toimialoja, 
mutta koneenrakentajilla itsellään on vähäinen vaikutus teknologian kustannuksiin, 
nopeuteen, saatavuuteen, ominaisuuksiin tai niiden kehittymiseen. 
Empiiriset tulokset osoittivat myös, että tieteenhaara tai toimialapohjaiset alustat ovat 
voimakkaimmat potentiaalista murrosta aiheuttavat taloudelliset konseptit tämän tutki-
muksen rajauksella. Alustat ovat uusia elementtejä, joilla on merkittävä vaikutus toimi-
alan dynamiikkaan, mutta perinteisten yritysten johdolla on harvoin omaan opiskeluun 
tai kokemukseen perustuvaa osaamista niistä. Alustat saavat voimansa verkostovaiku-
tuksista, joissa tietotyöläiset, startupit ja monikansalliset yritykset luovat yhdessä arvoa. 
Koneenrakentajat eivät pysty estämään alustojen syntymistä tai merkittävästi hidasta-
maan niiden kehitystä. Ne voivat ohittaa ilmiön, sopeutua siihen tai mahdollisuuksiensa 
ja kyvykkyyksiensä puitteissa luoda oman alustastrategiansa. 
Merkittävä osa ajureista, jotka kiihdyttävät digitaalisia konsepteja, ovat perinteisiä ja 
rationaalisia, kuten tuottavuus, läpimenoajat, ominaisuudet, laatu tai kustannukset. Osa 
kehitystä hidastavista ajureista on helposti tunnistettavissa, kuten 3D-tulostimen nope-
us tai kuinka moni käyttäjä antaa pääsyn dataansa. Huoli tietoturvasta hidastaa inves-
tointeja, ja olemassa olevien prosessien ja järjestelmien vaihtaminen on aikaa vievää. 
Empiiriset tulokset osoittivat kuitenkin, että voimakkaimmat hidasteet liittyivät suoraan 
ihmisiin ja päätöksentekoon. Kolme merkittävintä ihmisiin liittyvää hidastetta olivat sys-
teemisten ilmiöiden huono ymmärtäminen, johdon uskomukset ja kyvykkyyksien puute. 
Tulosten merkitys käytännön strategiselle johtamiselle kiteytyy kahteen asiaan. Ensin-
näkin johdon pitää ymmärtää ja uskoa, että digitaalisuus murtaa joiltakin osin nykyisen 
liiketoiminnan, ja toiseksi kehitys on niin monisyistä, ettei menestystä voi kovinkaan 
tarkasti suunnitella etukäteen. Osa tutkimuksessa käytetystä kirjallisuudesta ja Delfoi-
haastatteluista saadut tulokset painottavat tällaisessa tilanteessa yrittäjyysmäistä ajat-
telutapaa ja paljon pieniä kokeiluja, joissa hyödynnetään ulkoisten verkostojen tietä-
mystä. Toimintatapa mahdollistaa sen, että strategia voidaan luoda oppimalla, mikä 
samanaikaisesti kehittää kyvykkyyksiä, joita tarvitaan tieto- ja käyttäjäkeskeisissä liike-
toimintaympäristöissä. 
 
 
Avainsanat: digitalisaatio, teollinen internet, Big Data, tekoäly, alustat, avoin innovaatio, teolli-
nen murros, strateginen johtaminen, Delfoi, kontinkäsittely 
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“Be the change that you wish to see in the world.” 
Mahatma Gandhi 
  
19 
 
1 Introduction 
Communities have sought ways to achieve objectives that they perceived as valuable 
for thousands of years, such as conquering new regions, cultivating land, or in modern 
times, developing and delivering products and services in exchange for financial re-
wards to be distributed to stakeholders. This journey has always included fixed charac-
teristics, such as people and their relations, hierarchies, culture and social codes, other 
sets of people with the same goals, and state-of-the-art tools and methods.  
The discipline that is dealing with the way of achieving these objectives is usually 
called strategy both in academic world and in common language.  Sun Tzu expressed 
his thoughts about strategy in the Art of War over 2000 years ago (Sun, 1963). Leader-
ship as a means to achieve goals is not specifically a new invention, either; Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s Il Principe was published in 1532 (Machiavelli, 2003), and like Sun Tzu’s 
book, it is read by business leaders in the current millennium. The Wealth of Nations 
published in 1776 by Adam Smith was a milestone for modern economics (Smith, 2014) 
in the same way that The Principles of Scientific Management by Fredrick Taylor in 
1911 was for modern business administration (Taylor, 1998). Innovation has always 
produced unexpected results, causing disruptions or paradigm changes. The list of 
disruptive innovations is endless: fire making, bows and arrows, steam engine, spin-
ning jenny, telegraph, transistor, Internet, etc. 
Likewise, learning by experimenting and sharing knowledge is as old as mankind 
(Wenger and Snyder, 2000). The major disruptions in knowledge creation are the in-
vention of writing by the Sumerians in 3000 BC (Fischer, 2008) and the invention of 
printing by Johannes Gutenberg in 1448 (Childress, 2008). In this dissertation, it is as-
sumed that the ability to transform any type of data, observations, events, etc. to digital 
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forms as well as the ability to process it, store it, and share it economically, globally, 
and in real time have the same type of systemic characteristics as the invention of writ-
ing or printing.   
Is digitalization as disruptive as Uber in taxi business suggests?  Do the strategic man-
agement schools and tools detect the systemic change in business environment in way 
that that can be used for strategy formation? The objective of this dissertation is to in-
crease understanding on the potential impact on digitalization on machine-building in-
dustry and factors that either drive or inhibit the development.  
 Motivation 1.1
The motivation for this research included also personal inspiration. I have been fortu-
nate to witness the transformation of a Finnish state-owned aircraft factory to a tech-
nology center that is a global leader in the development of automated ports and termi-
nals over the last 30 years. I have been part of the transformation in senior manage-
ment by leading functional or business organizations and part of the corporate staff 
responsible for strategic planning, mergers and acquisitions, and technology. This jour-
ney brought me either temporarily or for longer periods to one-third of the world’s coun-
tries, which has increased my understanding of globalization on the macro level and of 
people with different backgrounds on the micro level. 
The factory celebrated its 75th year anniversary in 2011, and Cargotec published the 
history of the factory (Koivuniemi, 2013), which was also a story of survival during sev-
eral disruptions beginning with war and war reparations. The pace of change acceler-
ated in the 1980s. The product offerings narrowed from tens of categories to half a 
dozen, and the factory eventually began to serve only one customer industry: ports and 
terminals that handle containers. The transformation also involved a geographical 
change from a domestic supplier to a center that is a part of a global network. The in-
ternationalization generally followed the pattern described by Luostarinen (1979) in 
which products, operations, and markets have their own internationalization patterns 
but jointly contribute to the development, growth, and mature phases of the internation-
alization of a firm. At the same time, the value chain narrowed from a fully integrated 
factory to a competence center (research and development, sales and marketing, pro-
ject management, services, and support functions). Between 1994 and 2005, the facto-
ry underwent five ownership changes, including several changes in the company and 
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product names. The last milestone was in 2012 when the factory moved to a purpose-
built technology center, including a large test site, laboratories, and a workshop for pro-
totypes, which is located near Tampere University of Technology in Finland. 
The common denominator of survival was versatile technological competence through-
out the organization. The core competence related to machine-building, and the digital 
technology adaptation was evolutionary. Information technology came first to adminis-
trative processes, and then it was embedded in production machinery. In the 1980s, 
programmable logic was introduced in the products. Today’s autonomous machines 
represent a continuum of that development. They are highly sophisticated, but the fun-
damentals of business have remained the same in comparison with digitalization in the 
media business. A popular claim is that digitalization has a marginal impact on capital 
intensive industries. Increasing the understanding of this claim was the personal inspi-
ration behind this dissertation, which is also relevant in determining whether there is a 
need for the next transformation of that former aircraft factory.  
The Internet of Things, Industrial Internet, and Big Data are all examples within the 
digitalization domain. They have all appeared in recent years in the Gartner’s hype 
curve (LeHong et al., 2014). McKinsey Global Institute (Manyika et al., 2013) published 
a research report in which 12 disruptive technologies in order of their estimated poten-
tial economic impact by year 2025 were listed. The first six are relevant to this disserta-
tion. General Electric (GE), which is considered the father of the Industrial Internet con-
cept, described the fundamental logic for a machine builder in their white paper (Evans 
and Annunziata, 2012). In table 1 on page four, and example is used in which it is es-
timated that the value of 1 % fuel savings in commercial aviation would amount to $30 
billion in savings over 15 years. This could be achieved using the Industrial Internet, 
and the benefit could be shared between the developers and the users. 
These data suggest that digitalization would be highly relevant for all machine-builders, 
but it does not necessarily indicate industrial disruption. For many companies, the main 
digitalization agenda is related to the growth opportunity that it offers; however, there 
are ample disruption examples from other industries, such as the management beliefs 
of Kodak in films vs. digital photography (Lucas and Goh, 2009), IBM as an example of 
surviving disruption through transformation (Gerstner, 2002), and Amazon disrupting 
bookstore businesses with digitally enabled customer insight and superior logistics 
(Kimble and Bourdon, 2013). Every industry has its special characteristics and it also 
easy to state these examples are not applicable to one’s own industry. To better un-
derstand the discussions that took place in management in the industries that have 
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experienced digital disruption, senior executives from three industries who were insid-
ers in the digitalization discussion before the disruption took place in their respective 
industries (media, fine paper, and retail) were interviewed. 
An Editor-In-Chief of a large newspaper explained the media’s experience with digitali-
zation. In the early 1990s, newspapers were “ready”: printing was effective, distribution 
was in order, readers were satisfied with the content, and owners received good re-
turns on their investments. At the same time, local language was protecting national 
newspapers from international competition, and the domestic market was stable be-
tween the national leaders and regional newspapers. The production process was the 
first to be digitalized. Then digitalization emerged in the form of internet, emails, mobile 
phones, and laptops, but they were tools used to complete the same processes as be-
fore. The new millennium experienced a change driven by owners’ ambitions and the 
dot.com era. Several visionary experiments were performed, but they were buried at 
the same time as dot.com had its crash landing. Google and YouTube were identified 
as potential future competitors but were underestimated, partly due to several parallel 
changes at the time and partly due to earlier failed experiments that might have been 
premature. The disruption caused by digitalization also occurred during a low cycle, so 
the focus was on cutting costs. There was also considerable natural inertia, as the ma-
jority of the assets and personnel were in printing and distribution. Incumbents were not 
able to translate the experiments to the next level, which was eventually done by play-
ers outside of the industry, such as Google and Facebook; however, this has also 
pushed the surviving incumbents toward digitalization maturity that surpasses most 
other industries. 
Electronic mail did not create a “paperless office,” a slogan from more than 15 years 
ago, which could be the reason paper companies did not experience the magnitude of 
digitalization in their industry. A retired executive from a large Finnish wood processing 
company stated that the impact on paper demand was underestimated simply because 
improvements in old strategies still paid off, which in practice referred to investments in 
faster machines or shutting older machines down. The weak signals of digitalization 
existed but they were more apparent to colleagues whose business was not dependent 
on the fine paper. In hindsight, it is obvious that investments in new raw material-based 
products would have been a good option. This scenario was available, but it was shad-
owed by the old paradigm. The focus has now shifted, but the lead times for success 
are lengthy. 
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The retail example is analogical. Currently, shops and department stores are in the 
midst of closing; however, many of these stores were built when e-commerce was al-
ready changing consumer habits. A former retail executive admitted that this situation 
was foreseeable over 10 years ago. The impact of digital development was acknowl-
edged, and there were several experiments using digital technologies that had been 
conducted; however, as previously mentioned, the magnitude of the impact was under-
estimated. The root cause for the underestimation was the same as in media: digitali-
zation was predominantly operating under the old paradigm. In retail, this meant that 
Big Data was utilized to optimize the supply chain or that information was used for bar-
gaining with suppliers. To a lesser degree, it was used for improving marketing com-
munication with customers, recognizing changing consumer behaviors, and innovating 
business models. 
Practitioners have acknowledged the potential of digitalization. A growing number of 
digital strategies have been implemented in firms, and experiments have been initiated. 
There is a justified assumption that digitalization also has an impact on firms’ compe-
tencies. Old competencies change or disappear by automation, which is both a mana-
gerial and a societal issue. At the same time, the need for new types of competencies 
has emerged. A study by Oxford University (Frey and Osborne, 2013) has suggested 
that the next wave of computerization will impact also knowledge work. Also new ways 
of working emerge in startup companies. This is one reason that even large multina-
tional companies have begun to use learnings from startups, which is evident in GE’s 
CEO Jeffrey Immelt’s explanation for hiring 1,000 people from Silicon Valley: 
“If you give them the room and pick the right idea, you can hire great people with 
a great mission and you can change a company.”1 
 Research questions 1.2
This dissertation is based on an assumption that digitalization will change some of the 
fundamentals regarding the way that machine-builders create value during the next 10 
years. The potential changes in paradigms are assumed to be systemic, but to obtain 
theoretical and empiric evidence, the research question was divided into sections. The 
                                               
1
 GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt in The World Energy Innovation Forum, Pando Daily 15.5.2014 
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objects of the impact are categorized as products, services, operations, and business 
models. The factors that enable the potential impact are called drivers, and they can be 
digital technologies or economic/ strategic management concepts that utilize opportuni-
ties that digital technologies enable. The inquiry focused on disruptive impacts, which 
can be referred to as paradigm changes or as changing the rules regarding how value 
is created in an industry. It is an important distinction from quantum leaps in market 
positions, which is a normal objective of major R&D projects of the firms.  For most 
industries, the largest share of development money is invested in continuous improve-
ment because in tough competition keeping the current market position requires al-
ready a lot of effort.  
Machine-builders are called “actors” that use the technology of several domains and 
that use engineering disciplines to integrate those technologies to solve the needs of its 
customers, which in this dissertation are called “users.” Firms that supply digital tech-
nologies that can be products or services are called “enablers.” Actors might have their 
own core technology and might make multiple choices regarding how they compete 
within the market they have selected. A typical choice for actors involves which part of 
the value chain it opts to have own resources. To narrow down the empirical portion of 
this dissertation, the actor must have following characteristics: 
 The solution of the actor is a long-term investment for the users regardless of 
whether it is accounted for on the balance sheet or considered a cost item in 
the profit and loss statement 
 The actor operates in a market in which there is a global supply and demand 
 The solution of the actor in the user process is critical and consequently up-
time is critical 
 The machines have already autonomous versions or those will likely be avail-
able within the next 10 years 
The last “in scope” criteria is particularly important, as the autonomous vehicles utilize 
various types of digital technologies. Autonomous operation is also quite different for 
users, as the important part of the users’ value has been dependent on the actions of 
an operator (often a driver). It is also a change to the development paradigm of the 
machines for the actor. An important part of machine behaviour data has been based 
on drivers’ experiences. Autonomous machines create data that is measurable. It is 
often real-time data, and it can be perceived as factual. This type of data is a new 
source of input that the actor can use when developing new products, services, opera-
tions, and business models. Autonomous operations have though existed for decades 
in the process industry. 
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Finally, the value is captured by the user. In an industrial context, the user can be a 
power station, a chemical plant, or a service provider. The empirical portion of this dis-
sertation assumed that users are global container handling operators at ports. A port 
operator uses systems, machines, and services to serve its customers, which include 
shipping lines at sea and trucking and railroad companies on land.  
The primary assumption is: 
Digitalization is a major systemic enabler for future competitive ad-
vantages of the machine-building industry, and in some phase of the val-
ue creation, it is or will be disruptive within the next 10 years. 
The research questions are: 
Which drivers enabled by digitalization accelerate or inhibit disruption in a 
machine-building industry that serves global container handling? 
Do the enablers, actors and users have different views on the drivers or 
sub-drivers that either accelerate or inhibit the disruptive development? 
How are disruptive drivers related to each other in a machine-building in-
dustry that serves global container handling? 
The answers to these questions will provide support for decision-makers regarding 
their current strategic choices and allocation of resources. Ultimately, the benefit mate-
rializes in better value creation or in extreme disruption with a higher likelihood to stay 
in business or to lead the change. 
 Structure of the dissertation 1.3
Chapter two describes the theoretical foundation for the empirical research. The re-
search question is considered from three perspectives. Industry evolution, disruption, 
and convergence address the question from an external viewpoint. Firms take actions 
in businesses, and the strategic decisions are usually made by management. There-
fore, the second perspective of the theories is derived from economics and strategic 
management. The characteristics of digitalization might explain some of the disruption 
potential. Digitalization has also triggered new strategic concepts, such as platforms, 
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and thus the third perspective of the theories involves digitalization. The inquiry fo-
cused on systemic changes, which resulted in a rather wide theoretical range 
The third chapter presents the research methodology. Mixed methods were utilized, 
and the primary method used is the Delphi technique, which was triangulated by a sur-
vey and three case descriptions. Findings from thematic Delphi round one served as 
input for Delphi round two. They were also used to fine-tune the survey and case de-
sign. The survey was also used to expand the coverage of the Delphi interviews.  
The results are presented in chapter four so that each method forms an individual sec-
tion. The chapter begins with a short description of the container handling industry to 
provide a background for the interpretation of the results. The discussion and conclu-
sions combine qualitative (Delphi interviews and cases) and quantitative (survey) re-
sults in chapter five. Also the validity and reliability is reviewed in this chapter.  The 
chapter concludes by summarizing key contributions and suggestions for future re-
search avenues. The structure of the dissertation is described as a process in Figure 1. 
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2 Theoretical foundations 
The inquiry involved investigating potential industrial disruption, its drivers, and its in-
hibitors. A general assumption regarding disruption in business is that somehow the 
rules regarding how value is created change. More generically, it is similar to a para-
digm change. 
Thomas Kuhn (1996) defined the usage of a paradigm: 
On the other hand, ‘paradigm’ stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values 
and techniques, and so on shared by the members of given community. On the 
other hand, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puz-
zle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules 
as a basis for the remaining puzzles of normal science. 
A new innovation often acts as a catalyst in this type of a change. In this dissertation, 
the catalysts that were studied were related to digital technologies. Bower and Chris-
tensen (1995) characterized technologies that can be disruptive by stating: 
The technological changes that damage established companies are not usually 
radically new or difficult from a technological point of view. They do, however, 
have two important characteristics: First, they typically present a different pack-
age of performance attributes—ones that, at least at the outset, are not valued by 
existing customers. Second, the performance attributes that existing customers 
do value improve at such rapid rate that the new technology can later invade 
those established markets. 
The first set of theories focuses on how industries evolve. In that evolution, changes 
initiated by businesses largely depend on decisions made by a firm’s management. 
Therefore, the second set of theories involved both strategic management and theories 
that focus on managers as part of the organizations of those firms. To understand the 
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potential of digitalization as well as the drivers and inhibitors, the chosen digital tech-
nologies were reviewed from a systemic perspective. There is an assumption that digi-
tal technologies offer a wide range of systemic concepts that impact both the external 
business environment and the internal processes and capabilities of firms. This led to a 
situation in which the three main theory areas consisted of a large number of individual 
perspectives. To keep the perspectives manageable, there was an attempt to focus on 
the seminal theories of each perspective; the judgement on selection was either based 
on academic citations or research indicating major usage by the practitioners. Chapter 
two concludes by merging the three sets of reviewed theory areas with the framework. 
 Industry evolution 2.1
This dissertation focuses on a machine-building industry that serves global ports and 
terminal customers, and therefore this sub-chapter begins with the perspectives of es-
tablished industries. Thereafter, theories that explain how industries evolve are re-
viewed. Evolution can be either incremental or radical. Particular interest is paid to the 
players, components, and mechanisms that are involved in industry dynamics.  
 
2.1.1 Industry definition 
The broad definition of an industry, “a particular form of branch of economic or com-
mercial activity,”2 can lead to interpretations based on the type of activity, such as a 
service industry, or the product, such as the automobile industry. Established industries 
are already categorized. The most practical categories can be found by viewing lists of 
classified industries from federations or by examining companies that are grouped un-
der different industries based on the stock exchange. The United States has a pivotal 
position in trading stocks or other financial instruments of companies. The U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission is the governing authority, and it uses SIC codes 
(Standard Industrial Classification) when categorizing companies by industries.3 SIC 
coding is relatively fine-tuned; however, the category to which the focus of this disserta-
                                               
2
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/industry, retrieved 6.6.2016 
3
 http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm, retrieved 6.6.2016 
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tion belongs (3510 = construction, mining & materials handling machinery & equipment) 
is not exhaustive when considering the needs of users. One way to solve this issue is 
moving towards more aggregate grouping and using the NAISC (North American In-
dustrial Classifications System) in which the industry would be classified into the group 
of 31-334, which is manufacturing. This would include the needs of the user but would 
also include several products that are not relevant. Despite the weaknesses of both the 
SIC and the NAISC, similar categories offer suitable platforms for research within the 
industry or between industries, especially if statistical methods or time series are ap-
plied. The same longevity that simplifies the trend analysis might create inertia that 
delays the renewal. This could be explained by the multiple stakeholders that have 
emerged based on classifications, such as financial analysts, standardization organiza-
tions, trade associations, employee organizations, labor unions, conferences, and trade 
magazines. The convergence of industries blurs the boundaries between old industries 
and emerging new industries.  
Some components appear to be characteristics in the theory of industry. Components 
such as supply, demand, price, and competition are rooted in the very principles of 
economic theories, even if the details differ depending on which economical system 
they represent. The division of labor (Smith, 2014) was originally based not only on 
specialization but also on the high amount of the value being in a manual work in the 
industrial production. The evolution of services, and later, knowledge-based services, 
has brought several intangible assets to complement the original factors of production: 
labor, raw materials, and capital. Products and services fulfill needs in the market, but 
they do have substitutes. Substitutes can be different products, methods, or services 
that fulfill the same need, which often is the explicit object of innovation. Differentiation 
is a smaller degree of substitution that is also important in avoiding price competition 
(Conner, 1991). One of the main conclusions in her article (Conner, 1991), which com-
pared five schools of industrial organization economics, was the importance of unique 
capabilities, which are quite different when considering labor to be a homogenous fac-
tor of production. The impact of a non-economic environment on economic develop-
ment has been discussed since the infancy of the economics field. Schumpeter (2012) 
highlighted also that it is wrong to simplify economic development by decoupling it from 
the surrounding societal development. 
                                               
4
 http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch, retrieved 6.6.2016 
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One of the most often cited modern theories used to explain industry dynamics is Mi-
chael Porter’s Five Forces (1979). The supply (bargaining power of suppliers) and de-
mand (bargaining power of customers) form the core of the model. Substitutes in eco-
nomics have been translated as a threat of new entrants or a threat of new products 
and services. These forces impact the dynamics that already exist between the current 
competitors of a particular industry. 
The Schumpeter’s (2012) societal view of in economic development was not included 
in the Five Forces. Thomas Freeman’s (2015) stakeholder model paved the way for 
today’s sustainability as an explicit form of business practice. The list of stakeholders is 
extensive: customers, competitors, media, employees, special interest groups, envi-
ronmentalists, suppliers, governments, local community organizations, owners, and 
consumer advocates. As an extension to Porter’s (1979) Five Forces, Freeman (2015) 
suggested that adding stakeholders as a sixth force would complement the model. 
Laplume et al. (2008) conducted an extensive literature research based on 179 articles 
between 1984 and 2007 and concluded that past stakeholder research was divided into 
five categories: Identification and Salience, Stakeholder Actions/Response, Firm Ac-
tions/Response, Firm Performance, and Theory Debates. The Identification and Sali-
ence group was closest to the industry definition, and there were 19 theoretical and 13 
empirical articles during the period examined. Mitchell et al. (1997) studied the typology 
and salience of the stakeholder theory for the management of a firm and determined 
that stakeholders must possess power, legitimacy, and urgency, and the strength of the 
impact depends on the number of attributes that are simultaneously present. In both 
papers, the view of stakeholders is firm-centric, and they do not capture the stakehold-
er role as a source of potential industrial disruption. The same pattern is evident in arti-
cles at large; searching “Stakeholder” in Web of Science (6.6.2016) provides 129290 
results, “Stakeholder, Industry” provides 14795 results, and “Stakeholder, Industry, 
Disruption” only provides 43 results. 
The Schumpeterian (2012) view was also present in the PEST (Political, Economic, 
Social, and Technological) model (Aguilar, 1967). It is firm-centric and was not de-
signed as a tool to diagnose industrial disruption, but it describes the factors that ac-
cording to Aguilar (1967), form sources of external strategic information that top man-
agement must understand for strategic planning. The PEST model has also got deriva-
tives when scholars have added e.g. legal, environmental, or ethical factors to the orig-
inal model. The limitations of PEST and its derivatives were discussed by Burt et al. 
(2006) in the context of scenario planning. The paper emphasized that the business 
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environment is also an outcome of management thinking. In addition, it suggested that 
the their scenario methodology contains a process of sense making that can identify 
discontinuities in the environment better than applying the static PEST model (Burt et 
al., 2006).  
 
2.1.2 Industry evolution 
Emergence suggests that something new is being created; evolution is normally ac-
companied by development, which is a continuum of something that already exists. 
Disruption refers to discontinuity in development, whereas convergence is a special 
case, as the mechanism of disruption relates to a merger of two or more existing phe-
nomena. Innovations based on digital technologies can most likely be a catalyst in all of 
the four above mentioned forms of industrial evolution.    
The question of emergence is existential; what was there before the industry was born? 
In the same way, scientific discipline industries can be formed by allowing a subset of 
existing industry to form its own industry. Logically, one of the contributors is new 
knowledge, or innovation. If a new medicine is invented, the extent of the application 
required to form a new subindustry from more generic pharmaceuticals is a matter of 
definition. It is unlikely that a firm’s innovation activity is targeted to form new industries; 
rather, the aim is most likely to satisfy the new or existing needs of the market. Aber-
nathy and Utterback (1978) discussed the importance of making a distinction between 
evolutionary and radical innovation. The distinction cannot exclude the ex-ante incre-
mental activity that yields an unplanned radical impact as a side effect.  
Although the Five Forces (Porter, 1979) can explain industry disruption, the model was 
developed at a time when the physical value chain held more importance. Porter (1979) 
also highlighted strategy formation based on the understanding of the industry evolu-
tion provided by the model. Later the model has been extensively used as a tool for 
owners to make portfolio decisions regarding where to invest and divest in industries. 
For these reasons, the Five Forces (Porter, 1979) is viewed as a model that explains 
both incremental and radical evolution within an industry, but it is not viewed by default 
as a model explaining the change for the fundamental rules of value creation. The axis 
of value chain vs. external threats poses the first question of whether there is a logical 
difference between the two regarding their impacts on industry evolution. In established 
industries, the players in the direct value chain might have a long history and 
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knowledge of each other, which would suggest more towards incremental evolution. 
The likelihood and impact of external threats is also dependent on the entry barriers of 
the industry. According to Porter (1979), the threat of industry includes six major entry 
barriers: economies of scale, product differentiation, capital requirement, cost disad-
vantages independent of size, access to distribution channels, and government policy. 
Physical production played an important role when the Five Forces was introduced. 
Digitalization introduces characteristics that do not fit well into the Five Forces. If the 
physical product can be decoupled from the value creation, the model might become 
weaker. Digital products and services behave differently than physical products also 
with the entry barriers having global scale, real-time product differentiation, low capital, 
and virtual distribution. Porter (1979) considered the experience curve to be a major 
factor related to the cost disadvantages, which is an important paradigm in several in-
dustries. Porter concluded that the new entrant might be more cost effective than the 
experienced competitor when it can utilize a new technology, which is an important 
notion in digitalization. Government policies in virtual products and services are related 
e.g. to data security and ownership. Afuah and Utterback (1997) combined the view of 
the Five Forces and the phases of evolution (fluid, transitional, specific, and disconti-
nuity) and argued that the Five Forces without the context of an evolutionary phase 
provides a static view of industry development. 
There are also perspectives that consider evolution from a temporal perspective. The 
diffusion of innovation describes the process of the adaptation of innovations by cus-
tomers. Rogers (2003) called the phases Innovators, Early Adopters, Early Majority, 
Late Majority, and Laggards. In his theory (Rogers, 2003), the size of the population 
forms a curve that is similar to normal distribution. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) 
concluded that there is a sequence of innovation in which the focus moves from prod-
uct innovation to process innovation after the rate of innovation of the product has de-
clined. The S-Curve is another focal theory that explains the temporality of industry 
evolution. Based on the product perspective Foster (1986) suggests that the lifecycle of 
a product follows the S-curve where the development is slow in the beginning and in 
the end but fast during the time when the product has passed the introduction. The 
theory explains that development in the next S-curve is driven by new technology 
and/or innovation. The S-curve theory does not implicitly affirm whether the change 
affects the dynamics only inside of the existing industry or whether it also applies to 
industrial disruption. Klepper (1997) argued that there are a number of industries in 
which evolution does not follow the phases of the product lifecycle theories. 
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There are also other perspectives of industry evolution. From the supply perspective, 
evolution is often accompanied by scientific discoveries and innovation, whereas mar-
ket-based evolution suggests an unsatisfied or hidden demand. Malerba (2007) divided 
the challenges in industry evolution into demand, knowledge, networks, and co-
evolution. He also viewed the evolutionary process as industry-specific. Malerba et al. 
(2007) coupled experimental users and demand-driven industry dynamics, and con-
cluded that the evolution of the suppliers of new technology is initially dependent on 
experimental users and an unsatisfied niche market.  
One of Robertson’s (1967) four conclusions was that innovation can be categorized 
depending on the strength of its impact on established patterns. McGahan (2000) sep-
arated industry evolution into non-architectural and architectural, and she divided non-
architectural into Receptive and Blockbuster categories and architectural into Radical 
Organic and Intermediating categories. She concluded that the Receptive category is 
more stable with a focus on continuous improvement and e.g. distribution, transporta-
tion, and retail would be in that category (McGahan, 2000). The examples are most 
likely not static, and McGahan (2000) pointed out that retail was an example of Recep-
tive evolution only before the Web. The Blockbuster category involves large upfront 
risks prior to success. A characteristic of both architectural categories is the first mover 
advantage, which Radical Organic receives from product and process innovation and 
Intermediating receives from innovation related to customers and suppliers. 
Low and Abrahamson (1997) added an entrepreneurial view to industry evolution. The 
view involves the development phases of the industry in an organizational context. The 
phases are Movements (emerging industries), Bandwagons (growth industries), and 
Clones (matured industries). The Movement phase is characterized by a need for legit-
imacy, the entrepreneur’s ties to several non-overlapping networks, social factors in 
stakeholder motivation, and innovative strategy. The Bandwagon phase rapidly attracts 
new competitors, which shifts the focus to resource acquisition. The Clone phase is 
characterized by intense competition, and evolution is driven by efficiency of execution.  
Disruption in industry evolution implies discontinuity which in business often is attached 
to how value is created. Many of the earlier evolution theories contain aspects that can 
lead to disruption, but they are not easy to foresee ex-ante; however, disruption seems 
to be a phenomenon that is an integral part of an economic system. Schumpeter (2008) 
argued that capitalism can never be stationary and that Creative Destruction is the fun-
damental engine that destroys existing economic structures by periodically replacing 
them with new ones. 
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Dosi (1982) introduced a theory that argues that demand alone cannot explain industry 
discontinuities and that there are also technological paradigms that function similarly to 
scientific paradigms. He argued that trajectories are the result of market or technology-
based innovations, whereas discontinuities are a result of a new paradigm that also 
considers society at large in addition to the market and technology. This view is similar 
to Schumpeter’s (2008) view. Tunzelmann et al. (2008) reviewed technological para-
digms, and 26 years later, their biometric study showed that Dosi’s (1982) argument 
had evolved into a focal theory on technological paradigms. They also claimed that 
Dosi’s (1982) theory bridged technology-specific knowledge and firm-specific capabili-
ties. 
Prescott et al. (2014) defined Industry Convergence as “the blurring of industry bound-
aries that creates competition among firms, which did not compete with another previ-
ously.” Several convergence articles are related to the ICT industry. Lee et al. (2010) 
argued that in advanced countries, the competitive advantage in new economies is 
highly multidisciplinary and includes scale, scope, expertise, and convergence. They 
constructed a framework in which the evolution of convergence and organizational in-
novation had six levels: Product->Functional->Organizational->Technology->Industry-
>Bio-artificial. Hacklin et al. (2010) called the convergence phases as knowledge, 
technological, applicational, and industrial phases. 
There have been several attempts to design a model that can foresee potential con-
vergence. Fai and Tunzelmann (2001) stated that growing complexity based on patents 
drives the flow of knowledge from one industry to another and consequently enables 
convergence. Curran et al. (2010) analyzed chemicals, pharmaceuticals, personal care 
products, and food and agriculture and concluded that a patent analysis can provide 
indications of emerging convergence. 
Important contributors to convergence include knowledge flow, competence develop-
ment, and enabling networks. Srinivasan et al. (2007) concluded that vicarious learning 
is an important contributor for converging markets by analyzing the data of digital pho-
tography development. Lei (2000) argued that industry convergence places significant 
pressure on companies’ core competencies as a competitive advantage and that com-
panies should be more alert regarding the development of adjacent industries. The 
importance of networks was studied by Lee (2007), and he used data from the telecom 
industry. The framework is shown in Figure 2. His conclusion was that the quality, 
quantity, and diversity of the information from networks do contribute to timing and rap-
id entry into the market. 
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Figure 2. Network resources, mechanism, and expected relationships (Lee, 2007)  
 
The European Union called the convergence of telecommunication, information media, 
and electronics as TIME industries5. Hacklin et al. (2013) argued that drivers for the 
TIME industry are related to the advancement of technology, open architectures and 
standards, policy and regulatory reforms, and changes in end-user demands. The view 
is slightly different according to an earlier article by Gambardella and Torrisi (1998), 
who studied the electronics industry and concluded that technological convergence 
does not necessarily imply market convergence, partly due to the large amount of in-
dustry or product-specific assets of the existing actors. The difference in these views 
might be explained by the increasing role of intangible assets that can currently be 
shared. Benner and Ranganathan (2013) also investigated the telecom industry and 
studied investors’ beliefs and analysts’ reactions regarding convergence using data 
from VOIP technology. Their conclusion was that divergence works more positively 
with growth-driven investors than margin-driven investors. The finding might indicate 
inertia in convergence if the investor community behind the potential converging indus-
try is margin-driven. Rao et al. (2006) examined the same industry from a different per-
spective when they studied the fusion of several disruptive technologies and used 
Skype as a specific case. They concluded that new business models play an integral 
role in technology fusion based on disruptive convergence. 
                                               
5
 http://www. europarl.europa.eu/Jobs of the future require multi-skilling, retrieved 6.6.2016 
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2.1.3 Disruptive vs. sustaining change 
The heading reflects the earlier viewpoints of evolutionary vs. radical (Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978) innovation or development targeting a current S-curve or a shift to the 
next S-curve (Foster, 1987). Christensen’s (2011) book, Innovator’s Dilemma, has 
gained vast popularity among practitioners, and it is often referred to when incumbents 
discuss the potential impact of digitalization. Schumpeter (2008) and Dosi (1982) dis-
cussed industrial disruption, paradigm changes, and discontinuities, whereas disruption 
alone more often implies radical changes in product-based market positions in busi-
ness. This does not exclude a pattern that leads to the disruption of industries. Due to 
its merits in day-to-day management practices, this sub-chapter specifically examines 
the degree of radicalness using Christensen’s (2011) framework. 
The daily activities involved in operating a company and investing in development to 
maintain a historical competitive advantage requires a significant amount of time and 
effort from management. The fact that the investment pays off might divert manage-
ment’s focus away from activities that target disruptive and riskier opportunities. Chris-
tensen's (2011) Innovator’s Dilemma has gained vast popularity due to its fundamental 
argument: doing the right thing might still push you out of business. The fact that the 
theory is gaining more popularity now than 20 years ago could imply that there are a 
growing number of issues for which the “right thing” has changed; based on this disser-
tation, the change would be enabled by digitalization. The two core elements of his 
theory are characterized as follows: 
“Sustaining technologies have in common that they improve the performance 
of established products along the dimensions of performance that mainstream 
customers in major markets have historically valued.” 
“Disruptive technologies bring to market a very different value proposition than 
had been available previously and underperform established products in main-
stream markets but they have other features a few fringe (and generally new) 
customers value.” 
Christensen’s framework was based on case research from several industries, i.e., 
computer disks, steel, and excavators. The cases had a commonality that the good 
companies provided supplied based on a need expressed by customers, which led to 
performance oversupply (more features that customers needed). In these cases, the 
disruption was based on a technology that was simpler, less expensive, and reliable. 
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The core elements of his theory are shown in Figure 3, which also illustrates that over 
time, disruptive technology addresses the needs of the high-end market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of sustaining and disruptive technological change (Christensen, 2011) 
 
The low-end market customers are not necessarily the same what Rogers (2003) re-
ferred to Innovators, or experimental users, as defined by Malerba et al. (2007). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) developed a framework that examined the potential failure 
of incumbents using a concept called Architectural Innovation, which refers to changing 
the linkages between the product concept and its core components. If the link remains 
unchanged while the concept is reinforced it is called Incremental Innovation, whereas 
a discontinuity in the concept refers to Modular Innovation. Changing the link and rein-
forcing the concept is referred to Architectural Innovation and if there is a discontinuity 
it would imply Radical Innovation. Henderson and Clark (1990) suggest that “Architec-
tural Innovations destroy the usefulness of architectural knowledge of established 
firms.”, whereas Radical Innovation forms a new Dominant Design. Utterback and Ab-
ernathy (1975), who developed the concept of Dominant Design, asserted that there is 
a time period in a given industry when a firm can apply a dominant competitive strategy 
based on innovative product design.   
Danneels (2004) discussed the definition of Christensen’s Disruptive Technology, its 
assumptions, and its core conclusions. The overall conclusion was that the theory is 
useful but overly simplistic, and consequently, most of conclusions involved the need 
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for future research avenues. Danneels (2004) pointed out unanswered aspects of the 
theory, such as: 
 When does technology become disruptive? 
 Can ex-ante predictions for firm’s success be made based on theory? 
 Are there other factors in addition to the incumbents that would explain the dis-
ruptive impact better? 
 Is there a way to model the customer orientation’s role in disruptive technology? 
 Is separate activity in disruptive technologies the only successful way to ad-
dress the issue? 
Danneels (2004) also argued that the customer-related critique of the theory is not jus-
tified as Christensen’s view was not against customer orientation. Tellis (2006) followed 
a similar process in examining the core elements of Christensen’s theory and reached 
a conclusion that is similar to Danneels’ conclusion, which is that the theory has be-
come too generic considering the quantity of data it is based on. Tellis (2006) suggest-
ed two specific conclusions: 
1. The same problem as with Disruptive Technology occurs in the S-Curve techno-
logical evolution. 
2. The underlying explanation of visionary leadership is not considered.  
Markides’ (2006) critique of Disruptive Technology was that it was too technology-
driven and did not take into account business model innovations, which have different 
characteristics.  Sood and Tellis (2011) argued that disruptive attacks can occur in both 
low-end and high-end markets and that incumbents introduce disruptions as often as 
entrants, which are not always less expensive, as Christensen (2011) suggested. 
Based on the model that Sood and Tellis (2011) applied to four markets (external light-
ing, desktop printers, data transfer, and analgesics), they reached three conclusions: 
1. Disruption takes place from multiple directions. 
2. Disruptors do not always introduce disruptive technology. 
3. Disruptive technologies do not always follow the S-Curve; the development can 
be sporadic. 
A recent critique by Bergek et al. (2013) challenged both current sources of incumbent 
targeted disruptions, competence (technology) and demand (market), based on case 
studies on electric cars and gas turbines. They stated that current industries possess 
more inertia than current theories suggest. They explicitly argued that Creative Accu-
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mulation, a term they used for the concept, requires the simultaneous and rapid fine-
tuning of existing technology, the acquisition of new technologies, and the integration of 
those technologies into superior products and solutions. Indirectly, this would mean 
that incumbents have better chances to be disruptors than Christensen (2011) sug-
gests, and that sometimes being disrupted might be better explained by the poor im-
plementation by the incumbents than by the Disruptive Technologies theory. 
The question of the predictability of Disruptive Technologies was included in Christen-
sen’s critique, and there are number of articles that address this question. Linton (2002) 
modeled the factors that have an impact on whether an innovation is disruptive and 
used MEMS (Microelectromechanical systems) as a reference, as it has numerous 
applications and high anticipated growth rates (lowest 60 % over a 6-year period) with 
a high variance (highest 19900 %). He discussed learning curves, changes in market 
size, repurchasing, supply constraints, replacement technology, and complementary 
products. Based on his quantitative model, he argued that forecasting potential disrup-
tive innovations requires each market to be analyzed independently before reaching a 
conclusion. Linton (2002) also asserted that the inhibitors of supply and demand must 
be understood to improve the quality of the forecast. Husig et al. (2005) tested Chris-
tensen’s (2011) concept in making ex-ante predictions on the disruptiveness of W-LAN 
technology. They concluded that W-LAN would not be disruptive and that the method-
ology is useful for practitioners because it offers a continuous and systematic way of 
following the progress of potentially disruptive technologies. Based on their literature 
review, Govindrajan and Kopalle (2006) argued that technology-based disruption mod-
els are not effective in making ex-ante predictions for potential disruptive technologies 
but that they provide good frameworks for ex-ante predictions regarding which type of 
firms could develop disruptive technologies.   
Technology strategies and technology roadmaps have been used by management for 
future technologies as part of the overall strategy of firms; however, the principle ques-
tion regarding whether or not disruptive technologies can be predicted remains. Walsh 
(2004) combined the road mapping tool and disruptiveness, and MEMS was used as a 
reference technology. Figure 4 presents the components of the factors needed for 
roadmaps. 
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Figure 4. Multitier visual output of a technology roadmap (Walsh, 2004) 
The road map illustrates a systematic process based on a framework comprised of 
existing theories, expert judgment, and data. The process provided 15 conclusions, 
and the framework and process were argued to be useful (Walsh, 2004). The frame-
work includes links between components and systems that were slightly different than 
those presented for Architectural Innovation by Henderson and Clark (1990). Walsh 
(2004) highlighted the need for a wide coverage of stakeholders in the process to avoid 
entrapment by Sustaining Technologies. Kostoff et al. (2004) presented similar findings, 
but their view was more process-oriented and also included stakeholder participation 
and workshop procedures. They emphasized the potential offered by text mining as a 
new technology-based tool (Kostoff et al. 2004). 
The lack of competence of the incumbents in relation to Disruptive Technologies is one 
critique of Christensen’s model. Henderson and Clark (1990) suggested that Architec-
tural Innovation destroys the existing knowledge of incumbents. Danneels (2004) dis-
cussed the issue indirectly when investigating the need for separate organizations for 
Disruptive Technologies. Henderson (2006) argued that incumbents’ weaknesses re-
garding disruption are not only explained by cognitive failures of top management but 
also by a lack of technological and market-related competencies. Garrison (2009) also 
analyzed the competence perspective of Disruptive Technologies. He concluded that a 
response capability is critical in the early adaptation of Disruptive Technologies and 
that smaller firms tend to do this better. Garrison (2009) related this response capability 
with the technologically opportunistic business culture of a firm. 
Christensen has extended the original theory several times since 1997, and in his pa-
per (Christensen et al.) published in 2002, he pointed out that core requirements in 
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applying the theory are the ability to make the distinction between Sustained and Dis-
ruptive technologies or ideas as well as to manage them differently. One of the Chris-
tensen original claim (2011) for incumbents’ weakness to detect disruptive business 
ideas is that they appear to be marginal for the faith of the company in the early stage. 
Christensen et al. (2002) also discussed the fundamental aspect of repeatability, which 
would require a separate process for disruptive ideas, as they are difficult to accom-
plish. They explained that one of the few companies that has provided an array of dis-
ruptive innovations is Sony. Wessel and Christensen’s (2012) recent article included 
business models in the disruption discussion, which addressed prior criticism. They 
also concluded that inertia limits disruption and outlined five barriers: 
 Conservative customers 
 Difficult technological implementation 
 Lack of proper ecosystems 
 Immaturity of the technology 
 An unchangeable current industry cost structure 
Wessel and Christensen (2012) posited that the advantage of disruptive innovations 
must be realistic, rather than trying to break inertia that is based on natural reasons, 
such as ships carrying heavier cargo than planes. 
 Economy, strategy formation and top management teams 2.2
Stakeholders, and other factors that form the external environment of a firm, have been 
discussed in relation to industry evolution. In the value chain, enablers, actors, and 
users’ strategic actions also direct the course of future development. The actions are 
based on management decisions. This sub-chapter reviews the literature on strategy 
formation and top management teams. First, a few perspectives regarding the aspects 
of economics in digitalization and knowledge-based businesses are briefly presented.  
 
2.2.1 Knowledge based economy  
The fundamental factors of production—labor, raw materials, and capital—will inevita-
bly be involved in machine-building in some form. Firms in the machine-building indus-
try’s value chain also continue to maximize profits to compensate owners through divi-
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dends and to invest the remaining profits in the firm for future profits. The profit is made 
using the factors of production with innovative methods and procedures to deliver 
products and services to customers, and the price is dependent on the competition in 
the market. Digitalization allows for increasing value, which is delivered in intangible 
forms. This is a shift toward a new type of knowledge-based business. Digitalization 
allows also knowledge workers to participate in value creation independent of their lo-
cation and at least partly independent of whether they work as private entrepreneurs, in 
startup companies, or in multinational corporations. 
The World Economic Forum (2015) introduced a concept of Output Economy, that uti-
lizes smart connected devices, and as a result, enables optimization on a higher sys-
temic level, whether it involves energy saving or improved health. This also expands 
the concept of products and services. The Outcome Economy concept is illustrated in 
Figure 5. The concept was presented as a roadmap to the Industrial Internet, but it also 
reveals that the higher the development stage, the less dependent the value creation is 
on the original factors of production, except of the knowledge workers if they would be 
defined as labor in the original context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Outcome Economy concept (World Economic Forum, 2015) 
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Because an increasing amount of value in digitalization is based on processing 
knowledge, a resource-based view on economics is crucial. Conner (1991) studied the 
topic in the context of an industrial organization economy and identified five schools of 
economy: Perfect Competition, Bain, Schumpeterian, Chicago Responses, and Trans-
action Cost. By analyzing those against what was known on resource dependency, she 
concluded that: 
“Performance differentials between firms depend to significant measure on pos-
session of unique inputs and capabilities.” 
She highlighted the importance of capabilities in collaboration with Prahalad (Conner 
and Prahalad, 1996) by arguing that privately held knowledge is a focal source of the 
competitive advantage of a firm. In the digital era, both privately held resources and 
transaction-based fundamentals are challenged. Crowd concepts push the limits of 
firm-centric resources. 
The transaction economy is also challenged by a sharing economy, or open source 
movement, in which contributors might have hedonistic, intellectual, social, or other 
similar motives that cannot be explained by rational economic theories. In his book 
Managing in the Next Society, Peter Drucker (2002) emphasized cognitive science and 
posed a question to firms: how are knowledge workers attracted? A mismatch of firms’ 
values has resulted in some knowledge workers remaining independent and applying 
their own values in open networks, which was the case in the Linux movement. 
Uber and Airbnb popularized the sharing economy discussion based on the financial 
benefits of asset sharing. Belk (2010) studied sharing and made a distinction between 
sharing, gift giving, and commodity exchange. He also argued that a powerful driver in 
a sharing economy is the changing attitude toward ownership. Sharing in B2B is not 
new; shipping lines have shared vessel capacity between competitors for years; how-
ever, sharing in B2B is more similar to a transaction economy, as it is based on con-
tracts that reserve capacity. For consumers, sharing seems to be driven by platform 
businesses that act as marketplaces that contain the information needed for sharing to 
be effective. Ownership issues were also examined when Bardhi and Eckhardt (2012) 
investigated sharing in the context of passenger cars in the Zipcar case. They defined 
Access Based Consumption as “transactions that can be market mediated but where 
no transfer of ownership takes place” (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012). They also conclud-
ed that market-mediated sharing eliminates the social reciprocity aspect. John (2013) 
analyzed the rise of sharing Web 2.0 not only from an economics viewpoint but also 
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based on its societal impact. Sharing ideas, which is enabled by information networks, 
is also a growing phenomenon. The platforms are reviewed in sub-chapter 2.3.1, and 
the open innovation paradigm is reviewed in sub-chapter 2.3.2.  
A final note on economics is that the division for B2B and B2C is also blurred by indus-
try convergence. Fifteen years ago, Achrol and Kotler predicted (1999) that a network 
economy would have similar consequences for B2B as it has had for B2C. 
 
2.2.2 Strategy formation 
Firms should answer the type of research questions of this dissertation as part of their 
strategy formation. Whether digitalization will enable industrial disruption should be 
determined based on that process, and whether to ignore, adapt, or become a disrup-
tor should be determined based on external opportunities and internal capabilities. 
Management typically uses explicit tools in its strategy formation, or at least post-ante it 
can likely be concluded that there was a certain type of strategy thinking utilized to 
reach conclusions and make decisions.  
The tools are often derived from particular strategic thinking or strategic schools, and 
therefore they logically reduce the perspective to that of the premises of the strategy 
tool. 
Business environment is not stable, which would imply that schools and tools are also 
to a certain degree of temporal.  The selection of tools might also impact the actual 
strategic choices. In this dissertation, the schools and tools are reviewed based on po-
tential disruption enabled by digital technologies. Value chain and process thinking, 
industry beliefs, and business models are reviewed in this context in their own sub-
chapters. 
Strategy can be analyzed from a corporate or a business perspective. Corporations 
often approach the strategy from an owner’s perspective, including visions, missions, 
values, portfolios (which businesses they are in), financial structure, performance man-
agement and organizational structures. If the corporation operates in multiple busi-
nesses, they have to design the roles between the corporate and businesses as well as 
the themes they wish to drive across businesses. Corporations must prove that they 
are more than the sum of their parts. Collis and Montgomery (1998) suggested that 
resource allocation (general vs. specialized) can be utilized to analyze this, which takes 
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into consideration the scope of the business, coordination mechanisms, control sys-
tems, and the size of the corporate office. Businesses must make choices regarding 
how they create value by serving their customers better than the competition, which 
often includes decisions on markets, customers, products, and services. In addition, 
cost vs. value, required capabilities, and numerous functional statements, such as dis-
tribution and production models (owned or outsourced), should be considered. Strategy 
is also a process that involves a varying number of participants of the organization or 
the participation of stakeholders. Minzberg and Lampel (1999) discussed the evolu-
tionary nature of the process due to learning, borrowing, and blending new with old in 
the competition in evaluating new ideas. It is also known that planning without commu-
nication and implementation does not yield the expected results. 
There are number of articles and books that have discussed the different perspectives 
or schools of strategy. Several of the schools evolved based on a theory of a scholar or 
a framework of practitioners. Minzberg et al. (1998) listed 10 strategic schools: Design, 
Planning, Positioning, Entrepreneurial, Cognitive, Learning, Power, Cultural, Environ-
ment, and Configuration. Cummins and Wilson (2003) distinguished 13 different per-
spective of strategy: Ethos, Organizing, Intention & Anticipation, Orchestrating 
Knowledge, Data and Sense-Making, Creativity, Exploration & Interconnection, Sys-
tems Thinking, Process-Power-Change, Marketing, Numbers, Decision Making, and 
Orientation & Animation. De Wit and Meyer (2005) framed strategy into Process, Con-
tent, and Context. Content includes strategic thinking, formation, and change. Näsi and 
Aunola (2002) used a framework in which strategic logic included four perspectives: 
Strategic Management and Strategic Management of Structures are administrative in 
nature, whereas Strategic Game and Strategic Leadership are situational and environ-
ment-driven.  
The 10 schools by Minzberg et al. (1998) comprise a comprehensive framework that 
combines strategic thinking and strategy formation, and it is used here as a framework 
to review respective theories. A number of strategic tools are placed inside of the 
schools and some of them are developed later than Minzberg et al. (1998) published 
their framework. 
The Design School requires understanding the external environment in relation to a 
firm’s internal capabilities, and therefore the SWOT (internal strengths and weaknesses 
and external opportunities and threats) tool is included in this school. This school also 
highlights the architectural and conceptual character rather than the form, as the name 
suggests. Humphrey (2005), one of the developers of SWOT, underlined the im-
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portance of formal planning when using the tool in his retrospective description. Minz-
berg et al. (1998) argue that the Design School has been one of the most used one by 
practitioners in strategy formation. Chandler’s assertion (1990) that structure follows 
strategy fits to the philosophy of this school. Case methodology has a strong link with 
this school as well. 
The Planning School emphasizes the formal planning process. Planning as a discipline 
is familiar in engineering or product development in which structures, hierarchies, pro-
cesses, checklists, iterations, and reviews are used daily. If top management has a 
focal role in the Design School, detailed planning implies a greater role for planners, 
and the management role shifts toward an approval role. Minzberg et al. (1998) refer 
Igor Ansoff as one of the important pioneers in this type of strategic thinking.  
The Positioning School assumes that based on analyses, an optimal strategy with ge-
neric characteristics can be chosen. BCG matrix is a prime example of that. Using the 
BCG matrix (Henderson, 1970), businesses are analyzed based on the growth of the 
market in relation to the market position, and depending on the status of the business 
in the portfolio (matrix), there is a specific optimal generic strategy available. Later Por-
ter’s (1985) generic strategies of cost focus or cost leadership and differentiation or 
differentiation focus became almost the industry standard. Ansoff’s product / market 
window (Ansoff, 1957) is however a good example of a tool that can be applied with 
logic of Design, Planning or Positioning School. In that model product or market could 
be either existing or new and the model was designed for diversification strategies. The 
analysis, market attractiveness, and choice of generic options phases comprise an 
integral part of this model, and therefore it can be argued that it belongs to this school. 
The bestseller Must-Win Battles (Killing et al., 2006) can be included here due to its 
analytical process coupled with generic advice, although it has characteristics of the 
Design School (external opportunities vs. internal capabilities). 
The Entrepreneurial School is based on visionary leadership, and according to Minz-
berg et al. (1998), it can also be defined as strategic thinking by seeing through (behind, 
above, below, beyond, ahead, and beside). They also connected this to the Schumpet-
erian (2008) view of entrepreneurialship in economics. This type of person-centric and 
intuitive strategy formation has been linked to corporate leaders, such as Jack Welsh, 
and owners of entrepreneurial companies, such as Richard Branson of Virgin and Ste-
ve Jobs of Apple. In the digital domain, Eric Ries’ Lean Startup (2011) has become an 
important handbook. The attributes of entrepreneurial management and intuition in the 
development of this handbook could place concepts such as the Minimum Viable 
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Product in the Entrepreneurial School, but Ries’ (2011) focal element of continuous 
learning would suggest that the Learning School would be an equally justified interpre-
tation. 
The Cognitive School is different from the other schools because it focuses on strate-
gists’ mental processes. The role of the Cognitive School in this dissertation is related 
to management cognition as one sub-driver that can explain the inertia or acceleration 
of drivers that cause industrial disruption. Therefore, management cognition is re-
viewed in more detail in sub-chapter 2.2.3. 
The Learning School involves the connotation of capabilities and strategy formation. 
The Core Competence of the Corporation article by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) is one 
milestone of that school. They defined Core Competencies as “collective learning in the 
organization” in integrating diverse production skills or multiple technologies as well as 
organizational value creation. This implies that resource development is a vital task of 
top management. Conner and Prahalad (1996) shared a similar view regarding re-
source dependency in a knowledge-based economy. Minzberg et al. (1998) included 
the perspective of rule breaking and ignoring industry beliefs as characteristics of the 
Learning School, although this visionary attribute could also be included in the Entre-
preneurial School. Rule breaking is mentioned in the principles of Hamel’s (1996) strat-
egy formation: “If there is any hope of industrial revolution, the creators of strategy 
must cast off industrial conventions.” The same concept was discussed in Kim and 
Mauborgne’s (2005) Blue Ocean Strategy (reconstructing market boundaries) and the 
Business Model Generation by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010). Unlike Hamel (1996), 
who emphasized resources, Kim and Mauborgne (2005) and Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) both highlighted the process. Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) developed later 
their thinking into the Business Model Canvas, which is their trademark in this decade’s 
strategy tools. 
The Power School suggests that strategy formation is a political process. Although 
there are elements of political compromises in the strategic processes of firms, perhaps 
with the exception of the Entrepreneurial School, this school emphasizes observation 
rather than a set of tools for practitioners. Due to the external compromises, the school 
is related to the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2015). Minzberg et al. (1998) discussed 
the role of strategic alliances in this school; however, it can be argued that forming alli-
ances is one strategic choice regardless of whether or not the risk of compromises in-
creases.  
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Minzberg et al. (2010) stated that the Cultural School is based on the concept that 
strategy formation is also a social process. For effective results, the cultural aspects of 
participants must be understood and considered. For competence or resource-based 
views, there is a stronger need to manage the cultural dimension as well, as discussed 
previously; however, it could be argued that managing cultural dimension is not only 
relevant in strategy formation but also in all leadership or stakeholder relations. The 
national culture poses a dimension of its own in the international business environment. 
The cultural aspect is related to this investigation in the same way that management 
cognition is related, which will be reviewed in sub-chapter 2.2.3. 
The Environmental School reduces strategy formation to a responsive role. The fun-
damental belief is that there are a number of general forces that affect strategy for-
mation; however, firms cannot influence them. Minzberg et al. (2010) listed population 
ecology as one of the main sources of strategic thinking. During the investigation of this 
dissertation, it was assumed that digitalization is a systemic phenomenon that has an 
impact on knowledge creation. If this assumption is correct, then no firm or group of 
firms could change it. As a critique to a passive response, the premise would still be 
generic enough to allow for successful strategy formation. 
The Configuration School is a temporal dimension of the schools. It presents different 
models of organization based on the premise that their use is situation-driven, which is 
similar to Chandler’s (1990) assertion. As moving from one organizational ideal to an-
other is a laborious process, Minzberg et al. (1990) presented several examples re-
garding transformation or change management for this school. Thus, in this dissertation, 
the aspects of the Configuration School are similar to management and leadership, 
which are reviewed in sub-chapter 2.2.3.  
Minzberg et al. (1990) classified their schools in two different ways. First, they classi-
fied Planning, Design, and Positioning Schools as Prescriptive Schools, and the re-
mainders were classified as Descriptive Schools. Then, they illustrated the activities 
based on publications and management attention over time. The Prescriptive Schools 
had a medium level of support due to the introduction phase in the early 1970s. The 
Planning School was popular from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s when the Position 
School gained popularity over the declining Planning School. The Descriptive Schools 
have had growth activity since their respective introductions, but the Learning and Con-
figuration Schools experienced increased growth. The Configuration School might not 
be comparable because it is considered to be a temporal hybrid of the other schools. 
Another synthesis method involves placing the schools in a matrix where the predicta-
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bility of the external environment is the y-axis, and the x-axis represents the rationality 
of the internal process. The synthesis is presented in Appendix 1, and the main conclu-
sion is that the extreme unpredictability and natural internal processes are characteris-
tics of the Cognitive and Learning Schools.  
The analysis of strategic schools by Minzberg et al. (2010) did not discuss all major 
tools used by practitioners. All schools have some type of implicit or explicit assess-
ment as part of the strategy formation, and tools such as the Key Success Factor 
based analysis and planning by Daniel (1961) or the popular Balanced Scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992), which combined customer perspectives, business objec-
tives, and development plans with financial measurement, played or still play a role. 
Also, specific frameworks for holistic strategies, such as 7S (Structure, Systems, Style, 
Staff, Skills, Strategy, and Superordinate Goals) by Waterman et al. (1980) have been 
useful without being strongly linked to a certain school, which is the case also with pur-
pose-built models, such as the Repeatable Model (Zook, Allen 2012), for exploring 
growth opportunities based on the current core of a firm. Rigby and Bilodeau (2005) 
conducted a management tool survey and found that tools are temporal and have dif-
ferent strengths and weaknesses, and they also recommended that tools be adapted to 
the situation of the firm. This would imply that the tool selection can affect the outcome 
negatively if the incorrect tool is chosen. The same study (Rigby and Bilodeau 2005) 
revealed that at the time of the research, innovation was a vital element of corporate 
success but tools for senior management were not up to par, whereas the most effec-
tive tools were available for strategic planning. 
This dissertation investigates disruption or paradigm changes in lieu of quantum leaps 
in market positions or continuous improvement. Digitalization is described as a system-
ic phenomenon. This would locate the enquiry in the place of the framework (Appendix 
1) where the external world is uncertain and complex, and the internal process is closer 
to natural than rational. Based on the framework, this would suggest closeness to the 
Learning School, and that cognitive and cultural factors should be considered. 
 
2.2.3 Top management team  
Management plays a central role in strategy formation, which was discussed in the 
previous sub-chapter, and it plays an equally important role in the implementation of 
strategies. This sub-chapter focuses on the soft perspectives that might impact strategy 
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formation and implementations, such as culture, values, and leadership, as well as 
more tangible aspects, such as structure and governance. If the assumption of com-
plexity and uncertainty is correct, strategic choices do carry more weight. Was Kodak’s 
failure to see digital photography (Lucas and Koh, 2009) linked to culture and leader-
ship, or is Christensen’s (2011) Innovator’s Dilemma in which success in sustaining 
technologies prevents incumbents from identifying emerging disruptive technologies 
connected to the mental models of management and organizations? 
Culture and values 
There are cultural aspects linked to firms as well as to the society or country to which 
the members of those firms belong. The same applies to the values of the firms’ vis-à-
vis the values of the individuals who work for those firms. Schein (2009) defined culture 
as “a pattern of shared tacit assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the way to per-
ceive, think, and feel in relations to those problems.” The practical test for the inquiry of 
disruption or paradigm change is whether a firm is risk adverse or not. Hofstede et al. 
(2010) defined culture as a formation of stacked layers in which the inner layer is val-
ues and following layers are rituals, heroes and symbols. Practices cut the stacks 
across and they are visible to external observers, but their cultural meaning is only un-
derstood by the insiders.  
It is rare that multinational corporations have monolithic cultures, as they are often 
formed by acquisitions, and thus they inherit the cultures of the acquired companies in 
addition to the variances of local cultures and customs of the countries and locations in 
which business entities operate. The influence of top management on culture is ques-
tionable. A strong wave of corporate culture took place at the same time that Japanese 
companies began to succeed globally based on quality, which was not only a result of 
methods but also of a strong corporate culture of quality. For this dissertation, the cul-
tural question is partly related to corporate comfort zones. Schein (1984) pointed out 
that anxiety reduction in corporations is a more stable phenomenon than positive prob-
lem solving with innovation, which is a fundamental part of human nature. Hofstede et 
al. (2010) identified four relevant business dimensions that had cultural differences: 
power distance, collectivism versus individualism, femininity versus masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance. The premise of the movement was that culture was stronger 
than written strategy and that there was a causal relation between corporate culture 
and performance. Barney (1986) concluded that organizational culture can be a sus-
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tainable competitive advantage if it is valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate. Corporate 
culture was harnessed in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a management tool to 
build a desirable culture. This took place at a time when globalization accelerated, and 
corporations began to increasingly deal with issues of managing people with diverse 
cultural backgrounds. Schein (2009) pointed out the importance of subcultures, which 
stem from mergers and acquisitions, globalization, technological complexity (occupa-
tional cultures), and opportunities offered by information technology.  
Based on their research, Tellis et al. (2009) stated that the flattening world has dimin-
ished national factors on radical innovation, but the importance of internal corporate 
culture is strong. Recently, Google’s attempt to maintain a start-up type of innovation 
culture by allowing employees to devote 20 % of their work time to individual projects is 
a well-known example. The top management vehicle often involves a change program 
towards the desired culture, whether it is an innovation, performance, quality, or safety 
culture. The time required to accomplish this often exceeds the allotted time of the pro-
gram. In the midst of the corporate culture boom, Beer et al. (1990) discussed the rea-
son that change programs do not produce change. Their conclusion was that the ma-
jority of the programs began from the top and targeted changes in attitudes, whereas 
the focus should have been on tasks, roles, responsibilities, and learning. 
Hofstede et al. (2010) defined values as “broad tendencies to prefer certain states of 
affairs over others and continued by stating that values are also feelings with an added 
arrow indicating a plus or a minus side and deal with pairings like moral versus immor-
al.” 
Based on the literature review, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) stated that the definition of 
values has five common features: 
“Values are (a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, 
(c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation and (e) are 
ordered by relative importance.” 
As with culture, there is a justified question regarding the extent to which top manage-
ment can impact the values of a firm as well as how quickly it can be accomplished. In 
family-owned companies, the owners logically have more impact and say regarding 
values. Value definition played a similar role in firms as corporate culture but more than 
10 years later. While the initial proposition was to create an innovative corporate cul-
ture, innovation was eventually listed as a corporate value. A similar challenge in multi-
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national companies also occurred: corporations might be formed as a result of multiple 
acquisitions, and they operate in several countries. One can separate two extremes 
when defining the company values: synthetic aspirational values vs. defining underlying 
values based on the company’s evolution. A detrimental case occurs when the written 
values contradict the behavioral values. One example is public punishment for mis-
takes when the firm claims that experimentation is a core value. The role of culture and 
values in this dissertation is a potential sub-driver for some of the forces that drive or 
inhibit industrial disruption that is enabled by digitalization, and an experimental culture 
is an example of an accelerative sub-driver. 
Structure and governance 
Structure has been briefly discussed in strategy formation. In large firms, corporate 
strategy often defines the structure and governance as well as the role of the corporate 
office, as stated by Collis and Montgomery (1998). The strategy schools include differ-
ing views of the role of structure. “Structure follows strategy” by Chandler (1990) is a 
different concept from the resource-based strategy scholars use. In all cases, the board 
of directors and top management also play a formal role in the firm, which is governed 
by company laws, and the roles vary depending on whether the firm is publicly or pri-
vately owned. 
The size of a firm and its complexity most likely has an impact on the optimal govern-
ance model. There are also managerial limits that impact performance. Penrose (1995) 
discussed this in his book, and his view can be interpreted as arguing that the limit is 
only temporary, as top management ultimately determines its organization’s structure 
and who it wishes to hire based on experience, competence, or personality.  Booz-
Allen and Hamilton (Kocourek et al. 2000) offered corporations four different types of 
governance choices: holding, strategic management, active management, and opera-
tionally involved. 
The organization design to create value in firms varies. Line vs. staff is a familiar con-
cept in the military; functions in firms’ are normally discipline-based. Process and ma-
trix organizations are both hybrid versions of a straight forward line organization. Net-
work economy has blurred the boundaries of internal and external organizations. Or-
ganizations are also normally hierarchical and divided into groups, divisions, lines, de-
partments, and teams, and the extent of the hierarchy correlates with the size of the 
organization. The type of business (consumer, industrial, service, global, local, project, 
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and multi vs. single product) that the firm is in, also impacts top management’s optimal 
choices regarding how to organize. 
The examples presented are practical examples to address the question regarding how 
firms should be organized rather than an exhaustive review of organizational theories. 
The question that is related to this investigation is whether organizational preferences 
are connected to potential disruption.  Based on research by Charitou and Markides 
(2003), 68 % of firms that engaged in disruptive strategic innovation activities did so in 
a separate unit. Corporate labs, for example, normally do not have the responsibility of 
commercialization. In the current millennium, and specifically due to the unprecedented 
success of startups, there is a new renaissance for corporate ventures. The Finnish 
ICT Corporation Tieto is a prime example. This corporation established an internal 
startup in 2014, and the CEO Kimmo Alkio discussed his rationale: 
"The objective is to break boundaries, change operational clock speed, get closer 
to customers and speed up decision making.”6 
Establishing a separate organization with disruptive activities implies that there is an 
assumption of a potential disruption or that the firm wishes to be a disruptor. Using an 
internal organization or external networks relate to the operational model of the firm. 
Use of external networks, which are discussed in the sub-chapters 2.3.1, Platforms, 
and 2.3.2, Open Innovation, can also include a notion that external networks can yield 
more novel ideas than the internal resources of the firm is able to provide. 
Leadership 
Visionary leadership is a characteristic of the Entrepreneurial School of Minzberg et al. 
(2010). An organization can have a leadership culture, and managers can be referred 
to as great leaders, such as Steve Jobs, though his leadership style was criticized. 
Leaders manage other people and therefore have an impact on firms or society at large. 
Leadership was also discussed by Sun Tzu (1963) or Machiavelli (2003). The Oxford 
Dictionary generically defines leadership as “the action of leading a group of people or 
an organization, or the ability to do this,7 which connects leadership to personal compe-
tencies. Large organizations typically train management in leadership. Perhaps the 
most widely used equilibrium of leadership styles in business is autocratic vs. demo-
                                               
6
 Tieto CEO Kimmo Alkio in Kauppalehti 23.2.2015 
7
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/leadership, retrieved 10.6.2016 
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cratic.  Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) discussed this equilibrium as well as the need 
for situational aspects of the styles. They concluded that the difficulty of right style in 
right situation lies in the inner forces of the leader: the value system, confidence in 
subordinates, personal leadership inclinations, and feelings of security in an uncertain 
situation.   
There are several other typologies available, and Westley and Minzberg (1989) divided 
visionary leadership into creator, proselytizer, idealist, bricoleur, and diviner. The vi-
sionary attribute is often related to the novelty of the actual strategic choice, whereas 
leadership styles can be related to the way that the strategy is implemented. Child 
(1972) discussed leadership aspect based on his dominant coalition concept and its 
power over the structural design of an organization when making strategic choices. A 
dominant coalition generally refers to top management, but in extreme cases, it can 
refer solely to the leader. In a turbulent environment, leaders manage uncertainties by 
simultaneously implementing incremental improvement and transformation (Tushman, 
1997).  
Deschamps (2005) analyzed the necessary leadership skills in the context of the type 
of innovation strategy applied by a firm. The model is presented in Figure 6, and trans-
formative innovations, that digitalization might enable, can be placed in the top right 
corner, as it is systemic and often includes external partners. According to Descamps, 
this leadership style refers to a “pragmatic architect” who envisions a new system and 
also understands the components and their relations as well as how to accomplish the 
goal when some of the critical knowledge is outside of the firm’s borders. Moore (2005) 
defined innovation categories based on product leadership, customer intimacy, opera-
tional excellence, and category renewal. He also pointed out that the required leader-
ship style varies based on the category. Moore (2005) expanded the thinking into two 
categories: the core – your unique source of competitive advantage and context–
everything else. He stated that core becomes context over time, and the benefit of a 
startup is that the focus is predominantly on the core. He also stated that context cre-
ates harmful inertia for renewal, and consequently, the leadership challenge is to rec-
ognize and prevent it. 
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Figure 6. Typology of innovation by strategic focus (Deschamps, 2005) 
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In strategy formation, cognition is a characteristic of the Cognitive School by Minzberg 
et al. (2010). It was concluded that it does not provide an explicit view on strategy but 
rather a group of theories that explain management decision making. This is particular-
ly important if it is assumed that during emerging disruption or paradigm change, deci-
sion making is more difficult. One of the salient theories that explain management 
choices was presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who challenged the utility 
theory’s assumption that gains and losses work the same way depending on the state 
of wealth by introducing the Prospects Theory. Empirical data showed that utility curve 
is steeper for losses than for gains. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced a 
weighting function to the formula that includes both probability and desirability; they 
also concluded that with very low probabilities, events are normally ignored, whereas 
very high-probability events are regarded as certain. The reference point also plays a 
major role in the context of digitalization. For instance, firm A would base their deci-
sions on the actions of main competitors B, C, and D, and a small gain is perceived as 
a victory, even though it would fall behind the digital development of company X in an 
adjacent industry. 
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Intuition has been studied extensively in decision-making theories, and it can be as-
sumed that strategic choices are common decisions for senior executives. Simon (1987) 
stated that in a management context, intuition is similar to professional judgment, and 
intuitive decision-making seldom takes place without an analytical process. Kahneman 
(2011) discussed the dilemma of intuition vs. analytical / rational in the context of fast 
and slow thinking using a vast number of examples, such as hindsight inadvertently 
distorting objectiveness. Another important contributor is framing, and Kahneman 
(2011) illustrated that a factually identical situation might lead to a different judgment 
based on framing. Rosenzweig (2007) argued that causality, which is often simplified, 
is an important source of management delusion. 
According to Webster,8 the world view is “a comprehensive view of the world and hu-
man life,” and it could be argued that a world view of digitalization is still developing. 
Most likely, there are already strong “world views” that might be diverse or even polar-
ized. This could also be the case in the long-term; Starbuck (1982) stated that no or-
ganization has a complete monolithic ideology, and even individuals can have multiple 
ideologies and still act logically. Smircich and Stubbart (1985) discussed whether the 
interpretation of the environment by a strategist is objective or perceived, a concept of 
the Enacted World, and they stated that “environments are enacted through the social 
construction and interaction processes of organized actors.”  
Simon (1979) viewed rational human behavior as subject to major boundaries of the 
environment as well as to the capacity of human beings (Bounded Rationality). Later, 
Simon (1991) also pointed out that the same mechanisms are relevant for organiza-
tional learning. One factor that reduces the rationality according to Kahneman (2003) is 
Judgment Heuristics, which causes the decision-maker to use a limited number of heu-
ristic principles when solving complex problems. According to Kahneman, this is useful 
but can lead to systematic errors.   
Stubbart (1989) divided managerial cognition into categories, networks, and inferences. 
He argued that the categories included experiences that are prerequisites for human 
cognitive abilities. Strategic schools of the previous sub-chapter serve as a good ex-
ample of such categorizing.  Stubbart (1989) also argued that the categories used by 
managers differ from those used in management science and also differ between man-
agers. One of the issues raised was that managers’ cognitive maps are flawed due to 
                                               
8
 http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/worldview, retrieved 15.7.2015 
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excess causality or because they are based on strategic concepts that are too abstract. 
In Stubbart’s (1989) article, managerial inference was based on rationality, heuristics, 
and expertise; he used integrating of information from a SWOT analysis to strategy 
formulation as an example of a cognition problem.  
2.2.4 Value chain and process thinking 
Value chains play a pivotal role in this dissertation from three perspectives. First, they 
are unbuilt into the research question where potential industry disruption and its drivers 
are analyzed separately based on the view of enablers, actors and users. Second, the 
value chain plays a central role in Porter’s Five Forces (1979), which is a seminal theo-
ry of industry dynamics. Third, industrial companies have included value chain per-
spective as part of their strategies, operations, and development activities for decades. 
The value chain is another popular concept developed by Michael Porter that yielded a 
large number of citations even 30 years after it was introduced in his book Competitive 
Advantage—Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (1985). Figure 7 describes 
his concept in which directly added value activities are called “primary activities,” and 
activities that enable the direct activities are called “support activities.” If value chain 
thinking is a successful concept in operational improvements in businesses, then can 
the same concept create inertia in a potential emerging paradigm change?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Value chain (Porter, 1985) 
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Porter’s value chain (1985) was publicized at the same time that total quality manage-
ment began to flourish. The English translation of Ishikawa’s (1985) What is Total Qual-
ity Control? The Japanese Way was a milestone in which the philosophy of breaking 
functional silos and focusing on processes took place (“the next process is your cus-
tomer”). Value chain thinking was also rooted in the business process of re-engineering 
and process management. Hammer stated (1990) that one must rethink the way differ-
ent phases are completed in the process. In essence, it calls for a quantum leap in pro-
cesses but very seldom is a source of renewal in company strategies or at the industri-
al level; however, there are notable examples of supply chain innovations that changed 
the industry practices, such as the well-documented Dell case in the computer industry. 
Lee (2002) commented that Dell’s success was based on their highly modular product 
structure, their build-to-order concept, and the ability to maintain a stable process in a 
highly unpredictable demand of innovative products. Process management was revital-
ized due to large enterprise systems, as consultants introduced a practice in IT projects 
in which the first phase was a description of a current process (“as is”) followed by an 
aspirational “to be” process. This practice included an intrinsic logic of improvement. 
In the development work of a firm, value chains and process thinking are combined 
with decision making in Cooper’s gate model. Cooper (1990) stated cycle time reduc-
tion and improvement of hit ratios as drivers of the philosophy of gate systems in inno-
vations. For example, the project can only progress to the next phase after the gate 
approval, but the goal of the system was a stronger market analysis in the early phases. 
Critique for the gate model involves the easy termination of a project, especially in 
large organizations in which there are large numbers of staff resources to evaluate 
proposals. This can proportionally increase incremental innovation that has a higher 
success rate but a smaller upside. Veryzer (1998) contended that the gate model is not 
the optimal approach to discontinuous innovation. The software industry challenged the 
sequential concept of gate systems in development for the same reasons that Cooper 
originally presented—time and hit ratio—by introducing the agile manifesto9 in 2001, 
which included the following principles: 
 Individuals and interactions over processes and tools 
 Working software over comprehensive documentation 
 Customer collaboration over contract negotiation 
                                               
9 http://agilemanifesto.org/ retrieved 10.6.2016 
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 Responding to change over following a plan 
The manifesto led to various methods, such as Scrum. The unique feature of Scrum 
(Schwaber and Beedle, 2002) compared to the gate model is Sprint, which is a prede-
termined period that is less than four weeks. The Scrum team develops a product or 
feature in the Sprint that meets the requirements and is ready for publishing. Another 
unique feature of Scrum is the retrospective phase, which is a session to evaluate the 
work of the team and present improvement ideas before the next sprint. Sprint retro-
spective can last a maximum of three hours.  
Recently, several radical value chain and process innovations have been enabled by 
digital technologies, and some were coupled with a business model change. This has 
occurred both in primary and in support activities or processes. Digital entertainment is 
a good example in which the process of satisfying a need, such as listening music, has 
been reinvented—downloading files instead of buying records or CDs from a shop. If a 
firm can deliver their products or services through digitalization, legacy systems are still 
a challenge. Incumbents often invest a vast amount of money in IT systems that make 
their current processes effective. Writing them down or upgrading them to accommo-
date a new process or business model is expensive. Often, the new type of infrastruc-
ture is service, which is attractive from a capital expenditure point of view, but the 
switching cost is a critical issue. Trigeorgis (1993) discussed this from a financial man-
agement perspective and determined that there should be financial modelling for active 
management to change the conditions of the original investment, which are IT systems 
in this case. For disruptive platform investments, the problem is twofold if an incumbent 
wishes to be the disruptor. First, the incumbent is responsible for the cost of legacy 
systems, and at the same time, it should invest in the possibility that the market would 
follow, including competitors, which resembles the Prisoners Dilemma10 as a decision 
problem (In game theory, a situation in which two players each have two options whose 
outcome depends crucially on the simultaneous choice made by the other, often formu-
lated in terms of two prisoners separately deciding whether to confess to a crime). 
Cable and Shane (1997) studied the Prisoners Dilemma in relation to venture capital-
ists and entrepreneurs and concluded that cooperation is a preferred option. This could 
be interpreted in a value chain context that two important competitors could cooperate 
in building a new “standard” for the value chain for the benefit of the industry. 
                                               
10
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There has been a tendency in high-wage countries to focus activities on the users, 
leave the upstream to suppliers, and act as a system integrator. This is evident in com-
panies that manufacture the hardware of digital technologies. Therefore, it is notable 
that successful digital companies also practice different value chain strategies, such as 
Tesla Motors, which is a small car company with a business model that differs from the 
models of the automobile industry. At the same time, they have a high integration in 
production, own key components, and have a massive manufacturing site11 despite 
their digital business concept.  
 
2.2.5 Industry beliefs 
Incumbents operate in established industries. Are there recipes that work collectively 
similarly to management cognition on an individual level? An industry recipe allows 
management to identify a sound space for their strategy that includes technological, 
financial, and social dimensions (Grinyer and Spender, 1979). Examples include econ-
omy of scale, need of flexibility, local vs. global, and asset or research intensive. An-
other example is the early mover advantage, which has a link to learning. Spence 
(1981) concluded that learning can create similar entry barriers as economies of scale 
in certain industries. Based on extensive case studies, Spender (1989) stated that the 
dynamics of an industry recipe are not driven by what firms believe about the industry 
but what managers believe about their companies. 
Dominant Logic is similar to an industry recipe. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) defined it: 
“a dominant general management logic is the way in which managers conceptu-
alize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions, be it technolo-
gies, product development, distribution, advertising or human resource manage-
ment.” 
They also argued that the limit of diversity of corporations is not driven by the variety of 
markets or technology but by the variety of dominant logics. Their suggested sources 
of Dominant Logic are shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Sources of Dominant Logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) 
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Matthyssens et al. (2006) studied five different industries regarding value innovation 
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a way that creates inertia for value innovation. 
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Markides’ (2006) earlier critique that Disruptive Technology is too technology-driven 
and do not take into account business model innovations, is the motivation to explore 
business models further. Business models are used to determine how a firm creates a 
better value than competitors; thus, it is related to strategy. If successful companies 
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machine and spare parts could be referred to as a razor blade business model, which 
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and ink. Business model innovation is not only used for new businesses but also to 
reinvent old businesses (Hamel, 1999). Tikkanen et al. (2005) stated that there are four 
conceptual levels of management cognition that are related to business models: indus-
try recipe, reputational rankings, boundary beliefs, and product ontologies.  
The benefit of business model thinking in systemic changes is that usually business 
models consider several aspects of the business simultaneously. Osterwalder’s (2004) 
dissertation provided a thorough analysis of different models of strategic thinking, and 
he suggested components that should be included in the business model. He also ana-
lyzed the elements of the components, such as fixed pricing (pay-per use, subscription, 
or list price). The dissertation also explained that different business models are more 
suitable or are at least used in specific industries. Osterwalder later published a book in 
collaboration with Pigneur (2010) in which the Business Model Canvas was launched 
as a tool, which is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) 
 
At the same time that generic business models, such as razor blade, were in demand, 
there was also a call for industry specific models both for existing and emerging busi-
nesses. O’Reilly (2007) published views on the use of the Web 2.0 business model in 
the software industry. He began his investigation using fresh examples. His conclu-
sions were not only relevant for Web 2.0 companies but also for firms at large: 
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 Services, not packaged software, with cost-effective scalability,  
 Control over unique, hard-to-recreate data sources that get richer as more peo-
ple use them,  
 Trusting users as co-developers,  
 Harnessing collective intelligence,  
 Leveraging the long tail through customer self-service,  
 Software above the level of a single device 
 Lightweight user interfaces, development models, and business models 
 
Business model excellence includes the same dilemma as operational excellence, i.e., 
success involves a risk of creating rigidity. Based on their case study, Doz and Koso-
nen (2010) suggested that top management requires three meta-capabilities to achieve 
the renewal of a business model of the firm: strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and 
resource fluidity. The Industrial Internet is one concept discussed in this dissertation, 
and the way several practitioners define Industrial Internet, takes already position on 
some of the elements of the Business Model Canvas.  
 Digitalization and strategy 2.3
There are a growing number of digital strategy models offered by consulting companies, 
an increasing number of digital strategy projects ongoing in firms, and active publishing 
of new academic papers about the topic to sustain momentum. Is digitalization a phe-
nomenon that is captured by the analysis of the external environment with the tools 
suggested by strategic schools, or can the strategy be developed based on digitaliza-
tion? Does digitalization indeed change the rules of how value is created? The as-
sumption has been that digitalization touches knowledge and value creation in a new 
way, which is a potential source of a systemic impact on the economy or on the strate-
gy of a firm. Digitalization also questions what markets can be considered large, like 
Chris Anderson is describing in his concept Long Tail12, when Internet due to its global 
coverage can transform local niche businesses into sizeable global market opportuni-
ties. The economic principles in the Long Tail are not new but technology has changed 
                                               
12
 http://www.wired.com/2004/10/tail/, retrieved 6.9.2016 
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the application of those principles, which has an impact to business strategies, which 
might be also relevant in B2B (Brynjolfsson et al. 2006). 
None of the strategic schools recognized the platforms as playing a role in strategy 
formation. Open innovation, crowds, and ecosystems are also elements that have been 
increasing in scale and impact due to the information network. The concept of a net-
work economy is older than Uber.  Platforms and open innovation are reviewed in later 
sub-chapters. The link between business models and the Industrial Internet was thor-
oughly examined from different perspectives in the article by Porter and Heppelman 
(2014) in which they endorsed the new era of competition due to smart, connected 
products and also suggested a path for progress: monitoring, control, optimization, and 
autonomy. Porter and Heppelman (2014) also argued that the Five Forces could be 
used to understand the industrial dynamics of digital technologies. This normative 
checklist was provided for strategists: 
 Which set of smart, connected product capabilities and features? 
 How much functionality should be embedded in the product and how much in 
the cloud? 
 Open or closed system? 
 Full set of smart, connected product capabilities and infrastructure internally or 
outsource to vendors and partners? 
 What data to capture, secure, and analyze to maximize the value of offering? 
 How to manage ownership and access rights of product data? 
 Should distribution channels or service networks fully or partially be disinterme-
diated? 
 Change its business model? 
 New business by monetizing product data through selling it to outside partners? 
 Scope expansion? 
Digitalization also provides a platform for different concepts for the firm itself. Häcki & 
Lighton (2001) argued that orchestration plays a key role in a network economy. They 
also provided evidence of network companies that outperformed their non-network 
peers. The network economy discussion lost momentum due to an interest in platform 
thinking, even though network effects are fundamental for both platforms and open 
innovation. Porter and Heppelman (2015) joined the discussion of how digitalization 
impacts the operations of a firm when value is created by data. Using analogies from 
the software industry, they discussed collaboration (externally and internally) in lieu of 
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hierarchical structures. During transitions, they suggested stand-alone business units, 
centers of excellence, or cross-business steering mechanisms. Porter and Heppelman 
(2015) also suggested the role of a Chief Data Officer to manage data aggregation and 
analytics on the corporate level.  
 
2.3.1 Platform strategy 
A forklift can be a platform. A firm that manufactures forklift trucks can choose the core 
platform of the truck (e.g., frame, control system, and driver ergonomics) and design 
interfaces for partners (e.g., power train, attachment, wheels, and hydraulics). This is a 
type of modular thinking that has been common in industrial development for decades. 
Platforms have also been important contributors of efficiency for internal operations. In 
many car companies, different brands share the same platforms (and components), 
and the motivation has been sharing development and production or sourcing costs by 
economies of scale. Sawhney (1998) suggested that product platform thinking can also 
be expanded to brand, process, globalism, and customers.  
Information technology brought platforms to the next level by enabling the development 
to be location independent. Also, the core product, software, enabled real-time delivery 
economically anywhere. This also expanded the concept of platform products. Can a 
platform be built based on niche knowledge, such as knowledge of the wear and tear of 
a bearing? Gawer and Cusamo (2002) wrote an interesting book analyzing three firms 
that became platform leaders, Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco, and three firms that were 
potential platform leaders, Palm, DoCoMo, and Linux. Compared to earlier efficiency 
driven modularity, the book described platform strategies that had a symbiotic nature in 
which the platform owner and complementors depended on each other, such as a 
memory chip and a computer. Their conclusion was that to pursue a platform strategy, 
the firm must be able to manage four levers. Scope of the Firm involves the ecosystem, 
and Product Technology involves the way interfaces are designed and intellectual 
property is managed. External Relationships include the designs of the consensus/ 
control and collaboration/competition mechanism with the complementors, and Internal 
Organization includes the designs of structures, processes, culture, and mindsets when 
some of the complementors are competitors. Later, Gawer and Cusamo (2008) offered 
two paths for leadership: Coring (if the industry does not have a platform) and Tipping 
(winning the platform war through market momentum). The paths have different tech-
nology and business choices. 
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Kenney and Pon (2011) posed a relevant question: if there is an emergent platform in 
the industry, which platform is it? Their case study focused on the smartphone industry, 
and the potential platform was the OS. The conclusion was that there is a dominant 
OS-based design and that Apple leads the platform race; however, due to a conver-
gence phenomenon, a disruptive new logic could emerge, possibly from someone like 
Facebook. Like most products, product-based platforms have logical commoditization 
risks. Technological products have addressed commoditization both by advancing the 
product and/or attaching services to it. Services can also be attached to platforms, but 
can service become a platform? Suarez and Cusamo (2009) argued that services can 
play a major role in mitigating the commoditization risk of product platforms. Cloud 
computing, which is also reviewed later, introduced platforms as a service concept. 
Weinhardt et al. (2009) used Salesforce.com as an example of this development. Earli-
er firms invested in proprietary Customer Relation Management (CRM)) systems or 
used modules of other systems, such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), for that 
purpose. Salesforce.com changed the merging Cloud technology, software, and ser-
vice concept. Zysman et al. (2015) highlighted the essence of algorithms and their rela-
tion to Cloud platforms. They called this change toward service the Algorithm Revolu-
tion. 
 
2.3.2 Open innovation as a paradigm in the development of a firm 
Open innovation, or one its forms, crowd, is not only a business paradigm but also re-
flects societal change. Innovation beyond corporate or other borders as a phenomenon 
was certainly not invented in recent decades. Western civilization experienced a similar 
innovation during the Athens centrum. ICT technology transformed the globe into the 
real-time Athens square, and Chesbrough implemented open innovation into manage-
ment discipline, which has been criticized not because of the content but for its novelty, 
as suggested by Trott and Hartman (2009). Chesbrough’s (2006) definition of Open 
Innovation is: 
“The use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
innovation and expand markets for external use of innovation respectively.” 
This means that the target can be a firm’s products or services, internal operations 
(primary or support processes), or business models. Regarding its relevance to strate-
gy formation, Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt (2014) contended that the overriding sugges-
tion in the strategy literature is to rely on internal resources for development. This 
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statement does not take into account that the tacit knowledge in a value chain has 
been transferred as input for internal innovation. Open Innovation also raises the ques-
tion of whether the wisdom of crowds can be superior to (Surowiecki, 2005) the com-
pany’s internal experts.  
Open Innovation can be organized by following the traditional principles of subcontrac-
tor relations, whereas the other extreme includes fully open crowd sourcing concepts. 
The characteristics of organization can include firm-driven ecosystems, industry trade 
organizations, commercial incubators, university organized platforms, etc. Crowdsourc-
ing as a concept for products, services, specific problems, vendors, customers, capital, 
ideas, or complete systems solutions is based on the notion that volume, diversity, and 
collective intelligence offer additional value. Malone et al. (2010) stated that a collective 
intelligence system can be developed by designing it using components that they 
called genes. They illustrated the evidence using Wikipedia, Google, and Linux as ex-
amples. Several public buildings are a result of architectural competitions; it was not 
called crowdsourcing, but it had the same characteristics. Howe’s (2006) article “The 
Rise of Crowdsourcing” suggested crowdsourcing as an alternative for outsourcing. 
Competitions take specific forms, such as Hackathons, in which private programmers 
spend a weekend developing a solution to a problem provided by an industrial firm. 
Hedenborg, the CEO of a Finnish factory automation supplier, Fastems, commented 
that their Hackathon provided nine product development initiatives in three different 
disciplines.13 The participants were both software students and professional companies. 
What drives Open Innovation as a tool for better competiveness? Is it richer content, 
cost, speed, or something else? The content is self-evident based on one of the Open 
Innovation principles in Chesbrough’s (2003) article, which points out that no one com-
pany possesses all talent, and there are also radical ideas that might be outside of the 
field or industry of the firm. The ability to obtain external knowledge might depend on 
the autonomy of the people in the experiment. Teece (2007) argued that there is a trap 
in Open Innovation if Open Innovation is seen as an alternative to integrating the 
knowledge that exists within suppliers, customers, and complementors. He also con-
tended that unique assets and resources are not enough for a sustainable competitive 
advantage without unique dynamic capabilities. In his ecosystem framework, he intro-
duced Analytical Systems, which include Learn and Sense, Filter, Shape, and Calibrate 
                                               
13
 http://www.organisaatio-sanomat.fi/hack-the-factory-toi-fastemsille-ideoita-teollisen-internetin-
soveltamiseen/ retrieved 7.7.201 
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opportunities in addition to the external existing and new knowledge. Cohen and Levin-
thal (1990) developed the concept Absorptive Capacity, which they defined as “the 
ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities.”  
Open Innovation can also involve cost issues. In crowdsourcing competitions, the 
hours spent on the solutions are not related to the winner’s prize; however, the transac-
tion cost for the incumbents that manage the network of startups or events as well as 
the indirect cost of the organizer might be high. Christensen et al. (2005) elaborated on 
this in their case study related to technology development and concluded that the rela-
tion and the cost differ depending on the maturity level of the technology. Felin and 
Zenger (2014) concluded that the cost related to communication in Open Innovation is 
decreasing due to platforms and standardization as well as due to communication 
technology development. 
Speed translates to cost; unlimited resources can either speed the development or 
delay the total process if not managed correctly, as the complexity increases when the 
number of people increases in a project. Gupta and Sounder (1998) stated that there is 
a growing importance for reduced cycle times in product development; they also 
showed higher user involvement in short-cycle product development. Dedehayir and 
Mäkinen (2011) suggested that in the systemic industry context, increased technology 
based clock speed intensifies time-based competitions in related sub-industries. 
Open innovation is structured, expanded, and accelerated by the innomediaries. 
Innomediaries can assist in all phases of innovation (Orientation, Exploration, Selection 
and Engagement), but their roles vary in different phases (Roijakkers et al. 2014). 
Roijakkers et al. (2014) also concluded that some of the innomediaries offer services 
based on the expertise of their own personnel, whereas the other type of innomediaries 
search and match clients with innovative companies using search engines. Some of 
the portals are in the global job market, such as www.freelancer.com, and some focus 
on individual disciplines, such as www.design.com.  
If Open Innovation is already a new paradigm, what will delay expansion? Obvious 
answers are a lack of understanding, knowledge, processes, and attitudes, such as 
“not invented here” syndromes. The nature of the barriers most likely differs depending 
on the object of Open Innovation. Chesbrough (2010) stated that one of the mental 
difficulties in the business model of innovation is that new business models might be in 
conflict with the firms’ existing technology. This makes business model innovation more 
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difficult, whether it is internal or uses Open Innovation principles. Huizingh (2011) sug-
gested that Open Innovation expansion has similar characteristics to the diffusion of 
innovation, and the followers are reluctant to copy Early Adopters, especially if it re-
quires organizational changes. The slow emergence could also be explained by cultur-
al readiness, as suggested by Savitskaya et al. (2010) in their case study on China. 
One major obstacle in Open Innovation expansion is the Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR), whether it is an excuse not to change or a justified concern of valuable intellec-
tual property leaking to current or potential competitors. Economically, it is a question 
of whether sharing provides a greater return than keeping the knowledge in-house. It is 
a more abstract question than calculating the rate of return for an internal R&D invest-
ment. West and Gallagher (2006) studied the question in an open-source software con-
text and pointed out that sharing innovations with vendors can lead to better products; 
they also promoted mechanisms for commercializing the “spillover” innovations. Arora 
et al. (2001) asserted that the technology market is growing, which makes the “spillover” 
option a real option. As attractive as the intermediate markets for the IPR might be, 
they are also more complex to manage than ordinary security markets. Trading IPR 
also involves changes in traditional intellectual property management (Chesbrough and 
Ghafele, 2014). 
 
2.3.3 The enabling technology behind digitalization 
Digitalization in this dissertation is understood as a process in which data is collected, 
transmitted, stored, processed, and used for value creation. The input can originate 
from people when they translate observations, judgements, or thoughts in writing or 
from sensors that collect factual measurement data. In digitization, the information is 
coded as a string of ones and zeros in different parts of the process. Coding infor-
mation is common, but ADC (Analog Digital Converter) began the modern expansion. 
In the early 1980s, it was used in military applications and was expanded to the civilian 
market. Its usage further accelerated in the mid-1990s when ADC became a mass 
market component in different consumer applications (Robertson, 2006). There are 
numerous digital technologies, but only the fundamental ones are briefly described in 
this sub-chapter. They are used in digital systems or concepts that drive the potential 
disruption from a technology point of view, which was investigated in this dissertation. 
The systemic concepts are described in sub-chapter 2.3.4. 
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A transistor by Bell Labs in 1947 (Early, 2001) was one of the first key components in 
the future digital system. It was a simple, small device that could either act as an elec-
tronic switch or as an amplifier. The capacity of the transistor began to increase when 
the integrated circuit, which utilized semiconducting silicon, was invented by Texas 
Instruments in 1958 (Kilby, 2000). The next step was the microprocessor, which made 
it possible to use digital data as input and to process it according to programmable in-
structions. The microprocessor was not invented by Intel, but the Intel 4004 micropro-
cessor from 1971 (Betker et al., 1997) is perceived to be the first commercial micropro-
cessor. It paved the way not only for computers but also for other parts of a digital sys-
tem as an embedded component. 
Memory is needed for storing data either temporarily or for long periods. The first hard 
discs were invented by the IBM lab in 1956 (Praxley, 2007) to be used as part of their 
mainframe computer. Thereafter, there have been physics-based innovations of the 
discs or innovations in the production technology, which has enabled the growth in ca-
pacity (measured in bytes, which is equivalent to 8 bits), the decrease in the physical 
size of the device, and consequently, the reduced cost of storing data.  
Peripherals, such as sensors or various user interfaces, are fundamental for the sys-
tem to interact with the outside world. For entering data or viewing results, there have 
been innovations, such the keyboard, the mouse, and the touchscreen. The technical 
development of sensors is more important from an industrial perspective. The process 
industry measures various factors of the process by sensors in order to control the pro-
cess in a definite way. The importance of the sensors increases when they can be 
connected wirelessly to the external systems. This has enabled telemetry, for example, 
in which problems with a working machine can be solved remotely before they have 
occurred. Systems improve by increasing the amount of sensors that feed the critical 
data with a high reliability. The cost also decreases, which further accelerates market 
penetration. A robot is an example of a product that could not have been developed 
without digital technology. A robot needs sensors for safe navigation and for the input 
to make the right decisions, which are made by computer algorithms. Robotics has 
catalysed the development of actuators. Work machines require several actuators with 
micro movements to operate unmanned. There is also the additional challenge that 
both the machine and the load can weigh tens of tons.  
Algorithms are the brain of the system. They present the rules of system operation and 
are coded with a computer language, known as the software. The history of software is 
relatively brief. IEEE software publication place the introduction of the software in late 
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1983 or early 1984 (Ebert, 2008). Thereafter, the development has been rapid, and 
there are different generations of computer languages as well as clusters of languages. 
Some of the software programmes are platforms, and some are specific to an applica-
tion. Software technology is an interesting topic, but the relevance to this dissertation is 
that software is the core enabler of the systemic impact of several digital technologies. 
Wireless technologies decoupled various applications based on location constraints.  
As disruptive as innovations by Bell, Edison, Hertz, or Marconi were over 100 years 
ago in radio technology, more recently, GPS and GSM were the enablers of modern 
digitalization. GPS is a technology that utilizes satellites that orbit in space, which origi-
nated in the U.S. Department of Defence. The commercial usage was originally initiat-
ed by the Joint Office as a Navstar GPS program in 1973 (Stotts et al., 2014) that 
shared technology with civilian stakeholders.  In hindsight, it is easy to conclude that 
the program succeeded, as GPS has become a de facto global platform for commercial 
applications that utilize location information. GSM technology was developed by enter-
prises and universities that were developing technologies for mobile communication in 
Europe. At the same time, there were competing technologies from the U.S. and Ja-
pan. The scale impact occurred because major European countries were able to agree 
on the GSM standard (Hillebrand, 2013), which later also became a global standard. 
The economics and relevance for GSM and GPS was that they both became global 
technologies, and that the industry leaders chose them as platforms to develop applica-
tions for various industries. GSM paved the way not only for voice but also for data 
transmission. Data transmission has had rapid developments in speed and cost. Both 
technologies were also linked to industrial and consumer businesses.  
There are several other technological components in digital systems. The systemic 
impact of the individual components begins with the features, but the cost development 
has become even more pivotal, creating an increasing number of new applications. 
Cost reductions are the result of innovations in production technology and increasing 
volumes. The increasing volume originated from the consumer business, but more and 
more the same components are also used in industrial applications. The development 
has followed Moore’s law: 
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"The number of transistors incorporated in a chip will approximately double every 
24 months."14 
Moore’s law has been reasonably accurate since the introduction of the Intel 4004. 
Development will continue, but the expert’s opinions are not unanimous regarding pre-
cisely how it will follow Moore’s law in the future. 
 
2.3.4 Digitalization as a systemic phenomenon 
If the technological components and their features, cost, and impact are relatively fac-
tual, the situation is more complicated for the systemic impact. When purchasing the 
next generation of a microprocessor, the capacity, cost, and functions are known. It is 
far more complicated to buy one Industrial Internet, even though there are service pro-
viders that claim they can deliver it. Technology based concepts are often transferred 
to businesses by the consulting department of technology companies or standalone 
consulting companies. The list of digitalization concepts chosen for this dissertation is 
based on the rank of the concepts researched and promoted by those companies, and 
that are also relevant for a machine-building industry. Other potentially disruptive digi-
talization concepts that emerged during the empirical research are discussed in the 
results section. Open Innovation as a potential paradigm changer has been reviewed in 
the strategy section, but it is also included in the list. The concepts differ based on their 
characteristics, and they can have interdependencies. The scope of the concepts is (in 
alphabetical order): 
 Additive Manufacturing (also referred to as 3D printing) 
 Big Data/Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
 Cloud Computing 
 Internet of Things 
 Industrial Internet 
 Model-Based System Engineering 
 Open Innovation 
 Robotics (or autonomous operations) 
 
                                               
14
 http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/history/museum-gordon-moore-
law.html?wapkw=moores+law, retrieved 6.8.2015  
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Additive Manufacturing 
In manufacturing, there have been numerous technologies, such as machining, weld-
ing, bolting, gluing, casting, and their combinations. The difference in Additive Manu-
facturing (AM) is that the product or component is built by printing it layer by layer, 
making it three-dimensional, which is referred to as 3D printing. For AM technology to 
advance, the material coverage must be expanded (usually plastic), larger objects must 
be enabled, and there must be acceptable speed and unit costs. AM offers systemic 
changes; the physical supply chain of products can become digital, or a firm can have 
a business model of selling “recipes” for printing spare parts. It is also an enabler of 
speedier R&D via rapid prototyping. Engineering a current product to be printed is a 
quite different approach from designing a product that was originally designed to be 
printed, which is a challenge for engineering competences of the incumbents.  
Future development has both product and supply chain paths. By combining the paths 
and services, it can catalyse the business model evolution (Cotteleer, 2014). Cohen et 
al. (2014) presented five disruptive attributes related to 3D printing: accelerated prod-
uct-development cycles, new manufacturing strategies and footprints, shifting sources 
of profit, new capabilities, and disruptive competitors. Gartner’s prediction of spending 
on 3D printers is $13.4 billion in the year 2018, and the forecast for 2015 was $1.6 bil-
lion15 D’Aveni (2015) examined annual patents in AM (from 80 to 600 in ten years) and 
argued this growth indicating the technology reaching a tipping point. AM is not only 
advancing by the high technology companies or system integrators (actors) but also 
due to users. The US Navy is printing drones on board vessels for intelligence.16 On 
the civilian side, 27 companies in the port of Rotterdam formed an alliance to print four 
spare parts after a tedious selection process to be tested in real operations.17 AM is not 
only driven by the competitiveness of firms; it also offers potential societal benefits (dis-
ruption for some), such as reducing dependence of current trading partners or delaying 
climate change due to a decrease in the unnecessary transportation of products. 
 
 
                                               
15
 http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2887417 retrieved at 6.8.2015 
16
 http://3dprint.com/85654/us-navy-3d-printed-drones/ retrieved at 6.8.2015 
17 http://www.maritimeprofessional.com/news/printing-rotterdam-port-274044 retrieved at 
6.8.2015 
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Big Data/AI 
Big Data involves the economical processing of large quantities of data. It is also 
viewed here as one of the steps toward Artificial Intelligence (AI). Interpreting data is 
common for humans and growingly also for machines. The change involves the un-
precedented flow of data of human behavior, often internet-based, or data from sen-
sors. At the same time, storing and computing data has become more economical, and 
there are better algorithms available. 
Big Data has often been referred to as a new source of innovation; the analytics are 
somewhat different when making sense of human behaviors or predicting a machine 
breakdown. The following two statements are true of machine data: the amount and 
nature of the data collected increases rapidly, and data can be transferred wirelessly. 
Based on data from sensors, conclusions can often be validated by simulations or em-
pirical experiments based on the laws of physics. The Artificial Intelligence of machines 
is related to machine learning or deep machine learning (Itamar et al., 2010). There is 
evidence of the effect of Big Data-driven business improvement but also large industry 
and firm variety how to capture the benefit (Brown et al., 2014); however, they suggest 
that data science requires a center of excellence to develop the required capabilities. 
Westerman et al. (2014) emphasized having the customer data in focus when develop-
ing data driven insights. Big Data alone is not the answer for future business success, 
as there is always some degree of judgment required, and therefore decoupled conclu-
sions of the company or its culture can lead to strategic mistakes (Guszcza and Rich-
ardson, 2014). Also, the investments in AI will continue, as AI can be the vehicle used 
for transforming computing from productivity to content. The Watson IBM is a prime 
example in the healthcare business, where advanced analytics assist doctors in diag-
nosing cancer. Likewise, the software giant SAP is developing its HANA technology for 
better analytics from predicting football results to business intelligence. Modern tech-
nology can also follow older business models, such as with Google, which has been 
using the traditional newspaper business model but more effectively and globally (Hu-
berty, 2015).  
McAfee and Brynjolfsson based on their interview of 330 North American executives 
concluded that data-driven companies were more profitable (McAfee, Brynjolfsson 
2012). They highlighted that the speed and variety of data has increased, which chal-
lenges deep hierarchical decision-making in data-driven environment. McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson (2012) came up with five management challenges into the transition to be 
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data-driven: Leadership, Talent management, Technology, Decision making and Com-
pany culture.  
 
Cloud Computing 
The dominant process of private and public organizations in developing IT included 
following steps until recently: internal process development (as is and to be) and the 
choice of suitable software for application and implementation (possible pilots and 
rollouts). The cost and lead time was driven by scale, complexity, and the effectiveness 
of the process itself (feasibility studies, planning, decision making, and implementa-
tion). Long lead times meant that entities conducted parallel activities (old processes 
with the old tools and new processes with the new tools). The Cloud changed this. A 
firm can connect to the Cloud and receive a world-class process with IT support in 
weeks and can pay for the usage. It is obvious that as a model, it is more flexible than 
rollouts and more economical than depreciating the IT infrastructure cost each month. 
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (Mell and Grance, 2011) has 
defined three service models for Cloud Computing: IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), 
PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service), and four deployment 
models: Private, Community, Public, and Hybrid Cloud.  
From a disruption point of view, the Cloud lowers the barrier for newcomers to enter the 
global business market, and it also offers economies of scale to SME’s that were previ-
ously available only for MNEs. Several of the known new business model innovations 
are utilizing the Cloud as a technology, such as Netflix in broadcasting. Although the 
Cloud is a major source of disruption for the previous type of computing, it is also vul-
nerable to security risks. These issues require both technological solutions and new 
policies regionally and internationally (Kushida et al., 2015). Security risks can affect 
both public and business domains but also privacy at large. The Cloud has the same 
inertia attached to it as AM or AI, as it includes elements of which many incumbents 
have no prior experience or knowledge. Iyer and Henderson (2010) listed seven capa-
bilities that are needed in the formulation of a firm’s Cloud strategy: Controlled Inter-
face, Location Independence, Sourcing Independence, Ubiquitous Access, Virtual 
Business Environments, Addressability and Traceability, and Rapid Elasticity. 
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Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is related to the Internet. Experiments in building computer 
networks began in the 1960s in military and university circles. The explosion occurred 
in early 1990s with the invention of the World Wide Web. Free access was a prerequi-
site for the explosion according to Sir Timothy John Berners-Lee, who won the first 
Millennium Technology Prize in 2004 for his pioneering work with the World Wide Web: 
“The decision to make the Web an open system was necessary for it to be uni-
versal. Had the technology been proprietary it would probably not have taken off. 
You can’t propose that something be a universal space and at the same time 
keep control of it.”18 
 
Thereafter, the Internet has experienced several enhanced technological innovations in 
the platform and especially with the applications that utilize the platform. The systemic 
impact will occur when people are connected globally at all times. It is easy to under-
stand the magnitude of the value based on Metcalfe’s law from the early 1980s, which 
states that “the value of a network grows as the square of the number of its users 
grows” (Metcalfe, 2013). 
While the Internet is the platform for people to become location-free and have real-time 
access to data, IoT involves connecting physical objects. Manyika et al. (2013) defined 
it as “the use of sensors, actuators, and data communication technology built into phys-
ical objects that enable those objects to be tracked, coordinated, or controlled across a 
data network or the internet.” HCI and M2M were discussed before the Internet, but the 
global scalable platform was missing. Some companies, such as Cisco Systems, use 
the Internet of Everything for the same concept. Kellmereit and Obodovski (2013) 
named five core application domains for the future of IoT: Connected Cities, Homes, 
Health, Cars, and Supply Chain. Gubbi et al. (2013) explained that web.3 (ubiquitous 
computing) uses intuitive queries and is based on Cloud technology to achieve the po-
tential of IoT. This is also an example of the interdependence of the selected digitaliza-
tion concept, as stated in the introduction of the sub-chapter. 
 
                                               
18 Sir Timothy John Berners-Lee, http:/taf.fi/en/millennium-technology-prize/winner-2004/ re-
trieved 6.8.2015 
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Industrial Internet 
IoT and the Industrial Internet as concepts are mixed both in academic and business 
literature and discussions. The core difference is that IoT has a stronger link to con-
sumers, and Industrial Internet is linked to the value creation of a firm, which in many 
applications makes it more mission-critical. The ETLA report (Juhanko and Jurvansuu, 
2015) presented a model in which the link between a consumer to smart, connected 
products and services was lifestyle-based (IoT), for a firm’s data-based business mod-
els (Industrial Internet) and for the society frictionless services (= information society 
2.0). GE emphasized the systemic nature by pointing out that the core aim of the In-
dustrial Internet is connecting intelligent machines, advanced analytics, and mobile 
people at work (Evans and Annunziata, 2012). The same systemic character is men-
tioned in Porter and Heppelman’s (2014) article in a farming context in which applying 
the Industrial Internet concept allows farm equipment manufacturers to move from 
equipment performance to farm output optimization. The earlier cited World Economic 
Forum (2015) Output Economy concept also described the progress of the Industrial 
Internet in which the last three phases represent an increase in the systemic level of 
optimization (Figure 5). 
In their white paper (Bradley et al., 2013), Cisco estimated the value of the Internet of 
Everything (including the Industrial Internet) market as $14.4 trillion by the year 2022, 
and the almost equally influential drivers for value creation are: asset utilization, em-
ployee productivity, supply chain and logistics, customer experience, and innovation. 
Russo et al. (2014) suggested six questions that should be considered by machine 
builders to create value: how does data create new value, how fast will new business 
models emerge, how will industry structures change, how do we play in this space, 
what capabilities do we require to win, and how do we get started? Individual countries 
have also added the Industrial Internet to their agenda to develop or sustain industrial 
competiveness. German initiative Industrie 4.0 (Kagermann et al., 2013) is a good ex-
ample, which notably indicates that real-time CPS platforms are changing the paradigm 
of industrial service. The US consumer business tradition might explain why the focus 
in US industrial initiatives has been from the beginning adding customer value. Also, 
the German investment in the Industrial Internet is reflecting the change from the man-
ufacturing to customer in the national Acatech (Kagermann et al. 2014) research report 
published a year later than the original Industrie 4.0., which was called the Smart Ser-
vice Welt. 
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Model-Based System Engineering 
The focus of this dissertation is machine-builders. Even in standalone situations, ma-
chines are a result of multidisciplinary work. There is an ongoing evolution in the sub-
systems of a machine; material science creates lighter and more wearable structures, 
components are becoming more intelligent, and digitalization impacts how machines 
are controlled in several ways. The systemic complexity increases when a fleet of ma-
chines or machine interactions with upper systems (planning, maintenance, etc.) are 
taken into account. The development of a machine still follows the traditional disciplines 
as a foundation (mechanical, electrical, and software engineering), but digitalization 
has enabled new sources of input via sensors, new insight by algorithms that utilize Big 
Data, and a new set of tools. The tools include both methods such as simulations or 
crowdsourcing ideas as well as advancements in software for various disciplines, such 
as CAD tools. Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) has evolved as a promising 
discipline to manage the growing complexity of the R&D of a machine builder. It can 
combine the physical world with software in an early development phase. Architecture 
is needed to enable the actor to create a dialogue between internal and external 
knowledge and to orchestrate the use of concepts, such as Open Innovation. MBSE is 
an effective method, but further standardization would lead to advancement with influ-
ential actors (INCOSE, 2007) actively using it. Garetti et al. (2012) argued that virtual 
prototyping is moving from digital knowledge to a digital lifecycle. This is an important 
concept in building new business models that are performance-based. Nichols (2013) 
suggested that systemic complex problems can be solved in the CPS environment by a 
smart and synchronised development methodology (from previous concurrent devel-
opment), which is also a driver of business transformation. This methodology can in-
clude continuous iteration supported by virtual and real experiments, which is some-
what similar to Scrum (Schwaber and Beedle, 2002) ideology. MBSE is currently in an 
early phase, and technologies that can enhance it are still in development. 
 
Robotics 
In the context of this dissertation, robotics refers to work machines becoming autono-
mous. All work machines have features that assist the operators or protect the machine 
from failures whether caused by the operator, the machine, or the environment. Com-
puters have played a major role in this process. For example, a sensor measures the 
temperature of engine coolant, and if the temperature is too high, software instructs the 
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system to shut the engine down before it is damaged. These developments have re-
sulted in the capability to optimize productivity, fuel consumption, tire wear, and other 
parameters to improve the lifecycle economics of the machine. The next level of intelli-
gence for machines involves interacting with the environment, including taking instruc-
tions from production planning, communicating with the maintenance system locally or 
with a remote help desk, and interacting with the other machines to avoid collisions. 
Since machines were invented, operators have occupied the cabin and applied judge-
ment. Replacing human judgement with an algorithm is the essence of robotics in this 
research. This is already common with machines in the process industry but not to the 
same degree e.g. in farming, mining or port operations. For security reasons, industrial 
robotics has separated the man from the machine, but advancements are paving the 
way for humans to cooperate with robots in industrial applications. 
When a decision-maker’s objective is to switch to automation, it is most likely due to 
the anticipation of a better financial return than can be obtained by continuing to invest 
in the manual alternative. The technology is relatively novel, and there are concerns 
about reliability and safety, which can become better or worse. At the same time, it can 
be expected that the underlying technologies are still rapidly progressing. Automation 
causes unemployment for machine operators, but it might be more environmentally 
friendly; different benefits for different stakeholders. To reduce the inertia in automation 
and unmanned operations, that is related to the undesirable societal impact of unem-
ployment; various innovations that enable humans to work with robots should be pro-
moted as suggested by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2012). 
Robotics is also a field in which development in consumer businesses converges with 
industrial businesses. There are similar underlying technologies, such as machine sight 
or navigation. A self-driving Google car and the service robots in hospitals have more 
of an impact on the attitudes of the public than the welding robots in the 1980s. BCC 
research has forecasted that autonomous robots make up the largest category of smart 
machines (others are expert systems, neurocomputers, smart embedded systems, and 
intelligent assistants) with a $13.9 billion annual market.19 Cyber security is a core is-
sue in all digitalization concepts, but autonomous machines are directly vulnerable. 
Kohler and Colbert-Taylor (2015) stated that cyber hacking and cyberterrorism are fac-
                                               
19  http://www.bccresearch.com/pressroom/ias/global-market-smart-machines-expected-reach-
$15.3-billion-2019, 12.8.2015 
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tors accompanied by legal issues that affect the timing of the expansion of autonomous 
vehicles.  
 
Summary 
Concepts within digitalization are interlinked, and several concepts are systemic in na-
ture. Human behaviors drive the speed of the emergence of digitalization, which is not 
only influenced by rational benefits but also by usability and the user interface. There is 
not necessarily consensus regarding how the impact of the disruptive nature of individ-
ual concepts differs from industry to industry or for the potential timing. This disserta-
tion has focused on disruptiveness in the machine-building industry, which serves 
global ports and terminals. Whether or not views of the value chain differ between ena-
blers, actors, and users was also investigated. Some of the concepts are likely to be 
disruptive based on recent advancements and the economics of technology; for other 
concepts, technology must continue to advance or become more economical to cause 
a disruptive impact. It is also likely that the point of technological advancements or 
economics differs between industries. As indicated by the research question, the up-
time is critical for the value chain investigated, which implies that most likely, the way 
Uber disrupted the taxi business would not automatically be applicable in mission criti-
cal processes, though there are conceptual leanings from Uber. 
Westerman et al. (2012) introduced a matrix in which they defined the digital mastery 
level on the vertical axis as dependent on digital capability, and the horizontal axis was 
dependent on leadership capability. Applying this definition, they developed four levels: 
Beginners, Conservatives, Fashionistas, and Digital Masters. Based on the research 
data, they applied the matrix to several industries, which is illustrated in Figure 10. In 
this figure, enablers would be closest to high technology industries which are on the 
Digital Mastery level. Manufacturing was placed on the Beginner’s level.  
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Figure 10. Maturity by industry, (Westerman et al., 2012) 
 
 Synthesis on industry evolution, strategy formation, and 2.4
digitalization 
The phenomena and mechanisms investigated are part of the industry evolution; the 
theory sections discussed seminal theories that explain the dynamics of the industry 
evolution, such as the Five Forces (Porter, 1979), the role of the stakeholders (Free-
man, 2015), or emerging theories of industry convergence. The nature of the evolution 
was also investigated, which involves stepwise or disruptive continuous improvement. 
The focal theories are S-Curves (Foster, 1987), Technological Trajectories (Dosi 1982), 
Sustaining and Disruptive Technologies (Christensen 2011), or Diffusion of Innovations 
(Rogers, 2003).  
As the investigation focused on disruption or paradigm changes, the economics view is 
Schumpeterian (2012) in that larger disruptions in economies are linked not only to the 
technology or economy but also to politics and society at large. The basic elements of 
the factors of production are labor, raw materials, and capital. Knowledge labor is in 
key role in digitalization, which has strong links to knowledge-based value creation, 
which is illustrated by concepts such as Outcome Economy (World Economic Forum 
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2015). Capital and perhaps the more risk-seeking Venture Capital are expected to play 
roles in the development.  
The catalyst in Schumpeterian (2008) disruption (Creative Destruction) is the entrepre-
neur. In this dissertation, they are represented by the individual firm. A major way for a 
firm to cause disruption is related to innovation, which is often referred to as radical 
innovation in disruption. The intent, direction, plans, and resources of innovation are 
based on strategies of firms. Strategy formation was reviewed based on the 10 schools 
of strategies in the classification system developed by Minzberg et al. (1998). The plat-
form is a new element that has emerged in the digital era in economics and strategy 
formation. Platforms are also closely linked to Open Innovation and Crowds, which 
were included in the discussion of network economy.  Five Forces (Porter, 1979) is 
very value chain based and Crowds or networks are not conceptually included. 
Firms are key players in B2B business. The strategy formation and decisions regarding 
resources are made by management. The decisions are influenced by collected beliefs, 
such as Industry Recipes (Spender, 1989), Dominant Logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), 
and the governance and culture or individual beliefs that have an impact on manage-
ment cognition, which include Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1991), Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and values. Implementation is likely to be affected by 
the same beliefs as well as factors such as leadership style and capabilities, which 
include Absorptive Capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and Dynamic Capabilities 
(Teece, 2007). 
Digitalization is a systemic phenomenon, and its ability to enable disruption is likely to 
vary based on different theories of economics or strategic management. In addition, the 
disruption potential of individual digital concepts varies. Digitalization concepts were 
reviewed based on current literature and practices with the assumption that they can 
potentially cause disruption within the limits of the research question. 
The theory discussion, whether it is linked to economics, industry evolution, strategy 
formation, or individual technologies, examined elements that drive progress as well as 
elements that inhibit progress. The balance of these forces has an impact on speed 
and direction. The forces are easier to analyze individually; however, larger impacts are 
most likely due to the systemic impact of the forces as a whole.  
The summary of this literature review is illustrated in Figure 11. All potential drivers in 
the yellow section include sub-drivers that can work as inhibitors or accelerators. They 
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are based on the characteristics of the driver itself, or they can be caused by societal 
and political factors or various beliefs that have been reviewed. The model uses the 
Five Forces (Porter, 1979) and Stakeholders (Freeman, 2015) as one theory and con-
vergence as a different type of theory to explain industry dynamics. Radical innovation 
represents the means, Digital Business Models, and Networks, Crowds, Platforms as 
specific phenomena involved in digitalization. Firm, strategy, and management repre-
sent resources. Capital is specifically linked to Risk Capital. Digital technologies are 
AM/3D, Big Data/AI, Cloud, IoT, MBSE, and Robotics tools. Their systemic impact can 
be continuous improvement, quantum leaps, or disruption, which might be different in 
products, service operations, and business models of an industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The research object 
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3 Methodological foundation 
Considering the ways digitalization has impacted media and retail businesses, it is fair 
to state that a similar disruption or paradigm change has not occurred in the machine- 
building industry. This does not exclude the pockets of value creation disruption that 
already take place or some of the mechanisms of potential disruption that are similar in 
machine-building industry as in industries in which the impacts of digitalization are al-
ready visible. The purpose of the inquiry was to increase understanding; is disruption 
likely to happen, what will be disrupted, which factors drive or inhibit the disruption, and 
is the view on disruption different in the value chain. The focus of the inquiry includes 
innovations whose characteristics and performance are factual, but disruption depends 
on how the innovations, tools, or methodologies are applied in the future, which is a 
result of the decisions made now by the management or by the choices people do as 
employees in the firms or privately as consumers.  “Better” technology does not always 
win in the market place, which occurred in the Betamax vs. VHS case. The characteris-
tics of the investigation guided the applicable frameworks based on the philosophy of 
science, practical methodology, and the research design, which are discussed in this 
chapter.  
 Research philosophy 3.1
Positivism and hermeneutics form the dividing worldviews of science for this disserta-
tion. The positivistic worldview assumes that the findings are true and objective, the 
hypotheses are verified as facts or laws, values are not applied, and the research re-
sults are not dependent on the researcher (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The hermeneutic 
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worldview seeks understanding and posits that the essence of the relation between the 
researcher and the environment and the lack of absolute truth does not make the re-
search results unscientific (Gadamer, 2013).  
The positivistic worldview of science can address issues of discoveries that enable 
digital applications. Magnetoresistive random-access memory, which enabled the 
emergence of the hard disc drive, is based on laws of physics; however, Moore’s 
law cannot explain the cost or capacity of the memory chips in the future in a way that 
would meet the scientific criteria of positivism. As the majority of technologies that can 
enable potential disruption are already commercially available, the focus of this re-
search was not to predict the future development of these technologies but to increase 
understanding of the impacts on business, which is similar to the ethos of hermeneutics. 
The epistemology and ontology of future studies is another perspective in this research. 
The fundamental question is whether the future is predetermined or whether there are 
multiple futures that are results of today’s decisions. Moreover, does the goal of a de-
sirable future drive these decisions? There are several views among scholars that sup-
port the openness of the future, and concepts such as Futuribles (De Jouvenel, 1967) 
and Futures Map (Kuusi et al., 2015) are used. Godet (1994) added action to his con-
cept of Strategic Prospective, which underlines action orientation rather than fatalistic 
thinking as a base. Popper (2002) also stated in his harsh criticisms of historicism that 
“the future depends on ourselves, and we do not depend on any historical necessity.” 
Several possible futures are also the essence of scenario thinking as a methodology. 
This does not mean that the future would not be impacted by history or by the current 
state of affairs. Van der Heijden (2002) addressed the issue by presenting a diminish-
ing amount of the predetermined issues and a growing share of uncertainty as a func-
tion of time –measured as distance from current affairs. Using this framework, he iden-
tified three ways to predict the future based on distance into the future: forecasts, sce-
narios, and hope.     
As the desirable future includes an assumption of value according to Niiniluoto, 
knowledge seeking has several commonalities with design sciences (Niiniluoto, 2013). 
Based on the use of knowledge, research can be categorized into descriptive and nor-
mative research (Olkkonen, 1994). The objective of normative research is to guide fu-
ture development, and therefore design science can be considered normative accord-
ing to Olkkonen (1994). Malaska (2013) referred to research of the future as futurology, 
which includes basic research and philosophy of science questions about researching 
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the future, future studies that involve applying rigorous methodologies, and foresight, 
which applies research of the future to making better decisions. 
In his book, Creswell (2003) suggested a framework that was used to guide the meth-
odological choices of this research, which is presented in Table 1. Although it simplifies 
the schools of the philosophy of science, it offers a current view that considers the di-
lemma between positivism and hermeneutics.  
Postpositivism Constructivism 
 Determination 
 Reductionism 
 Empirical observation and measurement 
 Theory verification 
 
 Understanding 
 Multiple participant meanings 
 Social and historical construction 
 Theory generation 
Transformative Pragmatism 
 Political 
 Power and justice oriented 
 Collaborative 
 Change oriented 
 
 Consequences of actions 
 Problem-centered 
 Pluralistic 
 Real-world practice oriented 
Table 1.  Four worldviews (Creswell, 2003)    
The research question does not fall into the postpositivism category based on earlier 
arguments about positivism. The transformative view has a strong link to political sci-
ence, and therefore is not an ideal guiding framework, either; however, the four charac-
teristics of pragmatism suit the research question. Creswell also pointed out that prag-
matism is not committed to one view in the philosophy of science. Thus, there are ele-
ments of constructivism in this research. The objective was not to identify a framework 
or model that explains or predicts disruption or its mechanisms; however, if findings 
that can be presented in a descriptive framework emerged during the research, the 
characteristics could be viewed as related to the worldview of constructivism.  
Digitalization has been described as a set of systemic technologies, as it simultaneous-
ly impacts the business environment, stakeholders of the firm, and the way value is 
created. Digitalization can also lead to new types of products, services, operations, and 
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business models. Dussauge et al. (1992) stated that generic technologies can have 
numerous applications in various businesses and industries. In a broad sense, digitali-
zation is not a paradigm itself; however, based on the definition of the use of a para-
digm (Kuhn, 1996), as discussed in Chapter 2, there are multiple practical paradigms, 
e.g., business models applied by enablers, actors, and users, which are related to digi-
talization. Still, some paradigms involve a broader context, such as whether economies 
will be more open or closed. Paradigms can guide scientific work despite the lack of a 
standard interpretation according to Kuhn (1996); the same logic is evident when de-
veloping a business. Identifying solid causal truths regarding digitalization as a para-
digm changer in the machine-building industry is unlikely, which creates challenges in 
presenting the results of the findings. System thinking offers a viable alternative. For-
rester (1994) stated that system thinking can be applied to system dynamics. In the 
same article, he (Forrester, 1994) argued that systems thinking and soft operations 
research fit well together in the conceptualization phase of researching system dynam-
ics. He also asserted that the rise of soft operations research partly occurred because it 
can address issues of physical and social systems simultaneously.  
 Mixed methods 3.2
The obvious benefit of mixed methods is the triangulation of qualitative research with 
quantitative methods. For this dissertation, qualitative methods were the Delphi inter-
views and case descriptions whereas quantitative methods were used for the survey. 
All three methods are discussed in their respective sub-chapters. The validity and reli-
ability of the methods are reviewed in chapter 5.3.  
The ethos of this dissertation involves hermeneutics, and there was an intrinsic as-
sumption that the object of inquiry is too complex to achieve a solid understanding; 
however, if the mixed methods overlap, are related to the research question, and gen-
erate unique perspectives, triangulation and a holistic understanding can be achieved.  
Greene et al. (1989) evaluated the aspects of using mixed method designs and identi-
fied five purposes: Triangulation, Complementary, Development, Initiation, and Expan-
sion. Creswell (2003) classified the research strategy of the mixed methods into Se-
quential, Concurrent, or Transformative. During development, one method feeds other 
methods, which could be considered similar to Creswell’s (2003) Sequential category. 
Expansion seeks to extend breadth, whereas initiation is related to the discovery of 
new perspectives. Greene et al. (1989) analyzed how mixed methods are integrated as 
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part of an analysis or as part of an interpretation. Out of 57 mixed research projects 
they evaluated, they concluded that almost half had no integration and that almost 80 % 
of those with integration were part of the interpretation. 
Using the classification system of Greene et al. (1989) and Creswell (2003), the re-
search design of this dissertation utilized triangulation and expansion for the mixed 
method design. The process was partly sequential and partly concurrent so that the 
findings from an earlier phase could be used in fine-tuning the following phases. The 
sequential and concurrent phases of the research design, and triangulation and expan-
sion are illustrated in Figure 12. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The research design 
 Delphi method 3.3
The purpose of the investigation was to understand whether there is emerging disrup-
tion enabled by digitalization in a machine-building industry that serves global ports and 
terminals as well as the mechanisms that drive or inhibit it. Important assumption is that 
dynamics is impacted by differences of the view in the value chain, which has been 
simplified to enablers, actors, and users. The source of empirical data was based on 
experts’ opinions and their predictions regarding future development. One objective of 
the design of the Delphi interviews was a balanced distribution of the experts and their 
areas of expertise.  
Cases 
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The Delphi method is not the only option for studying future developments. Other op-
tions include systems and evolution methods, scenarios, other expert methods, and the 
creative identification of weak signals (Kuusi et al., 2013). A rigorous system and evolu-
tion analysis would have required a large quantity of data over a long period, which 
reduced the feasibility of applying the methodology in a reasonable amount of time. 
Scenario research would have been an effective option. It was not selected because it 
can be applied later using the results from the Delphi methodology, as Mannermaa 
(1999) suggested in his book. Weak signals or important rare events, which Taleb 
(2010) referred to as “Black Swans,” could have been used to identify qualitative fac-
tors that can cause disruption. Digitalization is described as a complex systemic phe-
nomenon. Taleb stated that “a complex domain is characterized by the following ele-
ments, both temporal (a variable depends on its past changes), horizontal (variables 
depend on one another), and diagonal (variable A depends on the past history of vari-
able B). As a result of this interdependence, mechanisms are subject to positive, rein-
forcing feedback loops, which cause ‘fat tails.’” This dissertation assumes that the ma-
jority of enabling technology already exists and is economical enough to have a disrup-
tive potential, and therefore the focus is on understanding managers’ decisions in ap-
plying the technologies. This also implies that the systemic loops referred to in Taleb’s 
definition are more important than identifying new “Black Swans.” There are also expert 
methods other than Delphi, such as various workshop methods in which a group of 
experts collaborate to solve a problem. The required professional and geographical 
aspects of the method would have been both impractical and expensive. Obtaining a 
holistic picture implied that some experts would be from competing organizations, and 
therefore the anonymity of the Delphi methodology was an integral requirement.   
The Delphi method was named after the Oracle of the ancient Greek town of Delphi, 
and it got the modern methodology from the Rand Corporation, which investigated po-
tential US industrial bombing targets from the perspective of a Soviet strategic planner 
in the 1950s (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). Linstone and Turoff (2002) characterized the 
Delphi method as: 
“Structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in al-
lowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem.” 
One of the reasons to use the Delphi method according to Mannermaa (1999) is to 
manage large complex problems between disciplines that lack common experience, 
methodology, and language. Rowe and Wright (1999) stated that anonymity, iteration, 
controlled feedback, and statistical aggregation of a group response are essential fea-
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tures of the Delphi technique. Based on the researched cases, they concluded that 
Delphi can outperform statistical groups. They also argued that variations in the use of 
Delphi methodology increase the difficulty of verifying its validity. Originally, the Delphi 
process was intended to create an increasing consensus with a panel by repeating 
rounds (Linstone and Turoff, 2002). Kuusi (1999) argued that the panelists’ arguments 
of their standpoints (for or against) over a straightforward consensus seeking are more 
useful in detecting future developments. Kuusi called this Delphi variant “Argument 
Delphi.” There are also special techniques, such as the use of images to encourage 
panelists to form an opinion (Adelson and Aroni, 2002). Their study revealed that the 
use of patterns created stronger differences in the subgroups. The risk of using images 
involves a growing variance in the interpretation of the actual question that might void 
the benefit of user-friendliness that using images offers. 
The Delphi technique has been criticized. The earliest and most cited criticism was 
from Sackman (1974), who based his critique on an extensive review of completed 
Delphi studies and concluded that the methodology should not be used until additional 
scientific procedures are incorporated. In his list of 16 conclusions, most are related to 
the applications of Delphi, such as in selecting experts or designing questionnaires. He 
criticized the forced consensus and suggested empirical experiments based on the 
methods of social sciences, which implied that the conventional Delphi method would 
move closer to positivistic worldview. Kuusi’s (1999) response to Sackman’s critique 
was that Sackman criticized Delphi based on opinion polls (transient invariances in 
opinion research), whereas the purpose of Delphi should be identifying relevant argu-
ments for future development. 
Using modern ICT technology improves the technical applicability of Delphi. Panels can 
be organized in which a large number of participants follow the Delphi process and its 
features. The development of preprogrammed algorithms enables real-time feedback.  
This development favors quantitative methods in analyzing the panelists’ feedback. As 
quantitative methods were applied to the survey for this dissertation, face-to-face Del-
phi interviews were conducted to better understand the views of individual panelists. 
The source of information for the Delphi method is the expert, which requires the re-
searcher to follow specific guidelines. Experts must be selected in a way that he or she 
possesses the necessary knowledge to provide expert answers. The question or the 
argument must be formulated in a way that the answer contributes to the actual re-
search problem. The research design must minimize the risk that the expert opinion 
reflects personal prejudices, biases, or distortion due to current events or any other 
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beliefs that cannot be completely eliminated. For example, recent digitalization publicity 
could cause experts to overestimate the impact, which behavior is described by Availa-
bility Heuristics (Kahneman, 2003). 
An important criterion for this research was the richness of data. For the Delphi rounds, 
this involved both the roles and backgrounds of the panelists. Kuusi (1999) offered a 
framework of the experts’ roles in predicting future developments that can expand the 
richness of the data, which is presented in Table 2. 
 Types of expertise 
Scientists 
Knowledge on invariance 
- permanent invariances of non-learning beings 
- transient invariances: habits, routines, and equilibrium points 
of learning actors 
Decision-makers 
Real and perceived capacity limits, perceived interests and 
routines, and real and perceived capability limits 
Synthesizers Relevant invariances, relevant capacity limits, relevant inter-
ests, and relevant capability limits  
Table 2. Three types of experts on future developments (Kuusi, 1999) 
In Kuusi’s framework, the learning being may have a different behavioral disposition 
now than in the future based on experiences; the learning being also has intent and an 
active memory. The capacity is based on the resources available to act. According to 
Kuusi, real capability limits are boundaries of rational behavior. He also noted that 
when real and perceived capability limits are combined, the actor behaves rationally. 
Kuusi’s (1999) capability statement is not derived from the competence of an individual 
or organization. Kuusi’s General Theory of Consistency posits that a “learning being 
continuously changes its cognitive map in response to experiences of inconsistency.” 
An important feature is that the decision-makers on a higher hierarchical level can 
move beyond the capacity and capability limits of a decision-maker of a lower hierarchy. 
A practitioner’s interpretation of the synthesizer is that they master relevance by being 
able to operate both in the scientist’s and decision-maker’s space. To illustrate this role, 
in the interviews, they are visually placed in the presentation frameworks in between 
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scientists and decision-makers, which is a different visual placement than in Kuusi’s 
framework shown in Table 2. 
The value chain was a background factor of this investigation. The value chain is a 
simplified version of Porter’s (1985) value chain (Figure 7) and it only includes enablers, 
actors, and users. Eliminating logistics or any other part of the physical value chain 
reflects the focus on value creation that is based on knowledge enabled by digitaliza-
tion. Therefore, the enablers are defined as the firms that supply digital technologies or 
related services. Porter’s value chain (1985) is similar to the operations. Operation it-
self can be an object of disruption caused by digitalization. The users are the global 
ports and terminals. The framework of experts was designed by merging Porter’s (1985) 
simplified value chain with the role of expertise in future development by Kuusi (1999). 
As both views consist of three elements, the size of the expert matrix will be 3x3. 
3.3.1 Delphi round one 
The digital technologies and concepts in economics and strategic management pre-
sented in Figure 11 were derived from the literature. The first objective of the Delphi 
interview round one was to determine whether the selection was relevant based on the 
judgment of the experts. The validation included all six technological concepts and the 
two concepts that are directly related to digitalization (Digital Business Models and 
Networks, Crowds and Platforms). The other five concepts were not included in the 
validation because they were either seminal theories used to explain industry evolution 
or fundamental components in economics, such as firms and capital. The first round of 
interviews either added or removed concepts from the pre-chosen 8 (6+2) concepts of 
the framework. The likelihood was low, as the concepts are rather generic in nature, 
but it is important to mitigate the prejudices that the researcher might have had when 
designing the framework based on the literature and research question.  
The second objective of the interviews was to identify arguments that might explain 
factors that either accelerate or inhibit the concepts of the framework. The framework 
included six technological and seven economic/ strategic management concepts. The 
accelerators and inhibitors had to be in the same abstraction level in order to be able 
draw later on conclusions. The high number of concepts meant that the abstraction 
level was higher if the focus would have been one or two concepts. This was mitigated 
by encouraging the panelists to express concrete justification or examples when choos-
ing accelerators or inhibitors. The concepts were referred to as drivers, and the accel-
erating and inhibiting factors were referred to as sub-drivers. The interviews were semi-
  
93 
 
structured. The user interviewees in the first Delphi round were other than ports and 
terminals to include the expansion aspect (Greene et al. 1989). The reason for expan-
sion is that there might be information in other industries that has not been learned in 
ports and terminals but that is or will be applicable to ports and terminals.  
The round one interviews included 2-4 experts in each cell of the 3x3 matrix. For value 
chain selection, firms were required to meet the criteria defined in the research ques-
tion, including the expansion in round one. Role section was relatively easy for deci-
sion-makers, as it can be narrowed down to owners, chairmen of the boards, CEOs, or 
those who manage a large business (from directors to executive vice presidents). The 
same logic was applied for the synthesizer, and the titles typically varied from CIO and 
CTO to various titles that indicate that the person is responsible for development relat-
ed to the research question. Scientist selection was more demanding, as the number of 
potential persons even from one university was very high. The criteria for interviewees 
included publications or experience working with the industry in a specific part of the 
value chain that the role the scientist would represent. In all interviews the importance 
of the personal expert view was highlighted instead of “official” view of the background 
organization. 
The process of the structured part of the first Delphi round was as follows:  
1. Role in the 3x3 matrix  
2. Research question 
3. Research design (Figure 12) and research object (Figure 11) 
4. Objectives of the interview (drivers and sub-drivers) 
An important part of the research object brief was the conceptual distinction between 
continuous improvement, quantum leaps, and disruption and the description of the dif-
ferent technologies. The time and style of descriptions was adjusted to match individual 
interviews, as all experts chosen possessed high expertise in most concepts, and their 
expertise in individual concepts exceeded the expertise of the interviewer. The open 
portion of the interview allowed experts to express any perspectives that might be rele-
vant to the research question that were not included in the framework.  
Some of the participants were likely to be insiders in public companies, and some of 
the questions might be sensitive. Therefore, the interviews were not recorded. The in-
terviewees were also assured that none of the memos would be distributed, no quotes 
with names would be used, and no results would be presented in a way that would re-
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veal their identities. The interviewees would most likely have approved recording, but 
they would also most likely have filtered their views. Interesting views of potential dis-
ruption do not necessarily align e.g. with the current agenda of the firm, and recording 
was not done even if some details were missed in the written notes. Harvey (2011) 
concluded that this is a tradeoff that the researcher must choose for interviews when 
trust is of utmost importance. Walsham (2006) argued that recording has a disad-
vantage in that the interview might be less open or truthful. This would increase the risk 
of favoring arguments that are better suited to the organization of the respondent. The 
outcomes of the interviews included documented views on the disruptiveness of pre-
sented drivers and suggested sub-drivers. 
3.3.2 Delphi round two 
The objective of the second interview round was to rank the selected drivers, and the 
three most important sub-drivers that either accelerate or inhibit drivers. The suggested 
sub-drivers were derived from the literature and Delphi round one. The experts were 
permitted to present new sub-drivers as well. When a new sub-driver emerged, that 
sub-driver was available for the next interview. The pattern of the emergence of new 
sub-drivers and their order of rank provided additional data on the consensus patterns 
in the value chain. Delphi round two also included an open portion in which the experts 
could either elaborate on their rankings and suggestions of new sub-drivers or express 
their views of the research question regarding whether digitalization is disruptive for the 
machine-building industry, which part of value creation is mostly impacted, or which 
mechanisms cause disruption. 
The selection of the population was done based on the same principles as described in 
Delphi round one with two exceptions. The size of the population was expanded to four 
experts in each of the cells to enrich both international coverage as well as the cover-
age of the firms and universities. Some of the experts were the same as in round one. 
The second difference was that the users were only from ports and terminals. For uni-
versities, this implies that the experts had researched transportation or logistics. This 
increased the focus on the research question. The interviews were not recorded based 
on the same reasons as the round one Delphi interviews.  
For the structured questions, either VAS (Visual Analogue Scales) or Likert scales 
could have been used. The motivation to use order ranking was to encourage experts 
to think critically. The use of a Likert scale could generate average ratings, which would 
yield similar values for several of the drivers and sub-drivers. This result could have 
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been avoided by eliminating the midpoint of the Likert scale, which according to Gar-
land (1991) is effective for socially unacceptable answers. Fabbris (2013) showed that 
the mental effort further increases during order ranking than rating, which suggests that 
for order ranking, the choices should be below 10. The procedure can be simplified by 
concentrating first on the highest and lowest. For the drivers, this was achieved by 
ranking only six digital technologies and seven economic/ strategic management driv-
ers. The selection of only the 3+3 most important drivers for the sub-driver ranking was 
partly done to simplify the mental effort, as Fabbris (2013) argued. The second reason 
was to maximize the interview time so that issues that the expert judged to be most 
relevant to the research question could also be discussed.  
The experts were told that the logic of disruption is based on the Schumpeterian (2012) 
concept, which was reduced to the PEST model from which drivers were derived from 
digitalization (technology in PEST), economic/strategic management (Economy in 
PEST) literature, and Delphi round one interviews. Political and social factors were 
present (if deemed applicable) in the sub-drivers that either accelerated or inhibited the 
digital or economic/ strategic management drivers.  
The process for the structured part of Delphi round two was as follows: 
1. Briefing 
2. Order ranking of technology drivers 
3. Order ranking of economic/strategic management drivers  
4. Technology (digitalization concepts) driver number one 
a. Suggestion of new inhibiting sub-drivers 
b. Order ranking (1,2,3) of the inhibiting sub-drivers 
c. Suggestion of new acceleration sub-drivers 
d. Order ranking (1,2,3) of the accelerating sub-drivers 
5. Economic / strategic management driver number one  
a. Suggestion of new inhibiting sub-drivers 
b. Order ranking (1,2,3) of the inhibiting sub-drivers 
c. Suggestion of new acceleration sub-drivers 
d. Order ranking (1,2,3) of the accelerating sub-drivers 
6. Repeating the same process as no. 2 and 3 technology and economic /strategic 
management drivers 
 
7. Free comments 
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The presentation slides used for the panelists are shown in Appendix 2. 
 Survey 3.4
The first objective of the survey was to triangulate the results from the Delphi interviews 
for all digitalization drivers and economic/ strategic management drivers that are direct-
ly linked to digitalization (Digital Business Models and Networks, Crowds, Platforms). 
As the respondent’s time spent on the survey was considerably less than the time 
spent by the interviewees, Digital Business Models were simplified to the Industrial 
Internet, which is assumed to be better known, and Networks, Crowds, Platforms were 
simplified to Open Innovation for the same reason. To enable triangulation, participa-
tion followed the same 3x3 matrix as the Delphi interviews. The objective was to 
achieve a minimum of 250 responses. 
The survey also expanded the breadth and scope of the inquiry (Greene et al. 1989) of 
the Delphi interviews in three different areas. First, there was an expansion to the 
judgment of the explicit systemic impact of the digital technologies to firms’ products, 
services, operations, and business models. The second expansion was the participants’ 
judgments on timing if they perceived that the systemic impact of the digital technolo-
gies would be disruptive. The third expansion involved understanding how well the 
firms or research institutes are prepared for the potential disruption based on the re-
spondents views on future development. This implies that a small investment may be 
adequate if the digitalization impact is perceived to be low. 
The reason for the targeted size of the population is that it enabled conducting statisti-
cal tests using the background factors (independent variables), which in this case are 
the respondents’ place in the value chain and the role of expertise in predictions of the 
future. A third background factor could be the respondents’ judgments on how well their 
organization is prepared for potential digitally enabled disruption. Values assigned to 
the various technologies and concepts, and the impact to products, services, opera-
tions, and business models also offer the possibility to analyze dependencies using 
statistical methods. 
3.4.1 Experiment 
One issue related to surveys is a low response rate according to a study by Baruch 
(1999) in which data from 175 different studies was used. His result showed an aver-
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age response rate of 55.6 %, but only 36.1 % in studies in which respondents were 
from top management or companies. For surveys, there are also unknown factors, in-
cluding who actually completed the questionnaire and whether or not the respondents 
understood the questions in the same way. The design of this survey attempted to miti-
gate these problems using a method in which the respondents were recruited from 
seminars, either organized by conference companies, research institutes, or compa-
nies internally. Seminars were selected so that almost all audience members would 
represent one of the roles in the matrix. The survey began by presenting the definition 
of the concepts used in the survey, explaining the response process, and instructions 
regarding how to complete the expert matrix position. The objective was diversity in 
both companies and geography. This process design provided close to a 100 % re-
sponse rate and fewer misinterpretations of the questions than in mailed question-
naires. One risk is related to the question of whether representatives in the seminars 
were from a relevant population. The study by Short et al. (2002) revealed that based 
on 437 studies, less than 20 % used random sampling. They also evaluated one study 
related to CEO performance and concluded that different sample strategies provided 
different results.  This survey included a hybrid approach in which company internal 
seminars typically have a predetermined population, but open seminars have a more 
random audience. The obvious risk is that the nine cells could be either underrepre-
sented or unevenly distributed. The matrix offers a possibility for comparison by aggre-
gating the value chain roles or doing the same for the expert roles, which would both 
provide a group of three for comparison. The whole population could also be used as a 
statistical comparison group against the aggregated Delphi interview results.  
A mixture of a structured scale and a VAS scale was used as a measurement tool, 
which was applied so that respondents first determined whether the impact of an indi-
vidual question was continuous improvement, a quantum leap, or disruption. Under the 
chosen category, the respondents indicated the strength of the impact by placing an “x” 
on a continuous scale in which the furthest left is the weakest impact, and the furthest 
right is the strongest. During the analysis, the three categories were then divided into 
three sections so that continuous improvement in the first section received a value of 1 
and last section received a disruption value of 9. The categories were marked with col-
ors to differentiate between them, but there were no red, green, or yellow colors to 
avoid any impression of desirability. The Likert scale and its derivatives are predomi-
nantly used in business research, but VAS is most effective when a respondent has a 
strong view on a topic but some of the reasons might be difficult to explain. Based on 
the definition of VAS in research articles, it is mainly used in medical research, such as 
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when patients must rate the degree of pain. The expansion of VAS to other sciences 
seems to be related to online surveys, which can partly be explained because the use 
of VAS with pen and paper has an extra phase due to recording the VAS result into a 
numerical value. In online surveys, this can be programmed as an automatic feature, 
and there are VAS engines available on the Internet. Neibecker (1984) studied struc-
tured scales and continuous scales with two test groups and concluded that there were 
no major differences in the results; however, he determined that the continuous scales 
might have better user interfaces, as they are less monotonous and also allow for more 
accurate answers than structured scales. The VAS results from this research were re-
structured; the raw data remains available for further research using also the detailed 
values.  
The experiment proceeded in the following sequence: 
1. Background (research question, definitions, process, instructions for the role)  
2. Answering section one (impact to products, services, operations, business 
models) individually with a 30 second time limit for each judgment 
3. After section two, the participants indicated disruption in any of the categories 
were instructed to have a view how long it takes that the disruption has reached 
a status that it is a normal way of doing business, 60 seconds  
4. In section three, the instructions were repeated, and thereafter, participants in-
dicated their views on the disruptiveness of individual technology and econom-
ic/ strategic management drivers (120 seconds).  
5. Finally, the participants rated the readiness of their organization in 30 seconds. 
The data collection was formatted with exact timing. The same presentation slides 
were used, and each slide had the same script to minimize variance between the ex-
periments. The total duration of the experiment was 20 minutes. The survey form is 
shown in Appendix 3. 
 
3.4.2 Analysis 
The survey data was filtered and completed before the analysis. During filtering, sam-
ples that were missing any background information (independent variables) were ex-
cluded. The final question was answered using the VAS scale (which had guiding 
numbers shown in Appendix 3) to indicate his or her organization’s preparedness for 
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the potential disruption, which is an interesting result, per se; however, the answer was 
also used as additional background information. This was accomplished by dividing the 
VAS scale in three equal sections so that the answers close to 0 were neutral, answers 
closer to -2 were regressive, and the answers closer to +2 were progressive. 
The pen and paper method was used for the survey, and after filtering, the data was 
typed into the Excel database so that each row represented one respondent. After the 
initial input, all data points in the database were checked twice to minimize marking or 
typing errors. Completion was done by replacing the missing value in the sample with a 
value that was the average value of the variable given by respondents in the same 
role/value chain matrix. Completion reduces variance, and it is selected to be applied 
based on the total amount of missing values in the whole population.  
After completion, whether the data followed a normal distribution was verified, as this 
impacts the choices of analysis. This was done using the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro 
and Wilk, 1965), which according to Razali and Wah (2011) is the most powerful of the 
four normality tests they evaluated as long as the population size is above 30. The 
Shapiro-Wilk test as well as other analyses and visualizations were completed using 
the Microsoft Excel add-on statistical tool XLSTAT20. 
The role of expertise in future (Kuusi, 1999) creates different perspectives. The object 
of inquiry was to understand how the views differ based on where the respondent is in 
the value chain, and the role of expertise is used to enrich the perspective. Also, the 
additional independent variable, the preparedness of respondents’ organizations for the 
potential disruption, might explain the given values. This creates a risk of generalization 
of the results if the size of sub-populations differs, as some of the sub-populations can 
either dominate or be under-represented. For generalization, the size of all populations 
should be between 10 and 20 (tight control); otherwise, it should exceed 30 (Roscoe, 
1975). Forcing equal representation later on would create a risk that the new samples 
would not be comparable with old samples. The generalization risk can be mitigated by 
balancing the sub-populations in which each sample is assigned a coefficient that bal-
ances the contribution of each sub-population in the entire population. To obtain the 
coefficient for individual samples, the total weight of the sub-population is divided by 
the number of samples in the corresponding sub-population. In further analyses, se-
lected methods can utilize the coefficients when calculating weighted averages or vari-
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 https://www.xlstat.com/en/solutions/base 
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ances, for example. The data formed 27 sub-populations when using three independ-
ent variables (3x3x3).  
The final step before presenting the results was to ensure that the interaction effect did 
not distort the interpretation of the results. The interaction effect (Dawson, 2014) shad-
ows the true impact of the background factor as another background factor (also called 
a moderator) that affects the same value of the inquiry. The background factors of this 
inquiry were role, the place in the value chain, and perceived investment impact. The 
presence of the interaction effect in the balanced data was determined by running a 
two-way ANOVA test. 
The survey results are initially reported as individual results. The interpretation of the 
results is included in the discussion and conclusions Chapter 5 in which the results are 
compared to both the literature and the results using the other two methodologies. 
 Cases 3.5
The objective of the case descriptions was to illustrate that there are existing or emerg-
ing disruptive phenomena in the scope of the research. The descriptions indicate future 
developments through analogies, and they stem from De Jouvenel’s (1967) claim that 
the future must be plausible based on the current state of affairs. Analogies do have 
shortcomings, which Martino (1993) listed as: lack of inherent necessity (history was 
not based only on physical factors), historical uniqueness, historically conditioned 
awareness (do your homework well), and causal analogy (things are not normally the 
same in all respects). He also emphasized the need for holism when using analogies, 
as technological change is a result of technological, economic, managerial, political, 
social, cultural, intellectual, religious-ethical, and ecological dimensions, which is a 
similar viewpoint as PEST (Aguilar, 1967) and its derivatives regarding changes in the 
business environment of a firm. In this dissertation, analogies serve a hermeneutic 
purpose to increase understanding rather than to predict causality. 
Case research is a widely used method in management science, and case methodolo-
gy has been an integral part of the research of multiple highly cited articles and books 
(e.g., Chandler 1990, Christensen 2011, Gawer, and Cusamo 2002). The number of 
cases needed is based on the goal of the inquiry. A study by Benbasat et al. (1997) on 
the applicability of case research in information systems showed that if the aim is de-
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scriptive, a multiple case approach is recommended. Yin (2014) listed sources for case 
research data: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, partici-
pant observation, and physical artifacts. Case studies have similar sampling issues as 
other methodologies, but the methodology is chosen based on the aim of the investiga-
tion. Eisenhardt and Graebner (1997) discussed sampling in the theory building that 
utilizes case research: 
“The purpose of the research is to develop theory, not testing it, and theoretical 
(not random or stratified) sampling is appropriate. Theoretical sampling simply 
means that cases are selected because they particularly suitable for illuminating 
and extending relationships and logic among constructs.” 
The sampling in this study followed the view of Eisenhardt and Graebner (1997), espe-
cially because the role of the case descriptions involved triangulation and expansion. 
The criterion for the cases was that the firm was either conducting or planning (pub-
lished) to conduct business utilizing digital technology to create value in a novel way. 
Value is also created in a space between the current actors and users, and the case 
actor is not a direct competitor of the digital enabler of the case. The value potential 
must be considerable in comparison to the investment needed. In the case descriptions, 
the structure of the industry is described as well as how the case has created new val-
ue and how it is away from actors (either from the current business or future growth 
potential). The case data was collected from public sources but validated by the repre-
sentatives of the case firms or by the representative of actors impacted by the cases. 
The detailed case design was completed after reviewing Delphi one round and the pre-
liminary results from the survey, which follows the sequential approach of mixed meth-
ods (Creswell, 2003).  
The selected cases include Enevo21, Trimble22, and XVELA23. Enevo is a firm involved 
in waste collection, Trimble is involved in farming (the business case has several simi-
larities with the case presented by Porter and Heppelman (2014)), and XVELA is in-
volved in container shipping and handling. Detailed descriptions will be presented in 
Chapter 4.  
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 https://www.enevo.com/ 
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 http://www.trimble.com/ 
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 https://www.xvela.com/ 
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4 Results 
The results are presented by following the same mixed methods logic as in the previ-
ous chapter, and they form stand-alone sections. The comparison of the results by dif-
ferent methods is in the discussion and conclusion (Chapter 5), which is the inherent 
strength of the mixed methodology research design. The user in this enquiry has been 
a global terminal operator. Therefore, the first sub-chapter, 4.1., presents the charac-
teristics of the global container handling industry in order to create a background 
against which the results can be understood.   
 Global container handling industry 4.1
The generic industry is transportation, which has a sub-segment—cargo transporta-
tion—to separate it from passenger transportation. The focal mode of transport is sea 
transportation, even though land transportation is briefly discussed as part of the sup-
ply chain. Over 80% of global trade is seaborne (UNCTAD, 2015). The alternative 
mode to long-haul ocean shipping is air freight, whereas the short-haul shipping alter-
natives are transport by road, rail, or river. In sea transportation, the transported goods 
are liquids, gas, bulk, and break bulk. The containers are steel boxes used to carry the 
cargo, and are standardized in length, width, and height; the most common size is 40 
feet long, 8 feet wide, and 9.5 feet high, the volume of which determines the maximum 
dimension of the goods to be loaded into the container. The majority of the container-
ized cargo is break bulk, although even bulk and liquids can be transported in contain-
ers. A reefer container is a special container with an integrated cooling unit to keep 
perishable goods (e.g., food) in ideal condition during the voyage.  
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The transportation system has two main actors: the shipper and the consignee. The 
shipper or consignee can be a primary producer, factory, trading company or individual 
consumer, depending on the function of the transported goods.  
Ocean shipping originated hundreds of years ago, when the sailing ships were carrying 
spices from Asia to Europe. The loading and unloading of ships was manual work. 
Based on this dissertation, one can argue that the invention of the container in 1956 on 
the East Coast of the United States (Levinson, 2006) was a disruptive innovation in sea 
transportation. One of the interviewees in the first Delphi round commented that disrup-
tive innovations rarely satisfy fundamentally novel needs but rather satisfy old needs 
with a fraction of the cost. The container eventually met the criteria. Using today’s lan-
guage, one could say that the container was a platform that enabled disruption of the 
transportation system. With this view, the network effects were important—the number 
of actors who adapted to the new method and the degree to which freight was contain-
erized. One important characteristic was that the container set the international stand-
ards that complementors were able to use in their development—ship, truck, rail wagon 
and container handling machine builders. The container was a very important decision 
to a port, as the weight of the container—tens of tons—made it impossible to handle 
with manual labor, leading to the need for mechanization of ports and, consequently, 
the pioneering innovations in container handling equipment. The end result of the inno-
vations made transportation costs of many goods so low that the goods could be pro-
duced wherever it was most economical, regardless of the final place of usage. The 
innovations also created inertia, where the cost of changing the container as the plat-
form of the transportation system had become beyond justification.  
The user in this dissertation is a port operator in the service business. The needed in-
frastructure (e.g., quay, buildings, power supply) is often leased from the port authority. 
The main supplier for the port operator is the equipment manufacturer which provides 
the equipment needed for the operation. For running the port, the operator needs an 
array of services like ICT services, building and equipment maintenance, and security. 
The operator can opt for most of the services to be provided internally or by external 
vendors. The container operator—one of the port stakeholders—serves the shipping 
lines in the sea transport system and the trucking and railroad companies in the land 
transport system. If the operation is transshipment, the containers normally arrive in 
large vessels and are redistributed to continue transport by smaller vessels, and vice 
versa. Customs, freight forwarders, and labor unions are other typical port-specific 
stakeholders.  
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Industry has always been international due to the nature of shipping. The shippers and 
consignees are extremely fragmented, but the shipping lines, ports, and equipment 
suppliers have been consolidating over the years. The five largest shipping lines ac-
count for 48.7% of the global market (Alphaliner, 2016), while the five largest terminal 
operators represent 49.7% of the market (Drewry Maritime Research, 2014). In addi-
tion, the five largest equipment suppliers provide 87% of industry cranes and 66% of 
mobile equipment; three companies were present in both categories (Schäfer, 2014). 
Some of the shipping lines also operate terminals, which typically are also open for the 
other shipping lines. The five largest shipping lines appear in Table 3, and the five larg-
est terminal operators in Table 4. The container flows are driven by consumer markets, 
and the highest growth occurs when there is a growing middle class. For example, in 
2013, 54% of the world’s containers were handled by Asian ports (Drewry, 2014).  
 
Rank Operator Existing capacity / 
million TEU 
Market share 
1 APM-Maersk 3.1 14,7 % 
2 MSC 2.7 13.0 % 
3 CMA-CGM 1.8 8.8 % 
4 COSCON 1.5 7.4 % 
5 Hapag-Lloyd 0.9 4.5 % 
Table 3. Five largest shipping lines (Alphaliner, 2016) 
Rank 
2013 
Operator Throughput /  mil-
lion TEU 
Market share 
1 Hutchison Port Holdings 76,1 11.8 % 
2 APM Terminals 68.0 10.6 % 
3 PSA International 61.7 9.6 % 
4 Cosco Group 59.9 9.3 % 
5 DP World 53.7 8.4 % 
Table 4. Five largest terminal operators (Drewry Maritime Research, 2014) 
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The business environment for the shipping lines, ports, and equipment manufacturers 
can also be analyzed using the same framework, PEST (Aguilar, 1967), which was 
utilized in the Delphi interviews. Political connections to the maritime industry are 
strong. Merchant shipping, and an own navy to protect the sea trade have strong roots. 
Functioning ports have equally key functions in the foreign trade of a nation. Historically, 
ports were run either by governments or municipal organizations, but one strong trend 
over recent decades has been privatization; the global terminal operators have taken 
the operational role. The largest operator, Hutchison, is running terminals in 52 ports 
located in 26 countries across all continents.24 However, the public authorities have 
kept their control through the terms of the concessions—often over 20 years—that they 
have granted to operators running their terminals. The concerns about climate change, 
environment, and safety are embedded in the political goals that end up in the legisla-
tion and regulation that impacts the maritime industry. Ships and the port equipment 
use fossil fuels, and carbon directives, engine emission regulations, and fuel taxation 
are measures that politicians can use to mitigate the impact. The rising cost of 
noncompliance, like oil leakage, also drives behavior to use technologies that are less 
oil-dependent. Environmental permits for greenfield ports call for stricter procedures 
than those of the existing ports. Ships, shipyards, and ports are also hazardous 
workplaces, and various types of safety standards are common. Ports are also the 
places where the goods not listed in the manifest are flowing (e.g., drugs, arms, explo-
sives, radioactive and chemical materials, illegal human immigrants), which have both 
direct and indirect impacts on maritime stakeholders. 
The economic impact of the ocean shipping and port handling costs are relatively low 
in relation to consumer goods transported in the containers. Therefore, the efficiency is 
not driven by fragmented shippers or consignees; rather, the cost is levied into the re-
tail prices. However, shipping is a volatile business, and the shipping lines have large 
investments in capacity. The competition has kept earnings at a relatively low level, 
and the EBIT margin has varied between 5-10% between 2006 and 2013 for the major 
companies (Schäfer, 2014). Shipping lines have mitigated this volatility by forming alli-
ances to, for example, share capacity in ships. In 2012, the size of the container liner 
business was $225 billion (Schäfer, 2014). The port business is location-driven; if a 
port is near a large consumer base, it already has a structural advantage. The opera-
tional success factor for the port operator is to turn the ship fast and economically, as 
                                               
24
 https://www.hph.com/en/webpg-87.html, retrieved 13.1.2016 
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the ship is the largest investment in the system; 18.000 TEU ship cost approximately 
$185 million25. It is equally important that the turnaround time is predictable, which al-
lows the ship to travel at an optimal speed in order to save fuel. The revenue for the 
operator comes from the volume of containers multiplied by the handling fee per con-
tainer; the global market size was $57 billion in 2012 (Schäfer, 2014). The four main 
elements in the cost side for manual operation are capital cost of the equipment, driv-
ers, fuel, and maintenance and repair. Port operators are making far better profits than 
the shipping lines; the average EBIT margin varied between 20-30% for the major 
players between 2006 and 2013 (Schäfer, 2014). Equipment suppliers can be catego-
rized into regional or global; they can also be divided into general machine builders that 
also make port equipment, or specialized companies. The business model is building 
the equipment fleet in a competitive market in order to make the profit with spare parts. 
Various levels of service contracts slowly emerge. Distribution is a hybrid of direct sales 
and use of distributors. The size of the port equipment market was $5.7 billion in 2013 
(an increase of 10-15% after service revenue), whereas the EBIT margin has varied 
between 2-6% with major players between 2007 and 2013 (Schäfer, 2014). 
The strongest social connection is employment. Indirectly, a functioning port supports 
employment through foreign trade in the same way that ineffective ports drive employ-
ment away. This critical role has made port workers’ labor unions strong throughout the 
world. The maritime cluster—shipping lines, shipyards, ports, port service providers, 
port equipment manufacturers, subcontractors—is also a large source of direct em-
ployment. Importance for employment has made governmental subsidies in shipbuild-
ing, for example, a common phenomenon. In Finland, the maritime cluster employed 
47,000 people (Viitanen et al., 2003). 
Port-related businesses encompass multiple technologies, but only the ones that im-
pact the system are mentioned (i.e., ship size, electrification, automation, smarter ma-
chines, and ICT). The ship size is undoubtedly the largest driver of the dynamics, as it 
impacts the economy of the business, freight routes, seaside operations, ports, and the 
hinterland, and it drives both the size of the container handling equipment—particularly 
cranes—and all other technologies that can speed up the operation. Figure 13 shows 
the development of container ship size in the last 20 years. 
 
                                               
25 http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/photos/2013-09-05/holy-ship#slide2, retrieved 13.1.2016 
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Figure 13. Ship size development in TEU's (Drewry Maritime Research, 2014) 
 
Electrification is one technology trend that relates to the endeavor to reduce fossil fuels. 
It makes the local emissions insignificant, but the systemic impact is dependent on how 
the primary electricity is produced (e.g., oil, gas, coal, solar, wind). Electricity also of-
fers potential to harvest the waste energy when lowering a container or braking mobile 
equipment, for example, when the waste energy can be stored into the batteries, simi-
lar to the process in hybrid passenger cars. Passenger cars, in fact, are the primary 
industry where heavier batteries are currently researched and developed. Local emis-
sions are also important, as the ports are close to urban areas. Technologies that ena-
ble automation are driven in some parts of the world by labor shortages, in other areas 
by the cost of labor, and in some applications by safety; these drivers also exist at the 
ports. The first unmanned terminal was opened in Port of Rotterdam by European Con-
tainer Terminals (ECT) in 199326. Since 1993, the number of automated terminals in-
creased from one to 26 in 2013, and at that time there were plans for an additional 30 
unmanned terminals, which indicates that the market is breaking (Schäfer, 2014). The 
ship loading and unloading is still done by the operators, however. Smarter machines 
are present in the ports, but the situation is no different than in mining, construction, 
agriculture, or forestry sectors. The machine components have embedded software 
and sensors, and the machines can harvest the data for the purpose of internal control 
and optimization; they can also communicate externally, either locally or over the Inter-
                                               
26
 http://www.ect.nl/en/content/history, retrieved 18.1.2016 
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net. ICT technology is embedded in components, machines, fleets, and system levels, 
as well as within the processes of the firms that build the machines. 
It is important to recognize that shipping has always been, and is likely to remain, fun-
damentally a commodity business (Lorange, 2009). This implies that despite the choic-
es of specialized strategy, there is a prerequisite of cost competitiveness in products, 
services, and internal operations for the actors participating in shipping. It is fair to as-
sume that many of the old recipes of continuous improvement still work. Digitalization is 
also a current topic in shipping, and the recent McKinsey and Company research report 
argued that digitalization is not only enabling better, safer, and simpler processes in 
shipping, but also reducing significantly costs in all phases (Hausmann et al., 2015). 
 Results from the Delphi interviews 4.2
The first Delphi interview round took place between October 20, 2014 and February 12, 
2015 (comprising 92% of the interviews), and the second round interviews were con-
ducted between October 19, 2015 and December 21, 2015 (comprising 95% of the 
interviews). The combined number of interviews was 60, from which 54 were face-to-
face; and six interviews were online. Interviews lasted between one and three hours, 
with more than 80% lasting around two hours (the time predicted when agreeing to the 
interviews). The two-hour time was based on three test interviews conducted prior to 
the actual interview rounds. The list of participants of both Delphi rounds one and two 
are located in Appendix 4, and after each panelist there is a reference in which value 
chain perspective he or she was interviewed (E= Enabler, A=Actor and U=User). This 
was important as some of the panelists had been working during their career in more 
than one value chain area. 
A general observation from the interviews was that expert behavior differed depending 
on the role of expertise on the future (Kuusi, 1999). Decision-maker interviews were 
clearly shorter than those of the scientists. Decision-makers expressed quite often the 
logic of uncertainty, but at the same time the need to make decisions based on what is 
likely to happen despite imperfect information. Scientists, independent of their location 
in the value chain, took longer than decision-makers to form their views on specific 
drivers or sub-drivers, despite the fact that their actual knowledge often was deeper 
than the knowledge of their decision-maker counterparts for that specific driver. Most of 
the scientists, however, offered valuable input to the research methodology even when 
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it was not asked as part of the interviews. The synthesizer group was closer to the de-
cision-makers in their ways of interacting in the interviews. This most likely can be ex-
plained by the fact that they were employed by the businesses, even though their func-
tional responsibilities were close to research and development.   
 
4.2.1 First Delphi interview round 
First round participation based on the expert role in the value chain is illustrated in Ta-
ble 5. Panelists came from seven different universities or research institutes, and 14 
different companies, of which 12 were in global business. One-third of participants 
were not Finnish citizens.  
Role/ Value Chain Enablers Actors Users 
Scientists 3 3 2 
Synthesizers 4 3 2 
Decision-makers 3 2 2 
Table 5. The Delphi panel in round one  
 
The first objective of Delphi interview round one was validating the six technological 
drivers that that were suggested by the earlier cited research reports (like  Manyika et 
al., 2013) to have potential to cause industrial disruption. The suggested drivers were 
AM/ 3D printing, Big Data/AI, Cloud, IoT, MBSE, and Robotics. Validation included a 
possibility to suggest new drivers. The second objective was finding sub-drivers that 
either accelerate or inhibit the development of each driver. 
The validation was an open discussion, where each driver was reviewed in the context 
of continuous improvement, quantum leap, or disruption. Review was not based on 
scoring or ranking but letting the panelist elaborate what his or her judgment of the im-
pact of a particular technology. The researcher translated later the written views into 
the above mentioned three categories. A comment like, “I believe that 3D printing will 
change the rules how manufacturing companies create value” implied disruption cate-
gory. 
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Out of the 24 interviews, 57 views were given that the driver could be disruptive in the 
context of the research question, 41 that the maximum that the driver could reach is a 
quantum leap in competiveness, and only five that viewed the driver as unable to 
achieve more than continuous improvement. The span for the individual drivers ex-
tended from two to 16 views being disruptive. The driver that got only two disruptive 
views got 14 views being a source of a quantum leap.  Based on the results all original 
drivers were included in the order ranking process in the Delphi round two. One panel-
ist proposed mobility as a new technological driver with a context of firms’ resources 
being location free. It was not taken to Delphi round two on the basis that mobility is 
inherent feature of the Networks, Crowds, Platforms which is one of the economic / 
strategic management drivers. 
Sub-drivers were also derived from the written comments where the panelist elaborat-
ed his or her judgment of a particular technology. A comment like “3D printing will be 
disruptive technology as soon as metal based materials can be printed” implied the 
inhibitive sub-driver, low number of printable materials for AM/3D printing. Some of the 
sub-drivers were suggested in the context of more than one driver; data security risk 
e.g. was suggested in the context of Big Data/AI, Cloud and IoT. Sub-drivers with the 
same content could have been suggested both as inhibitors or accelerators, but that 
did not happen.  
Some suggestions of sub-drivers formed almost Hegelian thesis-antithesis relation-
ships, like the one relating whether users open their data (i.e., open = accelerates; not 
open = inhibits). The same example can also be characterized as following Boolean 
logic even in individual use cases; the user opens its particular section of the machine 
data or not; the user opens all of its machine data or not. Following the user data ex-
ample, the likely expert view for that sub-argument in the Delphi round two is a heuris-
tic judgment of the average state of affairs; majority (minority, most, only some …) of 
the users are likely to refrain from giving access to their data based on my judgment of 
the benefits of the technological driver that I am aware of. It appeared that the inhibitive 
sub-drivers were more often attached to behavioral aspects (like beliefs), whereas ac-
celerative sub-drivers were easier to quantify (e.g., short development time). 
More than 30 inhibitive and 50 accelerative sub-drivers were proposed.  All those that 
were named more than once were merged onto the list from literature and research 
reports. In that merger, sub-drivers that had the same content but different names were 
placed under one name. The merged list of technological drivers and sub-drivers is 
presented in Table 6. 
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 Inertia sub-driver Accelerator sub-driver 
AM / 3D 
printing 
Limited size of the object  
Slow printing speed 
Low # of printable materials  
High investment cost  
Lack of competences 
Management beliefs 
Investment in current infrastructure 
Digital distribution (e.g. spares) 
Manufacturing recipe as IPR 
Unique mass production  
Sustainability 
Manufacturing close to usage  
New product features 
Big Data / AI 
Lack of relevant history data 
Data security risks  
Data ownership confusion 
Data ownership conflict of interest                                       
Management beliefs  
Lack of competences 
Privacy concerns 
Reduce of human errors 
Knowledge scalability 
Diagnose speed 
Prescriptive potential 
Core element in digital B2B business models 
Emergence of platform tools 
Advancement in cognitive computing  
Users open their data 
Cloud com-
puting 
Data security risks 
Investment in legacy systems  
Lack of competences 
 
Enabler for new business models 
Quantum leap in operational productivity  
Emergence of platform solutions 
Low cost of computing  
High supply of partners 
Lower barrier of computing 
Internet of 
Things 
Data security risks 
Lack of standardization 
Lack of systemic understanding 
Lack of competencies  
Non sensored Installed fleet 
Cost of data transmission 
Availability of data transmission 
Management beliefs 
Systemic productivity  
New source of customer insight 
Emerging platforms 
Digital entrants to equipment business                               
Inceptive to crowd   
Enabler of new business models 
MBSE 
Incompatible legacy systems 
Legacy processes  
Lack of competencies 
Management beliefs 
Reduced # of errors in development                                       
Short development time 
Low development cost  
Enabler of crowd knowledge  
Enabler of customer engagement in develop-
ment 
Robotization 
Legislation lagging behind 
High capital cost 
Lack of infrastructure 
Social disruption 
Technological risks 
High switching cost 
Manned design paradigm 
Systemic productivity 
Low wear, tear and collision costs 
Good LCC predictability 
High safety 
Sustainability 
Compensation of labor shortage (incl. labor 
unrest) 
Table 6. Results from Delphi round one, technological drivers 
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The process of validating the economic / strategic management drivers was the same 
as with the technological drivers. As described in the methodology chapter, the valida-
tion included only those two drivers that are directly related to digitalization (Digital 
Business Models and Networks, Crowds and Platforms). The other five drivers of the 
Figure 11 were not included in the validation because they were either seminal theories 
used to explain industry evolution or fundamental components in economics, such as 
firms and capital.   
Out of the 24 interviews, 13 views were given that the either of the two proposed driver 
could be disruptive in the context of the research question, 14 that the maximum that 
the driver could reach is a quantum leap in competiveness, and only three that viewed 
the driver as unable to achieve more than continuous improvement. Based on the re-
sults both drivers were included to the list of other five economic / strategic manage-
ment drivers as illustrated in the Figure 11.  
As a note, the round one interviews also yielded comments about Convergence, Radi-
cal Innovation, Five Forces, Stakeholders, and Capital.  Convergence was mentioned 
several times to explain strategic management mechanisms and to explain potential 
disruption, which endorsed the argument for it to be in the list for Delphi round two. 
Radical Innovation as a disruptor concept was viewed to be based on the content of 
the innovation itself. Capital discussion was pre-dominantly around the potential impact 
of “Silicon Valley” types of Venture Capital on the asset-heavy industries like machine-
building. The role of capital more often was viewed as a catalyst of a disruption that 
has already started, rather than the initiator of that process. 
Just as with the technological drivers, the majority of the interview time was spent on 
discussing sub-drivers that can either inhibit or accelerate the potential disruptive im-
pact of the economic/strategic management drivers. The proposed sub-drivers were 
merged with the sub-drivers of the literature, the same way as with technological sub-
drivers, and the results appear in Table 7. 
 Inertia sub-driver Accelerator sub-driver 
Five Forces 
(six) 
Rivalry between existing competitors 
Cost driven customers  
High entry barrier industry  
Long established stakeholder organiza-
tions 
Oligopolistic market 
Digital entrants to traditional industries 
Substitutive business models 
Value driven customers 
Value driven suppliers  
Influential Early Adopters 
Suppliers passing middle-men 
Active 6
th
 force       
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Inertia sub-driver 
 
Accelerator sub-driver 
Industry con-
vergence 
Industry organs  
Industry beliefs,  strong dominant logic 
Cultural barriers 
Industry specific financial KPIs                                
Platform supply 
Management rotation 
Business model diffusion 
General digital technologies 
Consumer business behavior into B2B  
Radical inno-
vation 
Legacy competences 
Legacy processes and systems 
Legacy leadership and management 
Return on continuous improvement 
Risk adverse business culture 
Conservative industry 
Lack of absorptive capacity 
Software intensity 
Access to crowd knowledge  
Experiment culture 
Influential Early Adopters  
New level of customer insight  
Powerful development tools 
Digital    busi-
ness  models 
Data security risks 
Data ownership confusion 
Fixed legacy systems and processes 
Lack of dominant theory 
Incumbents active resistance 
Lack of trust in virtual environments 
 High barrier industry 
Quantum leap in productivity 
Real time opportunity 
Asset light 
Influential Early Adopters 
Slow growth of existing business 
Startup emergence 
 
Networks, 
Crowds,  
Platforms 
Lack of capabilities 
Management beliefs 
Lack of systems and processes  
Lack of trust in virtual environments 
Conflict in IPR 
Platform availability (discipline) 
Unrestricted  capacity  
Fixed cost light  
Startup emergence 
Diginatives to firms 
Open source hardware 
Self-fulfillment motives of knowledge workers  
Crowd intelligence effect 
Firm, Strate-
gy, Manage-
ment 
Strong Industry beliefs 
Next quarter pressure 
Leadership from the past 
Well established dominant logic 
Complex organizations 
Hierarchical organizations 
Incrementalism 
Bandwagon, Hype, Halo  
Management consulting focus 
Slow growth of traditional business 
Management rotation 
Emerging digital strategy frameworks 
Experiment culture 
Degree of external engagement 
Risk capital 
Missing financial track record  
Inexperienced management   
Impatience 
Crowdfunding 
Asset light 
High upside  
Low interest rates 
Success stories 
Table 7. Results from Delphi round one, economic / strategic management drivers 
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Additional observations from the Delphi round one 
The World Economic Forum (2015) suggested a path to Outcome Economy that was 
seen in Figure 5. That view was also similar to what Porter and Heppelman (2014) de-
scribed—from products to systems of systems. The first observation relates to those 
concepts from several perspectives in the free comments during the Delphi round one. 
 There is a high complexity of optimizing components (diesel engine) or ma-
chine performance because it consists of so many subsystems; 
 A small amount of critical knowledge from upper levels has high value leverage 
if it can be coupled to lower lever development; 
 Decoupling of level or decoupling of value chain is always a potential source of 
disruption; 
 Decoupling opportunity can attract out-of-industry players (DHL starting to print 
some of the product as a service was named as example of decoupling part of 
the physical supply chain and while still satisfying the need of physical goods); 
 Creation of a higher level delivery has an advantage of little to no competition 
(Kim and Mauborgne, 2005), but also has a risk if customers of the current val-
ue chain are not optimal or ready for the new type of offering. 
Those types of comments that arose from the first round Delphi interviews were used 
to construct a preliminary framework that looks at disruption the same way as the 
World Economic Forum report (2015) or Porter and Heppelman (2014), but suggests 
the paradox of complexity and value if the layers can be decoupled. The preliminary 
framework is illustrated in Figure 14, which also provides guidance to the case design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Preliminary finding on systemic characteristics of disruption 
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Machine 
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The second observation was the emergence of four groups of concepts. Cloud, MBSE, 
and AM/3D printing were perceived as tools in digitalization. They were powerful, with 
different features attached to different applications, but ultimately they were perceived 
(according to some of the comments) as commodities available for everyone. Iot and 
Robotization were perceived as the second group -phenomena: connectivity and au-
tonomy, respectively. Therefore, it was suggested that they might contain true disrup-
tive nature. The disruptive nature of Networks, Crowds, Platforms, and Big Data/AI, on 
the other hand, differed.  Crowds and platforms were suggested to be one feature of a 
network economy paradigm, moving the power to crowds and users. This shift of power 
was suggested to create a leadership challenge for the players in the current value 
chains. The most important discussions about Platforms was whether they will be verti-
cal or horizontal, and how many Platforms there can be in without losing the benefits of 
the network effects. 
The third group, Big Data/AI, in this context appeared to be its own category as the key 
enabler. Many comments, like “the business is getting data-centric,” were mentioned. 
Big Data was only partly attached to AI and machine learning. AI (together with AM) 
was expected to still have strong technological advancement, and the roles of algo-
rithms and software as the carriers of value were mentioned. The fourth group was the 
value model or business model. Industrial Internet was mostly referred to as a con-
cept without generic meaning, whereas Industrial Internet as defined by General Elec-
tric was referred to as one Digital Business Model.  Another specific Digital Business 
Model suggested was an IPR fee for printing spare parts.   
The third observation was related to comments about timing. The most distinctive it 
was with tools and the key enablers. Cloud and Big Data were deemed to be technol-
ogies that are already matured. MBSE was referenced as a methodology/tool that still 
is advancing, but whose current usage is below the current potential. AM/3D printing 
and AI were expected to have the largest disruptive potential depending on technologi-
cal advancement. There were also some comments on the objectives of the impact. 
Operations and products were more often mentioned in a quantum leap context, and 
business models in disruption. Disruption in service meant both operational discontinui-
ties and the changes of business models. 
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4.2.2 Second Delhi interview round 
The number of panelists increased from 24 to 36 from the first Delphi round. They rep-
resented the 3x3 background matrix evenly, which meant that each role/value chain 
cell contained four panelists. Five panelists from round 1 were also interviewed at the 
second round. The second round was represented by nine different universities or re-
search institutes and 22 companies, of which 19 were in global business. Two compa-
nies and three universities had more than one panelist, but not from the same cell in 
the matrix. Panelists came from 11 different countries, and 60% were not Finns.  
The first objective of the Delphi interview round two was to rank order technological 
and economic/strategic management drivers from the Delphi round one. The second 
objective was to find possible new inhibiting and accelerating sub-drivers, and then 
rank order the three most important ones. The third objective was to detect differences 
on views on the drivers and sub-drivers between enablers, actors and users. As a last 
analysis there is a grouping of the same kind of sub-drivers that are either inhibiting or 
accelerating technological or economic / strategic management drivers as whole. 
  
4.2.2.1 Technological drivers 
The results of the order ranking of the technological drivers appear in the table 8.  
Driver Number 1 
rankings 
Average 
ranking 
Variance 
Big Data / AI 18 1,9 1,3 
IoT 9 2,4 1,6 
MBSE 5 3,9 3,0 
Robotization 2 3,7 2,3 
AM / 3D printing 2 4,2 1,7 
Cloud computing 0 4,9 1,7 
Table 8. Rank order of the technological drivers in Delphi round two 
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The results in the Table 8 represent the rankings of the panel as whole. Figure 15 pre-
sents the results visually so that each cell consists of four panelists’ three highest 
ranked technological drivers and different colors represent technological drivers. As an 
example, one enabler/ decision-maker ranked Big Data / AI as number 1, two enabler/ 
decision-makers ranked IoT as number 1 and one enabler/ decision-maker ranked 
MBSE as number 1 as potential technological disruption driver. The same logic applies 
to number 2 and 3 rankings and for all nine cells.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Three highest ranked technological drivers in the Delphi panel in round two 
 
In the third analysis, the technological drivers are aggregated by the value chain, as 
shown in Figure 16.  Each driver shows how many number 1, 2 and 3 rankings 
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(marked with colors) it got from respective value chain members, like the first column  
in the figure indicates that AM/3D printing got one number 2 ranking from the enablers 
and two number 3 rankings from the enablers. The Figure 16 indicates that Big data/AI 
and IoT received support independent from their places in the value chain. MBSE had 
commonalities with enablers and actors, and Robotization had the same kind of pattern 
between actors and users.  
 
 
 
Figure 16. Three highest ranked technological drivers in the Delphi panel in round two by the 
value chain 
When the participants were assessing the three most critical technological drivers, they 
came up with 30 new sub-drivers that either inhibited or accelerated the driver. Table 8 
illustrates all the new sub-drivers suggested, listed in the order of appearance (i.e., 
interview number), including the main driver, inertia (I) or acceleration (A), and how 
many order rankings (1, 2, or 3) the sub-driver achieved after the appearance. The 
growth of sub-drivers started to saturate in the middle of the interview round, and 
turned more sporadic thereafter. The order ranking of new sub-drivers is analyzed 
based on its pattern in order to judge whether the result would have been different if 
the sub-drivers would have been available from the beginning. 
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Table 9. New technological sub-drivers from the Delphi round two 
Sub-driver analysis is done for the top three drivers from Table 8 by presenting first the 
three most important inhibitive and accelerative sub-drivers based on the view of the 
panel as whole. The ranking of sub-drivers was done by giving three points to each 
sub-driver that was ranked as number 1, two points for number 2 ranking, and one 
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point for number 3 ranking. The analysis states the percentage from all points the sub-
driver received. Some of the closely related sub-drivers are clustered.  
After ranking sub-drivers are elaborated with respective free comments that arise in the 
Delphi interview round two. As a final sub-driver analysis the degree of consensus in 
the value chain is evaluated. The sub-drivers of the three lowest ranked drivers are 
analyzed as group at the end. 
Big Data/AI 
Three clusters of inhibitive sub-drivers got 79% of the points for Big Data/AI: 
 Beliefs, 26% (management and industry beliefs) 
 Data 31% (confusion and conflicts of ownership, security) 
 Competence, 22% 
Industry beliefs, which came from the interview number 11 was the only new sub-
driver that could have had any material difference in analysis. It collected eight percent 
of the points in the consecutive interviews, and beliefs as an inhibitive driver probably 
would have been even stronger if industry beliefs had been available from the begin-
ning. 
The accelerative sub-drivers for the Big Data/ AI were not clustered, and five individual 
sub-drivers achieved 75% of all points: 
 Prescriptive potential, 22% 
 Knowledge scalability, 15% 
 Users opening their data, 14% 
 Advancement in cognitive computing, 12% 
 Reduction of human errors, 12% 
Twenty-seven out of 36 participants elaborated on the importance of Big Data/AI in the 
disruption during their free comments on the choice of order of the sub-drivers from 
Table 6 or 9. Three new generic topics emerged from those comments: complexity, 
progress, and content. Increasing complexity was mentioned in several interviews, and 
it was described as the need for simultaneous optimization in several levels of a sys-
tem that are also interlinked. This development was perceived to exceed the human 
ability to cope with it, and therefore tools like Big Data were described to have disrup-
tive potential. Big Data was mentioned as one contributor to AI development, but at the 
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same time it was acknowledged that AI is still in its infancy stage compared to its po-
tential to disrupt industries. The key individual point in AI was that exception handling is 
still dominated by human judgment. Free comments related to development of machine 
learning and adaptive systems came more from the AI driver discussion than from ro-
botics. The third emerging Big Data/AI topic, content, stemmed from an industry or dis-
cipline perspective. “General industry Google” was not perceived likely, but instead 
many comments about discipline-based, data-driven platforms were made. This was 
coupled with the scalability (e.g., the friction of bearings in rotating machines as a 
source for a data-driven niche platform). The same justification was made for data-
driven industry platforms. One comment summarized the content view: “All the right 
answers are today accessible to anyone; you have to know the right question, which 
ability comes from the content knowledge.” 
Consensus is analyzed so, that if any of the value chain member’s percentage of points 
of the sub-driver differs more than five percent units from the average percentage of 
that sub-driver, it implies non-consensus.  
In the inhibitive drivers, there was non-consensus in the following sub-drivers (clusters): 
 Data (E= 35 %, A= 22 %, U=39%) 
 Competence (E= 23%, A=26%, U=17%) 
The non-consensus in accelerative sub-drivers was with: 
 Prescriptive potential (E=18% %, A=17 %, U=29%) 
 Knowledge scalability (E=11%, A=24%, U=11 %) 
 Advancement in cognitive computing (E=24%, A=6%, U=5%) 
 
Internet of Things 
Four inhibitive sub-drivers or clusters got 81% of the points: 
 Lack of systemic understanding/ competence, 38% 
 Management beliefs, 17% 
 Lack of standardization, 15%  
 Data security, 11% 
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The lack of used cases got seven percent of the points even though it appeared in in-
terview number 13; those points were mainly away from the lack of standardization. 
Three accelerative sub-drivers got 75% of all points: 
 Enabler of new business models, 27% 
 Systemic productivity, 23% 
 New source of customer insight, 19% 
The cost of technology got eight percent of the points, and because it appeared in in-
terview 13, it would have attracted more points, which would not have been taken away 
from any specific alternative. There was no any material new information about IoT in 
the free comments. 
In the inhibitive drivers, there was non-consensus in the following sub-drivers: 
 Lack of systemic understanding/ competence (E= 29%, A=28%, U=57%) 
 Lack of standardization (E=17%, A=23%, U=4%)  
The only non-consensus accelerative sub-driver was the new source of customer in-
sight (E=30%, A=13%, U=11%). 
 
Model Based System Engineering 
MBSE got its position in the final top three due to receiving more number one rankings 
than Robotization. The other justification for its high ranking came from free comments, 
where a number of participants stated that the disruptive part of Robotization is in AI, 
machine learning, or algorithms, rather than machines getting smart enough to operate 
without drivers. 
Three inhibitive sub-drivers or clusters got 88% of all points in MBSE: 
 Lack of systemic understanding/ competence, 49 % 
 Legacy processes, 24% 
 Management beliefs, 15% 
Three accelerative sub-drivers or clusters got 77% of all points in MBSE: 
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 Productivity (systemic or based on the shorter lead times), 37 % 
 External engagement (crowds and users), 27% 
 Power of visualization, 13% 
Visualization became available in interview 27 but still rated 13%, which likely have 
been higher if it had been included from the beginning. 
The free comments yielded some additional viewpoints to MBSE. Most notable was 
that modeling is one tool to manage the increasing complexity in AI, which benefits the 
current tools as well as accelerates the utilization of AI. It was also referred to as an 
enabler of simulations and higher level algorithms. The second topic was about en-
gagement, both internally and externally, and MBSE was mentioned as a platform that 
uses visualization and simulations as methods. MBSE was the only technological factor 
that had role-based patterns where the benefit was more seen by synthesizers (and 
somewhat by scientists), regardless if they were enablers, actors, or users. A few of the 
interviewees did mention that design systems are lower-cost investments than ERP 
systems, and therefore most of the decision-makers have little understanding of the 
benefits. One interviewee also stated that modeling the current knowledge is the best 
investment both in the short and long term. 
In the inhibitive sub-drivers, there was non-consensus in the following sub-drivers of 
MBSE: 
 Legacy processes (E=8%, A=29%, U=33%) 
 Management belief (E=33%, A=10 %, U=6%) 
The non-consensus in accelerative sub-drivers was with: 
 Productivity (E=46%, A=40%, U=17%) 
 External engagement (E=21%, A=24%, U=44%) 
 Power of visualization (E=21%, A=7%, U=17%) 
 
AM/3D printing, Cloud computing, and Robotization 
AM/3D printing got two number one ratings as seen in the Table 8. Almost half of the 
panelists acknowledged in their free comments that AM might be, for industrial produc-
tion, the most prominent disruptive technology when the technological barriers have 
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been solved; however, during the interview, respondents did not rank it higher as the 
timeline was uncertain and longer in the future. The inertia in the sub-driver ranking 
was predominantly divided into two categories: technical immaturity for large scale pro-
duction (size, material, speed), and management beliefs. One panelist expressed a 
view that there will be hybrid technologies (conventional attached to AM) during the 
evolution. The common denominator for the other free comments could be described 
as weak signals. Comments served also as concrete explanation to elaborate the 
choice of more abstract arguments (drivers or sub-drivers) as stated in methodology 
section 3.3.1. These types of comments were: 
 “DHL has started to use 3D printing as a tool in their delivery.” 
 “In spring 2015, 50% of recruitment in manufacturing in US required 3D skills.” 
 “3D revolution is not driven by a paradigm of how you print existing designs but 
how you design when things can be printed.” 
 “3D printing is a powerful technology to impact current trade imbalances.” 
Cloud had the highest consensus among the technological factors. It was perceived as 
the dominant technology in computing, but as a standalone was not disruptive. Even 
those few who lifted it into ranks 1-3 viewed the disruption to only be based on simulta-
neous business model innovation. Also, the ones who did not rate Cloud highly 
acknowledged that it has changed the paradigm of computing (e.g., cost, availability to 
anyone, scalability). Some saw security as inertia; others viewed that world class Cloud 
suppliers provide better security than even good companies can achieve internally. 
Robotization or autonomous processes had medium disruptive results. The dominant 
view of robots in the industrial context was evolutionary, and Robotization was seen as 
technical progress for productivity. This was supported by the sub-driver analysis. The 
inertia was technical, (23%, technology or deployment), financial (29%, capital or 
switching cost), or social disruption (18%). Social disruption in the technological devel-
opment has been an issue for as long as technology-based productivity has replaced 
human work for different jobs; this disruption is both a leadership and cost issue. Also, 
the accelerative sub-drivers of Robotization were similar to past automation develop-
ment (productivity 32%; addressing labor cost of availability 25%). Ten panelists ex-
pressed free comments on Robotization; five of the comments were pondering the 
question whether the end game is intelligent robots working together or slaves to a 
smart Cloud. There was not a strong view on this idea, but it was perceived as a vital 
question for development. Three panelists emphasized the medium steps in automa-
tion, like remotely operated machines, where the machine is intelligent but the planning 
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and exception handling is managed by a human operator. One panelist, however, 
pointed out that mixing manned and unmanned operations creates new types of securi-
ty risks. The remaining comments were related to changing industrial job profiles, from 
field to office. 
Interrelated technological sub-drivers 
The last analysis was trying to detect sub-drivers that impact to several technologies. 
This is achieved by three steps: first counting points of the exact same sub-drivers 
(such as data security), then analyzing whether there are easily available a more ge-
neric grouping where more than one sub-driver can be combined; low # of printable 
material in AM and technological risks in Robotization can be categorized technical 
barrier as an inhibitive sub-driver. The final step was counting the points based on the 
new grouping. The new aggregated technology related sub-drivers can be seen in the 
Figure 17 in rank order; eight aggregated sub-drivers constituted 92% of the inhibitive 
sub-drivers and 91 % of the accelerative sub-drivers. The summary of the results of 
technological drivers is shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 17. Top eight aggregate technological sub-drivers 
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Lack of competences / understanding
Productivity leap
Data (security, quality, availability, ownership)
New insight
Management / Industry beliefs
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Advancement in technology
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Social , Ethics
Speed
Number of points based on the ranking 
Red = Inhibiting, Blue = Accelerating 
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Big Data/AI Management/Industry beliefs  Prescriptive potential  
  
  
E A U Data (security, confusion, owner-
ship) 
 Knowledge scalability  
  
  
 Competence  Users opening their data  
  
  
IoT Lack of systemic understanding 
and competence 
 Enabler of new business models  
  
  
E A U Management beliefs  Systemic productivity  
  
  
 Standardization  New source of customer insight  
  
  
MBSE Lack of systemic understanding 
and competence 
 Productivity (including lead 
times) 
 
  
  
E A U Legacy processes  Enabler of external knowledge  
  
  
 Management beliefs  Power of visualization  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Summary of the technology drivers by the value chain 
 
Note: The colors represent consensus. Green means consensus with the value chain mem-
bers who have green color. If one of the three disagrees, red means that the one who disa-
grees has stronger support from the green ones and weaker support from the yellow ones. In 
the driver section, E = Enabler, A = Actor, and U=User. With sub-drivers, the logic is that the 
bottom square is Enabler, the middle square is Actor, and the upper square is User. The 
inhibitive sub-drivers are located in the left column and the accelerative sub-drivers in the 
right column. 
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4.2.2.2 Economic / strategic management drivers 
The results related to economic / strategic management drivers have been analyzed 
with the same procedure as the results related to technological drivers. They are also 
presented the same way as the technological drivers in the previous sub-chapter. 
Therefore, the procedures of the analyses, or instructions how to read the results are 
not repeated in this sub-chapter. The results of the order ranking of the economic / 
strategic management drivers appear in the table 10 representing the rankings of the 
panel as whole. 
Driver Number 
1 rank-
ings 
Average 
ranking 
Variance 
Networks, Crowds, Platforms 13 2,2 1,4 
Convergence 9 3,8 4,4 
Radical Innovation 7 3,8 3,3 
Digital Business Models 4 2,7 1,4 
Firm, Strategy, Management 2 4,1 1,7 
Six Forces 1 5,2 2,7 
Risk Capital 0 6,4 1,5 
Table 10. Rank order of the economic / strategic management drivers in Delphi round two 
 
Figure 19 presents results visually so the order ranking of each of the nine cells can be 
seen separately.  
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Figure 19. Three highest ranked economic / strategic management drivers in the Delphi panel in 
round two 
 
The aggregation of the economic/strategic management drivers by the value chain can 
be seen in Figure 20. There was a high consensus on the importance of Network, 
Crowds, and Platforms. Similar consensus existed with Digital Business Models, in-
cluding agreement that its disruptive nature was less than that of Networks, Crowds, 
Platforms. Convergence and Radical Innovation formed the only material differences 
by the value chain. Both were perceived important, but Convergence was more favored 
by enablers and actors, whereas Radical Innovation was favored by enablers and us-
ers. 
Six Forces 
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Note: Y- axes is number of respondents and X – axes is rating. 
 
  
129 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Three highest ranked economic / strategic management drivers in the Delphi panel in 
round two by the value chain 
The panelists suggested 31 new economic / strategic management sub-drivers that 
can be seen in Table 11. 
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Table 11. New economic / strategic management sub-drivers from the Delphi round two 
The rank order of the Table 10 for the sub-driver analysis of economic / strategic man-
agement drivers is altered to be for the top three: 1. Networks, Crowds, Platforms; 2. 
Digital Business Models; 3. Industry Convergence. The justification for Digital Business 
Models moving upward is the second lowest average ranking and equally low variance 
as with the number one, Networks, Crowds, Platforms. 
 
Networks, Crowds, Platforms 
Three inhibitive sub-drivers constituted 72% of points for Networks, Crowds, Platforms: 
 Management beliefs, 26% 
 Lack of capabilities, 23% 
 Systems and processes (both legacy and lack of new), 23%.  
The late sub-drivers’ legacy systems and processes (came from the interview number 
14 and collected 11 % of the points) and incumbents’ active resistance (came from the 
interview number 15 and collected five percent of the points) were the only ones who 
could have impacted to the analysis. The points of sub-driver, legacy systems and 
processes were later mainly away from lack of processes, which is still a similar sub-
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driver and thus was aggregated. Incumbents’ active resistance sub-driver started to 
reduce points from both of the process sub-drivers.  
Three accelerative sub-driver clusters for the Networks, Crowds, Platforms achieved 
77% of all points: 
 Emergence of platforms (discipline and industry), 32 % 
 Cost (fixed cost, transaction cost, capacity), 24% 
 Crowd intelligence effect (including users’), 21% 
Thirty-one out of 36 participants ranked Networks, Crowds, Platforms into top three and 
26 participants also elaborated on the topic further in their free comments. Other than 
the original or emerged sub-drivers, free comments fell under four different themes: 
diversity, users, eco-systems, and culture. Diversity was strongly attached to the exter-
nal knowledge in innovation. The comments highlighted that even large companies 
have many subject matter resources; group thinking might lead to low diversity, which 
can be mitigated by the methods of Open Innovation. Users’ opening their data was 
described as a disruptive enabler when users open their data beyond suppliers. Eco-
systems were discussed in two contexts: they are very different from the value chain, 
and managing them requires very different management styles and capabilities. Cul-
ture was also referenced from two very different angles. Some comments were close to 
management beliefs and related to the internal culture as a barrier to benefiting from 
the external world (other than directly from the value chain). The other cultural com-
ments were more philosophical, posing the question of whether openness and trans-
parency as concepts are shared in different national cultures, which most likely they 
are not—a relevant issue for multinationals. The free comments also contained a num-
ber of direct views on the open/close paradigm, and they were similar in tone: “Open 
systems will, at the end, win.” 
In the inhibitive drivers, there was non-consensus only in lack of capabilities (E= 27 %, 
A= 27 %, U=13%). 
The non-consensus in accelerative sub-drivers was with: 
 Emergence of platforms (E=28%, A=24%, U=45%) 
 Crowd intelligence effect (E=8%, A=29%, U=18%) 
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Digital Business Models 
Three inhibitive sub-drives or clusters got 78% of all points in Digital Business Models: 
 Industry barriers  (including incumbents’ active resistance), 37% 
 Legacy systems and processes, 23% 
 Data (security and ownership), 18% 
Silo organizations first came up in interview 21 and started to collect points thereafter, 
ending up with 9% of the points. Silo organization points were away from industry bar-
riers. This suggests that silo organizations as a sub-driver might have been in im-
portance close to those in the top three if present from the beginning. 
Three sub-drivers or clusters constituted 72% of the accelerative sub-drivers: 
 Cost benefits (productivity, capital), 33% 
 Influential Early Adopters, 17% 
 Slow growth of existing business, 15 % 
 New levels of customer insight, 12% 
New levels of customer insight originated in interview 19 and collected 12% of the 
points, mainly from productivity; this suggests that it would have ended higher in the list. 
From the free comments, new perspectives were found to form 4 themes: winners, 
timing, supply, and used cases. The winners discussion pondered the issue if the 
startups could win incumbents by using Digital Business Models. The challenge was 
perceived to be in high industry barriers and in the need for assets. Progressive incum-
bents or adjacent systems suppliers (e.g., type GE; ABB, Siemens) who possess some 
of the critical technologies were named also as potential disruptors. The need for both 
digital and domain capability (as with AI) was named as a prerequisite to winning with 
Digital Business Models.  
Timing comments mostly supported the opinion that there will be a pivot point for the 
growth of Digital Business Models; forecasting the exact timing, however, is not likely. 
The essence of the supply comments was that Digital Business Model in machine-
building is currently more marketing than supply. Therefore, the importance of the used 
cases is high, and was elaborated upon in many discussions. This is a bit of a Catch-
22, as everybody hopes for the occurrence, but nobody is willing to move. One specific 
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view was that an oligopolistic market structure may lead users to attract new suppliers 
with Digital Business Models in order to enhance the competition. 
In the inhibitive sub-drivers, there was non-consensus only in data (E= 13 %, A= 17 %, 
U=24%). 
In the accelerative sub-drivers, there was non-consensus in: 
 Cost benefits (E=20 %, A=43 %, U=35%) 
 Slow growth of existing business (E=19 %, A=22 %, U=6%) 
 
Industry Convergence 
Four inhibitive sub-drives got 83% of all points in Industry Convergence: 
 Industry beliefs (includes Dominant Logic), 32%  
 Industry-specific financial steering, 22%  
 Cultural barriers, 15%  
 Lack of domain knowledge, 14% 
Three accelerative sub-drivers got 88% of all points: 
 Business model diffusion, 41% 
 Consumer business behavior merging into B2B industries, 32% 
 Generic digital technologies,15% 
From the free comments, some themes were repetitive: speed, platforms, consumers, 
and individual companies.  Speed was related to industry beliefs and specifically to 
clock speed; most examples were phrased like: “What is fast development time – real 
time or 2 years?” Platforms were attached to generic digital technologies from a disrup-
tion perspective—especially discipline-based. Also, industry overlapping ecosystems 
were mentioned. Most of the consumer elaboration related to application business con-
cepts (apps) or rising user interface expectations in B2B driven by the people’s private 
experiences. Individual company initiatives, like earlier examples of DHL in 3D printing 
or Amazon in logistics, were referenced in industry convergence. 
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In the inhibitive sub-drivers, there was non-consensus in the following sub-drivers of 
Industry Convergence: 
 Industry beliefs (E=36%, A=35%, U=17%) 
 Industry-specific financial steering (E=19%, A=27%, U=11%) 
 Cultural barriers (E=14%, A=13%, U=22%) 
 Lack of domain knowledge (E=17%, A=6%, U=28%) 
In the accelerative sub-drivers, there was non-consensus only in business model diffu-
sion (E= 36 %, A= 48 %, U=33%). 
 
Radical Innovations; Firm, Strategy, Leadership; Industry forces; Risk Capital 
Free comments indicated that disruption by Radical Innovations is more isolated events 
than a result of a predictable pattern. Within these limitations, the inertia in Radical In-
novation was mostly explained by 3 sub-drivers: legacy leadership and ownership 
(26%), good returns by continuous improvement (21%), and risk-adverse business 
culture (19%). The sub-drivers that accelerate Radical Innovation were experiment 
culture (29%), influential Early Adopters (21%), and the new level of customer insight 
(19%). The dominant view in the free comments resembled Christensen’s Innovators 
Dilemma (2011): continuous improvement is a low risk activity which almost always 
pays back. Another view was that digitalization increases raw material for Radical In-
novation (e.g., sensors, computing, behavioral data, opinion data), which theoretically 
increases the chance of Radical Innovation as an event. There were also reminders 
that Radical Innovations are often low tech. The last category of comments related to 
business definitions or business models, and those comments emphasized that part of 
radicalness is redefinition (e.g., moving into higher systemic levels, as discussed earlier; 
or Blue Ocean type (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005) of thinking as discussed in the theory 
section).  
Free comments on Firm, Strategy, Management were similar to those of Radical inno-
vations, and centered on the inhibiting side around Christensen’s (2011) view, and on 
the acceleration side around “Steve Jobs” (i.e., was the smart phone disruption be-
cause of Steve Jobs, the product, Apple as a company, or its strategy and capability to 
implement it). However, the overriding perspective was the same as in Radical Innova-
tion: the firm is at the core of the changes inside of an industry, but is rarely a disruptor 
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of the industry as a whole. One comment sums up the average: “Large companies do 
disruptive things only when forced to do so.” Sub-drivers that slowed down Firm, Strat-
egy, Management as a disruptive driver were: successful incrementalism (28%), firm 
itself (e.g., authorial leadership and hierarchical, complex organizations; 23%), industry 
beliefs (23%), and short-term financial pressure (22%). The accelerative sub-drivers 
were somewhat the opposite: Visionary leadership (33%), experiment culture (23%), 
and slow growth of existing business (18%).   
Industry Forces was an interesting driver; practically every panelist recognized it as 
“The Theory” explaining industry dynamics. The recognition was similar to stakeholder 
theory, and still the combination ranked second lowest as an economic/ strategic man-
agement driver to explain disruption by digital technologies. The dominant inertia sub-
drivers were high-entry-barrier industry (35%) and cost-driven customers (31%), 
whereas three top accelerative sub-drivers were: Influential Early Adopters (37%), val-
ue driven customers (24%) and substitute business models (20%). One group of free 
comments was pondering the same question as in Networks, Crowds, Platforms: that 
the value chain is not equal to ecosystem, and the Industry Forces are strongly linked 
to the value chain. This was perceived as one weakness of the theory to explain net-
work-based disruptions. The inertia of industry barriers was explained with the view 
that the substitute suppliers in consumer business are often startups, but in high-barrier 
industries they are not credible. The conflicting views propose that niche startups can 
steal pieces of value from incumbents, or—when united—even bigger pieces. Some 
comments stated that the highest value generation potential is not constant to any 
place in the value chain. Theoretical views suggested that Industry Forces explain S-
curve leaps inside industries but not transformation between industries or systemic S-
curve leaps. There were also comments about lack of theory in this area apart from 
emerging Industry Convergence. 
Risk Capital was consistently viewed as a fundamental ingredient in the industry devel-
opment, but it was not viewed as a primary driver for industrial disruption. Only two 
panelists ranked it in the top three, and the few free comments were along lines that for 
all types of capital needs, including Radical Innovations or disruptive business models, 
there is eventually capital available. However, commenters acknowledged that the right 
timing of the access to Risk Capital speeds up disruption.  
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Interrelated economic/ strategic management sub-drivers 
All the economic /strategic management disruption sub-drivers were grouped into re-
lated categories the same way as was done with the technology related sub-drivers. 
The top eight sub-drivers constituted 96% of the inertia (when requiring that the sub-
driver was present in a minimum of two drivers), and 92% of the acceleration. The ag-
gregated sub-drivers can be seen in Figure 21.  The concentration pattern is weaker 
than with technological sub-drivers. There are also similarities in technological sub-
drivers and economic/strategic management sub-drivers. The summary of the results 
of economic/ strategic management drivers is shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 21. Top eight aggregate economic / strategic management sub-drivers 
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Management beliefs  Emergence of Platforms  
  
  
E A U Lack of capabilities  Cost benefits (productivity, 
capital) 
 
  
  
 Systems and processes  Crowd intelligence effect  
  
  
Digital Business 
Models 
Industry barriers  Cost benefits (productivity, 
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ness 
 
  
  
Industry Conver-
gence 
Industry beliefs  Business model diffusion  
  
  
E A U Industry-specific financial 
steering 
 Consumer business and be-
havior into B2B 
 
  
  
 Cultural barriers  Generic digital technologies  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Summary of the economic / strategic management drivers by the value chain 
 
Note: The colors represent consensus. Green means consensus with the value chain members 
who have green color. If one of the three disagrees, red means that the one who disagrees has 
stronger support from the green ones and weaker support from the yellow ones. In the driver 
section, E = Enabler, A = Actor, and U=User. With sub-drivers, the logic is that the bottom 
square is Enabler, the middle square is Actor, and the upper square is User. The inhibitive sub-
drivers are located in the left column and the accelerative sub-drivers in the right column. 
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 Results from the survey 4.3
The survey was conducted to investigate five different areas of interest: 
1. The systemic impact of the digital technologies and economic concepts (drivers) 
on firms’ products, services, operations, and business models (objects) 
2. Timing of the potential disruption by the object 
3. The disruptiveness of the drivers 
4. Preparedness of the respondent’s organization for the potential disruption (in-
vestment) 
5. Dependencies in independent variables, drivers, and objects 
The same 3x3 background matrix was used in the survey as was used in the Delphi 
interviews, and the process was as described in the methodology chapter. The final 
number of seminars where the population was sampled was eight (two public, three 
invitation-based, and three semipublic, where participation was limited from a popula-
tion that originally was open). The survey was answered by 305 persons. The participa-
tion profiles can be seen in Table 12. The participants came from 23 different countries 
and the number of non-Finns was slightly over one-third.  
Role/ Value Chain Enablers Actors Users 
Scientists 11 10 2 
Synthesizers 52 76 31 
Decision makers 25 75 23 
Table 12. Participation in the survey 
Filtering samples with incomplete background information eliminated four samples (one 
enabler–decision-maker, one enabler-synthesizer, one actor-synthesizer, and one us-
er-synthesizer). The samples that survived filtering were almost complete; less than 0.5% 
of the answers had unanswered data points. In most cases, only one data point was 
missing in the sample and therefore the data was completed in order to have other 
unique data points from those respondents as part of the analysis.  
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After completion, the data was tested with Shapiro-Wilk test and the results (see Ap-
pendix 5) indicate that the data does not follow a normal distribution. Table 12 reveals 
that sub-populations differ from each other, and balancing is required in order to in-
crease the generalization of the results. The value chain is expected to be the main 
explanation for the results, and the sample sizes by the value chain vary from 53 to 150. 
The scientist sub-populations are so small, even before splitting them based on the 
investment behavior, that they are dropped away when analyzing differences in the 
value chain with the balanced data. Those samples are not lost, however, as some of 
the analysis is done by using the whole population. Leaving out scientists leaves 18 
sub-populations for balancing, which results in 278 answers when counting the two 
other roles in value chain (see Table 12). Thereafter, 278 is divided by the number of 
remaining sub-populations (18), which equals to 15.45 - the total weight of the sub-
population. To get the coefficient for an individual sample, the total weight of the sub-
population is divided by the number of samples in the corresponding sub-population. In 
further analysis, selected methods utilize those coefficients (e.g., when calculating 
weighted averages or variances). 
The last phase before analysis is the interaction effect test using the two-way ANOVA; 
the results are enclosed in Appendix 6. The description given by the XLSTAT states 
that adjusted R2 express the proportion of the variability of the dependent variable of 
the model, and takes into account the number of variables used in the model. The first 
goodness of fit is for the whole population (see Appendix 6), and it indicates that the 
probability test is not met with Operations, Big Data, and Open Innovation. However, as 
only 6.9% and 9.5% of the findings in cases of Operations and Big Data can be ex-
plained, a p-value that is marginally over 0.05 is still acceptable.  Open Innovation has 
a clearly higher p-value (0.142), but it also has a low explanation power by variance 
(8.3 %). The other test (Type III SS) explains how much the combinations of individual 
background factors (e.g., place in value chain, role, and investment) can explain vari-
ance in the dependent variable. The test analyzes this with both the combination of two 
background factors and with all three.  The empty cells indicate that the interactions of 
the background variables have 0% chance of explaining the values of the dependent 
factor. Type III SS test is recommended if there is an assumption of interaction.  The 
interpretation by the tool instructions is that lower p-value indicates that the factor has a 
larger contribution in the model explaining the variance by the variable examined. The 
results suggest that the combination of value chain, role, and investment together 
might have interaction in the cases of Big Data, Industrial Internet, and MBSE, but as 
the variance can only explain less than 14% of those variables, it cannot be concluded. 
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Results also indicate that individual factors are not very powerful in explaining most of 
the variance in data. 
Before presenting results, three limitations can be summarized: 
 Data does not follow normal distribution.  
 Interaction effect does not shadow the impact of the background factors (inde-
pendent). 
 Background factors are only capable of explaining a small amount of variance 
in the dependent factors (drivers and objects).      
The survey results form three categories. First is the whole population that uses unbal-
anced data with an assumption that some of the answers may lie in a larger population. 
A second category uses balanced data and is seeking differences and similarities be-
tween the value chain members. The third category analyzes dependencies between 
the factors (e.g., place in value chain, investment) and values (e.g., systemic impact or 
relative disruptiveness of technologies and concepts), and is mostly impacted by the 
limitations above. 
4.3.1 Whole population 
The first result is the systemic impact of digitalization (i.e., continuous improvement, 
quantum leap and disruption). The results of the impact by object can be seen in 
Appendix 7. The result is presented by plotting the values with XLSTAT univariate box 
plot. In that plot, the box contains 50% of all the values, whereas the vertical line in the 
box represents the median value. The lines outside of the box indicate the boundaries, 
which include 95% of the entries. If there are still individual points beyond those lines, 
they can be considered as improbable outliers. The x represents the average value of 
the population. Average and variance values have also been added in the same picture. 
The first result indicates the following conclusions: 
 Data does not follow the normal distribution as the Shapiro-Wilk test indicated; 
 Product is perceived having least disruption impact (lowest average and vari-
ance); 
 Digitalization is expected to have quantum leap impact in operations of the firm 
that supplies machines (mean and 50% of the answers fit into quantum leap ar-
ea with 3.1 variance); 
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 Potential disruption is most likely to take place in the services and business 
models (average strong quantum leap but also a high number of answers in dis-
ruption); business models have, however, the highest variance of all of the po-
tential objects; and 
 Level of variances appears to be high, indicating uncertainty within respondents. 
Participants who judged potential disruption in any of the four objects also evaluated 
the timing (i.e., how long it takes that the disruption has changed the way of doing 
business) in three categories (i.e., less than 5 years, between 5-10 years, or over 10 
years). Those results can be seen in Figure 23, which represents the relative shares of 
the timing by each object. 
 
Figure 23. Timing of potential disruption by whole population, unbalanced data 
 
The results reveal that although the disruption potential of the products is lowest, the 
time to introduce it is the shortest. Services have a high disruption potential and almost 
as short an introduction time as products -even faster if the timeline is under 10 years. 
Operations have a medium disruption potential and a relatively long lead time, indicat-
ing high inertia to change how a firm operates. Changing business models have a high 
disruption potential but the longest lead time to reach acceptance by the industry. 
 
43% 38% 32% 
22% 
35% 52% 
48% 
57% 
22% 
10% 
21% 21% 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Products Services Operations Business Models
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 (
%
) 
Timing of disruption 
< 5 years 5-10 years > 10 years
  
142 
 
4.3.2 By the value chain 
The first result by the value chain is the potential disruption impact by digitalization to 
products, services, operations, and business models. The used data is now balanced, 
but the procedure is the same as with the whole population; the results can be seen in 
the plot in Appendix 8.  
There are multiple findings drawn from the plot: 
 The relative position in the disruption (when looking the averages) is the same 
with all members of the value chain (i.e., products lowest, operations in the 
middle, and services and business models higher); 
 In all of the objects, users have the highest variance; 
 Enablers systematically see more disruption potential (average) in all of the ob-
jects than actors and users. 
As the potential disruption is hard to judge, and variances are high, the second impact 
analysis is based on presenting how the views differ in the value chain with those par-
ticipants who rated the concepts and technologies either weak continuous improve-
ment, or strong disruption. This is based on the assumption that participants who as-
sign strong value farther away from the middle point are more likely have clear argu-
ments for their selections. Those results can be seen in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24, Weak and strong disruption impacts by the value chain, balanced data 
This figure illustrates even more clearly that the disruption expectations are highest in 
services and business models, and fair in operations. According to this analysis, the 
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users’ view is clearly more towards disruption in all of the objects. Users also view that 
the disruption is not as likely to emerge from the products as enablers and actors be-
lieve. 
The disruptiveness of technological and economic drivers was also analyzed by using 
XLSTAT univariate box plot; the results are enclosed in Appendix 9. The main observa-
tions from the plot are: 
 The highest variance is related to 3D printing and Robotics; 
 Enablers systematically viewed the disruptive impact of the combination of 
IoT/Cloud/Big Data to be stronger than did the users and actors; 
 Enablers are more conservative than users in 3D printing and Robotics; 
 Economic/ strategic management drivers (e.g., Industrial Internet and Open In-
novation) attract generally higher average values than the technological drivers. 
For the same reason as with impact analysis, technology and economic/ strategic 
management drivers are also analyzed based on the weak, continuous improvement, 
or strong disruption ratings; the results are presented in Figure 25. Also, here the high 
variance in 3D printing and Robotics is clearly visible, and users anticipate that these 
technologies might have a stronger potential impact than the rest of the population 
believes. Open Innovation was identified as an important disruptor by all the value 
chain members, but there is a equally sized opposition who perceives very small 
impact. 
 
Figure 25. Weak and strong disruption drivers by value chain, balanced data 
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The third result by the values chain is the respondents’ judgments on how well they are 
prepared with investments for the potential disruption by digitalization. This analysis 
also uses balanced data where the scientists are excluded. The results are presented 
in Figure 26. This data clearly indicates that the enablers believe that their company is 
taking progressive actions, whereas the users seemed to be equally unprepared, and 
the actors land somewhere in between, when almost half of the respondents share the 
view that their organizations’ investment in the digital technologies keeps them in the 
current relative position compared to their peers. 
 
Figure 26. Impact of own digitalization investments, balanced data 
4.3.3 Dependencies 
Before analyzing dependencies, various statistical methods were tested, but only corre-
lation and variance analysis appeared to be yielding results. The likely reason for this 
might be the high variance in the raw data.  
Correlation was analyzed by using non-parametric Kendall’s rank correlation method 
for both the balanced and unbalanced data. The Kendall correlation method can be 
used for large sample sizes, but Schmidt (1997) pointed out its wide use also in rank 
orders.  The results for the whole population can be seen in Appendix 10.  The results 
indicate that majority of the correlations have minor differences in the balanced and 
unbalanced data, but they are not significant enough to change conclusions. Therefore, 
only balanced data is used when analyzing differences in the value chain, which can be 
seen in Appendix 11. The correlation between business model and Industrial Internet is 
not taken into account as Industrial Internet is, de facto, a Digital Business Model. The 
conclusions from the tables in Appendix 11 are: 
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 Values given by actors deliver the weakest correlations between variables; 
 All participants in the different parts of the value chain view connectivity (IoT) as 
a driver for Industrial Internet; 
 Big Data/AI drives the disruption in all areas in the eyes of enablers; 
 Big Data/AI, Cloud, IoT form a cluster for Industrial Internet from the view of en-
ablers; 
 Big Data/AI, Cloud, Iot form a cluster also in the answers given by users; 
 IoT drives the disruption in all areas in the eyes of users (operations weaker); 
 Open innovation drives the disruption in all areas from the perspective of actors 
and users.  
Based on Shapiro-Wilk and univariate box plots, non-parametric methods would have 
been more ideal for analyzing variance; however, the use of weighting factors as were 
used in the balancing of the sample sizes complicates calculations when using rank-
based comparison methods like Moods median test, as they use unbalanced data by 
default. Therefore, ANOVA—which is a parametric method—-shall be applied. Using 
ANOVA with non-normally distributed data has a risk of error if the population has a 
high number of outliers. This, however, is not as critical an issue as in the correlation 
analysis, because ANOVA is using averages of random samples from the sub-
populations, and if the analysis is capable of creating a normal distribution for the sam-
ple averages of the sub-populations, it is also safe to compare the results between sub-
populations. The error is more likely with small sample populations under 30, or if the 
variances of the subgroups are very different. As ANOVA is applied in the value chain, 
the number of participants by value chain varies between 53 and 150, which reduces 
the risk. The variance differences between subgroups are relatively small, as can be 
seen in Appendices 8 and 9. The ANOVA F-test determines whether there are differ-
ences between subgroups, and results appear in Table 13. The interpretation of the F-
test is that if the corresponding p-value is less than 0.05 (Nuzzo, 2014), there is a sta-
tistical difference in the opinions between the subgroups (Figures are bolded in the 
Table 13).  
 
Pro-
ducts 
Servi-
ces 
Oper-
ations 
Business 
models 3D 
Big 
Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI 
Robot-
ics 
 0,030 0,099 0,661 0,386 0,004 0,026 0,024 0,003 0,154 0,203 0,448 0,038 
Table 13. ANOVA F-test results 
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After the F-test, the data is handled with an ANOVA t-test. The results are shown in 
Appendix 12. As the object of the enquiry is to identify differences in the value chain, all 
combinations of the value chain where F-test showed less than 0.05 p-value are drawn. 
The diagram in Appendix 12 is illustrated with colors, so that if the p-value between two 
value chain members is less than 0.05, there is an expected difference in the view. In 
those cases, the one in disagreement who believes more in disruption (i.e., higher av-
erage in Appendix 8 or 9) is marked with green, and the one who believes less in dis-
ruption with red. If all disagree, the middle opinion is shaded with yellow (no such cas-
es found). If the t-test did not recognize disagreement between value chain members, 
they are marked with blue, indicating that those members of the value chain share the 
opinion. 
 Main findings from Appendix 12 are: 
 Users are more skeptical towards the claim that products are affected by the 
disruption caused by digitalization than are enablers; 
 Enablers view 3D printing as less disruptive than do actors and users; 
 Enablers perceive Big Data and Cloud as more disruptive than do actors and 
users; 
 Users are more skeptical towards the impact of the IoT than enablers and ac-
tors are, but believe in Robotization being more disruptive than do enablers. 
 Cases 4.4
Case descriptions are part of the triangulation. They are, however, building on earlier 
cited thoughts of Jouvenel (1967) that the future has to be plausible and case selection 
by Eisenhardt and Graebner (1997) that “cases are selected because they are suitable 
for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among constructs”.  
Two other methods collect data based on the judgment about future development. The 
cases illustrate that there is already ongoing disruption in the scope of the research, 
even if it is marginal compared to the size of the market from which the cases are taken. 
The construct by Eisenhardt and Graebner (1997) is what, in Figure 5, was referred to 
as Outcome Economy, or what was modified—based on the Delphi interview round 
one in Figure 14—to be more closely suited to the machine-builder. Every case de-
scribes the ultimate output of that business, how the value is created by existing indus-
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try, and how the new actor has redefined the value creation. In all cases, the value cre-
ation is at higher levels (as seen in Figure 14). The solution has to be based on the 
digital technologies within the scope of the research and the application of the technol-
ogies. As one last criterion, the case has to establish a quantum difference in 
cost/benefit compared to the current industry practices, and must have originally been 
a startup company. 
4.4.1 Enevo 
Enevo was established in Finland in 2010, using a new business model. They operate 
in waste collection (output) with minimal resources in the system. The actors in the 
Enevo case are companies that manufacture trucks or waste collection devices at-
tached to the trucks, as well as companies that manufacture recycling and waste con-
tainers. The B2B user is a waste collection company that can be either private or public. 
The ultimate cost of waste handling is paid by businesses (cost of doing business) and 
citizens (cost of living, or component in taxes if waste collection is a public service). 
Enevo is the digital enabler that uses sensors, data transmission, positioning, analyt-
ics/algorithms, and cloud computing as digital technologies. 
The waste collection system consists of waste bins and final treatment (e.g., land fill, 
recycling, energy), plus transportation and handling in-between. A typical process is 
that a truck with waste handling equipment picks up the content of the waste bins and 
delivers it for final treatment. The owner has made an agreement with the waste collec-
tion company that, for a certain fee, waste bins are emptied on a regular basis (e.g., 
once a week). Based on these fixed schedules, trucks have their route plans. This pro-
cess results in both half-empty or overfilled bins are picked up, as picking is based on 
the calendar rather than on filling patterns. 
Enevo’s basic innovation is simple. The containers are emptied only when full, thereby 
optimizing the driving time between pickup points. The process is enabled by inexpen-
sive sensors that are attached to the container and powered by a battery that has a 
lifetime of up to 10 years in typical conditions and use. The sensors send the infor-
mation on the fill level of the container to Cloud, which-based on time series calculates 
the filling pattern and trend of that container, and therefore can predict when it will be 
full. That information can be used in route planning. This optimization has multiple logi-
cal values: the need for trucks and waste handling devices is less for every ton of 
waste handled. In the same way, the operational cost (e.g., driver, fuel, spare parts) 
from moving half empty bins or driving unnecessary distances disappears.  According 
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to Enevo, the productivity gain can be as high as 40%; conventional improvement is 
following a learning curve of a few percentages per year. The disruption logic is that a 
very small investment-in this case, inexpensive sensors and Cloud computing-can en-
able this productivity leap. Also, the improvement of the truck or waste handling equip-
ment is incremental, as the basic solutions have existed for years. Enevo’s solution is 
digital, and it can be scaled to fit any city that has a similar waste collection system. 
The value creation needs a new business model, or at least a new procurement pro-
cess, where the pickup fee is changed from days of pickups to tons of waste handled. 
Using that formula, the service provider can pass part of the savings along to the ulti-
mate payer, and thereby increase its competiveness. The other part of the savings can 
be shared between Enevo and the waste collection company via royalties or discounts 
of a few cents per ton handled. In the case of recycling, the collecting company sells 
the raw material, such as paper, saving in the handling and logistics, thereby yielding 
better margins without changing the business model. If one can assume that the need-
ed technology is mature and that everyone in the value chain saves, this should result 
in a major growth opportunity. But, there are also losers, and that logically explains part 
of the inertia. If the process requires less assets per ton, the need for trucks and waste 
handling equipment will go down as long as the entire system reaches a point where 
only productive moves are made and all growth of waste translates to the same growth 
of needed assets. This is also a difficulty for users who have heavy assets, including a 
high number of drivers on the payroll, if they have to compete with new entrants without 
assets, and who can apply the new method faster. It is certainly a difficulty for the driv-
ers, as fewer of them are needed to perform the job. If the user is a municipal company, 
reducing drivers may be against public opinion. However, in many cases as the amount 
of waste is increasing and the fractions collected increase, the cost savings and effi-
ciencies reduce the need to add new resources or invest in new equipment. In addition, 
in the private sector, the companies have means to increase their customer bases 
without additional investments. As the market is formed by a high number of end-users 
(i.e., businesses and citizens), the volume benefit is not realized if only a few of the 
end-users join the new system. Logically, one can project a pattern where Enevo’s 
growth pattern has a link to Early Adopter logic. When more users (maybe, also, an 
Enevo-type competitor) enter the market, at some time there will be a point where us-
ers using the conventional methodology become non-competitive.  
Interestingly, in the Enevo case, the actor (i.e., truck manufacturer or waste handling 
equipment manufacturer) is not even needed for this productivity leap despite the fact 
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that the innovation reduces the actor’s future market. For truck manufacturers, this 
possibility is not even visible in the beginning, as waste disposal is not a major applica-
tion for trucks, and new innovations applied in this segment in a few countries does not 
show up in market volumes. However, there might other digital innovations for other 
applications where a similar mechanism increases the asset utilization and compound 
they might result in lower growth rates that the manufacturer is used to. That still might 
be overshadowed by the normal variance of the GDP growth and investment behavior. 
For the waste equipment manufacturer, the impact is more direct, but Enevo’s solution 
is still outside of market scope and, in the beginning, impact to business volume is 
marginal. The reaction of the waste equipment manufacturer depends if they define 
their output as waste handling or waste equipment. If the answer is waste handling, 
they can try to copy Enevo, join Enevo, or buy Enevo. For Enevo, the strategic ques-
tion is whether Enevo can be become an open platform for all the related players, if the 
status of the bin would be a platform that would enable developers, including Enevo, to 
develop additional value-adding services, such as recognizing fire before it occurs 
based on certain patterns of rising temperature. 
The Enevo descriptions are taken from the company’s web page and presentations 
that the company has made in public. The case description was read and commented 
upon by Mr. Pirkka Palomäki, COO and CTO of Enevo, who verified the logic being 
correct. 
4.4.2 Trimble 
Trimble’s roots stem from 1978 in Silicon Valley based on the navigation and position 
technology, and they were an early applier of GPS. For the purpose of this research, 
the milestone for Trimble was when they established a joint venture with Caterpillar for 
advance guidance and control to be used in agricultural, construction, mining, and 
waste industries in 2002. Trimble’s case industry example is farming, as it is also con-
nected to business models that Porter and Heppelman illustrated in their article How 
Smart, Connected Products Are Transforming Competition (2014). 
In this case, Trimble is the digital enabler, an agricultural farm tractor manufacturer is 
the actor, and the farm is the user. The simplified process is that the farm is planting 
seeds to be harvested later by using farm harvesting equipment. The output of the pro-
cess is quality and quantity of the crop. For optimal crops, farmers need to know 
weather and soil conditions during the growing season as well as the precise applica-
tion rates for chemical and fertilizers based on historical and real-time data. For optimal 
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use of machinery, they need to know the real-time conditions of the machines; if the 
farm is large, that need extends to the whole fleet. Farm tractors might have low utiliza-
tion rates outside harvesting season, but during harvest, uptime is mission critical. 
Traditional farm output and machinery development has been only partially connected. 
The tractor development has followed the logic of any work machine development, per-
formance, features, cost, and regulations that are directed to that particular machine or 
application (e.g., safety, noise, emissions). Performance could be improved with higher 
horse power, features and innovations (e.g., ability to counter difficult terrains), and 
product cost with selection of components and efficiency with the actor’s operations. 
Reduction of operational costs, like fuel consumption have been a constant goal for the 
product development. The business model for machine-builders has been similar to 
that for razor blades, where significant amounts of the profit are made by selling spare 
parts during the lifetime of the machine. 
Trimble brings the business to Outcome Economy (World Economic Forum, 2015), 
goes to higher abstraction level as illustrated in Figure 14, orchestrates the systems of 
systems (Porter & Heppelman, 2014), and is building industry-specific platforms that 
other players can attach to. They apply sensors, provide data transmission, positioning, 
analytics, and cloud computing as digital technologies, combine internal and external 
sources of data, and enable the user to monitor and control equipment based on the 
knowledge that they have created with digital interfaces like mobile devices. Their 
business model is based on software licensing (price per acre per year). They also 
offer users additional value-added services that are derived from the knowledge that 
they manage the system in the industry. Compared to Enevo, every farm gets the ben-
efit, even if no other farms join the system. In order to obtain industry knowledge, 
growth of the number of users is needed. 
The same way as in the Enevo example, this all can be achieved without involvement 
of the actor as long as the user provides access to the data and Trimble has access 
also to resources and knowledge that typically are possessed by the actor. In all in-
stances, better utilization of tractors cuts part of the growth potential of tractors as long 
as their systemic development has reached maturity. The tractor manufacturers’ op-
tions are: stay out, develop their own solution, or buy Trimble (which has become less 
logical, as Trimble operates in a high number of industries). Caterpillar and Trimble’s 
joint venture is closer to acquisition, which has a consequence for Trimble, that in order 
to have Connected Farm as an industry platform, the other manufacturers have to co-
operate with Trimble-Caterpillar JV. Compared to Enovo’s example, the business re-
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definition is already ongoing. Precision farming is close to the concept of Outcome 
Economy (World Economic Forum, 2015), and other major actors like Agco27 and John 
Deere28 are active in changing the rules of how value is created in farming. The eco-
system around precision farming is not only driven by technological enablers like Trim-
ble or actors like Agco, Caterpillar, or John Deere, but also by companies like Monsan-
to,29 which comes originally from the agricultural chemicals market, but today is invest-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars into what they call Agriculture 2.0, which based on 
knowledge from agricultural data. 
The data for this description was done by analyzing public sources like the company 
web pages, but the logic of the case description was validated by an industry expert of 
one of the leading actors in precision farming. 
4.4.3 XVELA 
XVELA is an internal company startup of the Oakland, California-based software com-
pany, Navis, which was acquired by the Finnish company Cargotec in 2013. Navis 
supplies software that enables container terminals to run their operations. XVELA is an 
example of an endeavor to build industrial platforms; the development of these plat-
forms came up high in Delphi round two both as an accelerator of Network, Crowds, 
Platforms (Figure 22) as well as a generic accelerator of economic concepts that are 
sensitive for digitalization (Figure 21).  
Navis has been an industry-specific ERP supplier where the value of optimization is 
location-specific (i.e., within the confines of the container terminal). Global shipping, as 
described in sub-chapter 4.1, is relatively simple in physical form, as global trade is 
enabled by goods moving inside of a standardized container. By the same token, how-
ever, the information attached to and enabling the movement of the container and its 
contents is highly complex, and there are many stakeholders in every supply chain 
transaction (e.g., shippers, forwarding agents, shipping lines, customs, terminals, con-
signees, port authorities, and various governmental departments). The emerging logic 
from Delphi round one (Figure 14) was the assumption that many of the disruptive digi-
tal innovations optimize systems at a higher level than actors have been doing. This is 
                                               
27
 http://www.agcocorp.com/precision-farming.html 
28
 https://www.deere.com/en_US/products/equipment/ag_management_solutions 
29
 https://ag2point0.com/tag/monsanto/ 
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the case also in XVELA, as optimization of a terminal is sub-optimization if you look it 
from the supply chain point of view. The amount of waste in global shipping is highly 
related to inefficiencies in information flow, and Cargotec has estimated that the lost 
value of its waste is $17 billion annually30. 
The traditional information flow is based on the exchange of electronic versions of doc-
uments between two trading partners at specific points in time (e.g., after the ship de-
parts a container terminal). For example, a bill of lading is a document that is carrying 
the legal ownership from the shipper to consignee, and a shipping manifest contains 
the specifics of the cargo. A vessel stowplan document defines all of the containers on 
the vessel, their locations, and sufficient information for shipping lines and container 
terminals to exchange instructions as to which containers to discharge and load at a 
particular terminal. These documents are sent between parties in the supply chain, 
including governmental authorities, electronically; they adhere, for the most part to in-
dustry specific standards (e.g. EDIFACT), and are known in the industry as EDI docu-
ments. The crux of the problem is that information is sent to all stakeholders on a 1-to-1 
basis and at specific points in time—it is not shared in real time amongst all the parties 
who require this information in order to make sound and efficient operational decisions. 
Like with the Enevo case, the XVELA basic idea is simple. The shipping information 
would be loaded in real time into a Cloud platform that has analytics-based tools for 
optimization.  Access to information includes security considerations ensuring that all 
data is safely shared amongst all the key stakeholders, while safeguarding commercial-
ly competitive aspects of the data. In this regard, security is more robust than what has 
existed to date with the sharing of EDI messages among the many parties in the supply 
chain. Cost factors that such a solution may impact include: 
 Capital cost for vessels waiting to be loaded and unloaded; 
 Extra operational cost (e.g., fuel) for the vessel when sailing at a higher speed 
than needed, 
 Multiple handling of information in the value chain and by other stakeholders, 
 Lower productivity of the terminal, 
 Longer storage time for containers in terminals. 
                                               
30 http://www.cargotec.com/en-global/investors/materials/other-presentations/Pages/CMD-
2015.aspx, retrieved 3.5.2016 
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On the revenue side, better knowledge of information would increase vessel utilization 
and improve service, enabling performance-based pricing and rewarding good compa-
nies with premiums. 
The business model alternatives for XVELA are monthly and usage-based. If Enevo 
needs a high number of users at the municipal level to achieve platform benefits, 
XVELA needs the same at a global level. Many of the potential users of the systems 
are consolidated businesses. If acceleration motives are in productivity and new busi-
ness models, the inertia will likely follow the findings in the Delphi two round. Logically, 
a specific issue in this type of collaborative platform is trust (e.g., in Delphi sub-drivers, 
trust in a virtual environment), when competitors in the industry load their business data 
to the same Cloud platform. The same way as in the Enovo case, better asset utiliza-
tion cuts asset-based business growth (again from actors) somewhat, but actors do not 
really have a say whether users join the system or not. All reductions in or automation 
of multiple information loading are reductions of the labor force, but the impact is from 
so many streams that it is not a major inertia. As major users of the system are large 
shipping lines, the inertia results from Delphi two round most likely apply (e.g., man-
agement or industry beliefs, legacy systems), but there are no specific research data 
on this. Users in Delphi interviews, however, were aware of XVELA when answering 
questions related to Networks, Crowds, Platforms; Cloud, AI, and Digital Business 
Models. 
The strategic landscape for XVELA does have a few challenges. The first one is the 
speed of user acceptance and of reaching a critical mass of participation that will de-
termine whether it can become an industry platform. The other challenge is potential 
platform competition. This, according to many of the free comments in Delphi round 
two, can lead to a situation where users join several platforms, and none of them 
achieve a true network effect. Potential industrial platforms could come from the same 
route as XVELA themselves: ERP software competence for ports and terminals. The 
other source of potential competition is any player that is in logistics software solutions. 
XVELA has a head start, however, and time will show its effectiveness. 
This description was created by analyzing public sources, industry (sub-chapter 4.1), 
and researcher’s own industry knowledge. XVELA CTO Robert Inchausti also read the 
draft and confirmed that disruptive logic of the XVELA case is correctly written. 
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4.4.4 Summary of the three case descriptions 
The three case companies all are digital, out-of-industry enablers (from actors point) 
whose solutions add major value compared to the historical productivity improvement 
of the case industry. The key characteristics of the value-adding output, relationship to 
platforms, business models, the use of digital technology, and scalability of the busi-
ness is presented in Table 14, and it will be used as a framework when discussing re-
sults of the two other methodologies in the following chapter.  
 Enevo Trimble XVELA 
Origin (from case 
perspective) 
New business model 
based startup  
GPS technology (origi-
nally startup) 
  
Internal startup of an 
ERP supplier 
Output Cheaper waste per han-
dled ton 
Better crop for a farm Transparent, real-time 
cargo planning data for 
the entire ecosystem 
Platform scope Municipal+ Farm+ Global 
Business model License fee  License fee 
(+consulting) 
Monthly fee and usage 
Digital technology Sensors, wireless data 
transmission, Cloud com-
puting, Big Data /AI, 
Sensors, wireless data 
transmission, Cloud 
computing, Big Data /AI, 
GPS 
Cloud computing, Big 
Data / AI 
Scalability To similar waste systems To similar farming 
methods  
Global transportation 
Impact to actor Reduced growth rate in 
equipment based business  
Reduced growth in 
equipment based busi-
ness 
Chance to leverage 
Reduced growth rate of 
equipment 
Impact to user Reduced cost, opportunity 
to new business models 
Optimized output Better productivity or 
lower cost 
Chance to leverage 
Table 14. Summary of the three case descriptions 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
The ethos of this dissertation is hermeneutic, and the research question is related to a 
complex systemic phenomenon. The intent of the enquiry has been increasing under-
standing of whether the current value creation of the machine-building industry is going 
to be disrupted by digitalization and, furthermore, if there is a paradigm change, what 
types of technological and economic/ strategic management drivers cause the change. 
The underlying assumption has been that the consensus or disagreement about this 
future development in the value chain impacts the dynamics, and therefore the value 
chain has been a key component in the research design. This systemic complexity of 
the question triggered the use of relatively large number of technological and econom-
ic/strategic management perspectives. It also created a practical limit on how detailed 
the investigation could be without losing the holistic approach which is a critical attrib-
ute of the entire enquiry. The same reason drove the choice of mixed methods, which 
are not only used for triangulation of the results, but also for expanding the breadth that 
the different research methods cover.  Apart from the three short case descriptions, 
expert judgment was at the core of the Delphi interviews as well as the survey.    
The logic of the last chapter is that the discussion section covers the three areas of the 
enquiry: disruptiveness, value chain, and system perspective. In the first two, the find-
ings of all three methods and the underlying theory are utilized. The systemic section is 
based on presenting the key findings in a system dynamic model. The conclusion sec-
tion presents the contribution to industry evolution and strategic management as well 
as to practice. The analyses of reliability and validity of the results is done before end-
ing the dissertation to suggest potential future research avenues. 
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 Discussion 5.1
5.1.1 Disruption 
It is challenging to judge the drivers of disruption without understanding the characteris-
tics of the potential disruption. The proposition was that digital technologies enable 
technological and strategic management concepts which can disrupt the machine-
building industry. This dissertation is not trying to prove the proposition, but rather to 
increase understanding about the mechanisms that might result from it. Proving the 
proposition would have encountered dilemmas in the spirit of the positivistic philosophy 
of science: How do we verify with measurement that the disruption has happened? 
How do we measure the exact starting point?  
Disruption is, in this dissertation, defined as changing a paradigm of the industry. In the 
beginning, the definition of paradigm was done by citing Thomas Kuhn (1996), whose 
definition originated from scientific paradigms, but it also serves well in the industrial 
context: 
On the other hand, paradigm stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values 
and techniques, and so on shared by the members of given community. On the 
other hand, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puz-
zle solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules 
as a basis for the remaining puzzles of normal science. 
Theories in the second chapter dealt with content of the starting point, such as Domi-
nant Logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), Industry Recipe (Spender, 1989), and Business 
Model (Osterwalder, 2004). Other sets of theories looked upon the transformation 
mechanisms like Industry Forces (Porter, 1979), S-Curves (Foster, 1987), Technologi-
cal Trajectories (Dosi, 1982), Disruptive Technologies (Bower and Christensen, 1995), 
Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers, 2003), and Industry Convergence (Hacklin et al., 
2013). The third set of theories focused on the firms and people in management who 
initiate any change at a practical level: strategic schools and tools, Stakeholders 
(Freeman, 2015), Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Bounded Ration-
ality (Simon, 1979), and Absorptive Capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The frame-
work used to look at the system was based on PEST (Aguilar, 1967). It was originally 
developed as a tool to scan business environments, but it took simultaneously into 
consideration political, economic, social, and technological factors which were an inte-
gral part of Schumpeter’s (2008) seminal concept of the Creative Destruction, which 
also can be labeled changing paradigms. 
  
157 
 
Building on the notion of a heuristic starting point, one can draw from chapter 4.1 a list 
of beliefs that are in some form present with the practitioners of global container-
handling. 
 Users are conservative as they have high amount of capital tied up with the cur-
rent assets which still have a long lifetime; 
 Users are conservative as many of the them have a structural advantage to be 
in a location where high numbers of consumers and suppliers are located; 
 Actor’s business is driven by trade growth that has a positive outlook, and mar-
ket share of new equipment is a result of competition whose dynamic is best 
explained by Porter’s (1979) Five Forces; 
 The profitability of actors is mainly created with the after-sales services, where 
the highest margin component is spare parts; 
 Unmanned operations are still in their infancy stage, but their emergence is like-
ly to accelerate; 
 Out-of-industry startups do not possess credibility to seriously enter the busi-
ness. 
The disruption itself was empirically investigated in the survey and case descriptions, 
and it was also elaborated upon in many of the Delphi round two free comments. For 
analytical purposes, the potential impact was analyzed separately by products, ser-
vices, operations, and business models; therefore, the discussion follows the same 
logic. It is, however, recognized that concepts like Service of Everything (Zysman et al., 
2015) blur the boundaries of those categories. 
Products 
The survey result suggests that within the confines of this dissertation, products will not 
be the area where disruption emerges by digitalization. The minority, although they 
believed in disruption, also believed that the introduction time is shorter than in the dis-
ruption related to the services, operations, or business models.  The interpretation is 
that both development work and radical innovation of products continue to change 
market positions between actors using mechanisms that are well-explained by Porter’s 
(1979) Five Forces, but without changing the rules of the value creation of the industry. 
Also, new substitute products fit into the same Five Forces or general substitute theo-
ries in economics. There is also history-based evidence, that in global container-
handling, there has been an array of new types of products or methods introduced at 
frequent intervals without industrial disruption as defined in this dissertation. Digital 
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technologies are often generic, and more often than not originate from consumer busi-
nesses. Process computers that are needed for controlling the machines are available 
for all machine builders serving all industries. This makes it even harder to achieve 
product-based sustainable competitive advantage. Applying digital technologies faster 
than the competition can create temporal advantages that can be sustained if the actor 
is able to repeat its leadership in innovations. 
The case descriptions validate the point from a different angle. In the cases where the 
disruptive impact was achieved without actors’ involvement and with little or no cou-
pling to the product, even the digital solutions impact the future market of the products. 
In the infancy phase of digitalization, machine builders were using own technologies 
that kept companies like Trimble away, as machine builders had proprietary compo-
nents that they programmed by themselves. That development did not allow scaling or 
external innovation, and it did raise the barriers for the user who wanted to switch to 
another supplier. Also, one machine-one industry solutions meant that the R&D in-
vestment did not scale up, and consequently the progress was slow.  
The actors’ choices for the product is related to original sensoring (i.e., users can let 
sensoring to be installed to existing fleet by someone other than the actors), onboard 
computing, technologies that enable actuating functions based on computing, and 
technologies that enable data transmission to external systems. The biggest difference 
with the actors and companies in the case descriptions is the fact that the data ma-
chines collect from their performance, or from the process of which they are part, or 
from the environment where the process takes place, is a vital source of knowledge for 
development of new machines, but only for the actor. This does not take away the fact 
that in new machine development, boundaries of disruption are at the single machine 
level or location-based fleet. 
The weakness of product-based industrial disruption can indirectly be derived from the 
small number of free comments on the role of the products in the Delphi interviews. 
One could summarize them in one comment: Machines have become smarter, and 
they will continue to do so. 
Services 
In the survey data, services were perceived to be slightly more potential object for in-
dustrial disruption than business models (Appendix 7). Figure 23 shows that 90% of the 
respondents of the survey, who judged disruption to take place in services, also judged 
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that it will take place within the next 10 years. Predominantly, the “digital disruption” 
research reports of machine-building are close to this notion of the GE white paper 
(Evans & Annuziata, 2012). This might relate to logic that the objects of the service are 
multidisciplinary technological products, and the perspective of disruption is, often, how 
one of the existing incumbents could be the disruptor. In business seminars, the same 
notion is illustrated with one of the most referred examples: Rolls Royce and power by 
the hour.31 It indicates that performance-based service (also defined as a new business 
model) is used by Early Adopters (Rogers, 2003); this case suggests that aviation has 
been the forerunner at the industry level.  
For the digital enabler, it is different, and all the case firms can be defined as service 
companies: Enevo in waste management service, Trimble in crop optimization service, 
and XVELA in real-time cargo information service. Those services are only weakly 
coupled with actors’ products. Actors’ services historically are related to performance of 
individual products: spare part supply, maintenance and repairs, and by digitalization-
more towards uptime services that utilize the data that the machine builder has from 
the real operation, merged into its design knowledge. Enevo and XVELA services do 
not interfere with those types of services. Their services, as well as Trimble’s, is in the 
space which is a natural adjacency for actors to grow as firms. Trimble is also in the 
actors’ service space, which is enabled by the knowledge of machines they have 
through the joint venture with Caterpillar. 
As long as the service is attached to the actor’s own equipment, logically the disruption 
potential for the industry is limited. Service innovation even with that scope still has 
great profit and growth opportunity. The disruption mechanism impacting actors is more 
related to whether one player can service different brands, and whether the service is 
scalable. Trimble’s is also closer to this development. Trimble is trying to do both, as it 
is involved with the machine-building discipline with its connection to Caterpillar, and 
also applies the concept not only to agriculture (which was in the case description in 
sub-chapter 4.4), but also to other industries like mining and construction. The scalabil-
ity increases with the rate by which value can be added remotely. 
The free comments from the Delphi round two were along the same lines, with two ex-
pansions. Service operations are a target of quantum leap by digitalization that will 
                                               
31 http://www.rolls-royce.com/media/press-releases/yr-2012/121030-the-hour.aspx, retrieved 
16.5.2016 
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benefit the user and create competitive advantage for the actor.  That builds on logic 
that domain knowledge lies with current actors who would not change the content of 
the service but just improve the execution. The other comment was also evolutionary, 
stating that one avenue to digital services is bundling it with capital. The leasing busi-
ness has already contained various services built-in to the offering. It is not the same 
discussion as what was elaborated upon in sharing economy articles, other than the 
attitude for ownership might be changing in society at large. Platforms were mentioned 
several times in free comments, and most often they were linked to new types of ser-
vices if the user would open its data, but that will be discussed more in the driver sub-
chapter. 
Operations 
The impact of digitalization on operations is, according to the survey, stronger than on 
products but weaker than the impact on service/business models. If the impact is dis-
ruptive, it is perceived to take a longer time than if one initiates the change via a disrup-
tive product innovation. There are a number of interpretations here. On the lower dis-
ruption side, one can argue that software has been an enabler of both continuous im-
provement and quantum leaps for a very long time. This is most evident in process 
schools, or re-engineering as Hammer (1990) called it. Processes that were supported 
by systems also cause inertia as discussed earlier in the qualitative findings. This most 
likely is related to why disruptive transformation was judged to take a long time even 
though there were no specific beliefs inhibiting it. Cloud computing that was analyzed 
as a driver often impacts operations. As earlier cited, Salesforce.com (Weinhardt et al., 
2009) is a good example of one process as it changes the company-specific ERP solu-
tions into common pay-per-use solutions where the best practice process is incorpo-
rated into the service. From the competitive angle, this commoditizes a key account 
process. For the actor, this might be a quantum leap in efficiency of one process, but it 
is undeniably disruptive to those whose industry is defined as key account manage-
ment software.  
Many digital technologies of enablers allow actors to impact users’ operations. The 
case descriptions are such that actors are partially bypassed in the process. Digital 
technologies or related management concepts are often available for all value chain 
members; Open Innovation can allow very different development processes compared 
to closed innovation. These cases do not provide data on disruptiveness to operations 
of enablers or actors. However, there is evidence on the disruptive impact to users’ 
operations. In Enevo’s case, the waste handling company has to change its collection 
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system as directed by analytics in the Cloud platform rather than using fixed routes. 
Trimble’s results changes planning on the farm to be based on knowledge of the 
weather and other data-driven evidence. If the actor uses Trimble’s service, it can use 
the platform to develop services for its users. In that case, the actor uses modules like 
positioning, fleet management software, etc. XVELA, for the most part, passes actors 
as it is not a value chain-based service, but rather is an omni-channel platform where 
all stakeholders can get knowledge to improve their operations. With XVELA, this can 
result in major operational changes for the users, like closing departments when data 
handling becomes automatic in the Cloud platform. 
Delphi interviews were centered on disruption drivers. Keeping this perspective in mind, 
AM/3D printing was the only technology which was believed to have power to catalyze 
disruptive changes in operations of the actor. The current technological maturity is still 
inhibiting this tool, as will be discussed in the drivers’ sub-chapter. 
Business models 
Business models were ranked as disruptive as services in the survey. The emergence 
of the disruption was also judged to take longer than with the three other potential ob-
jects of disruption. Most likely, this is due to the beliefs that are discussed attached to 
the inhibitive sub-drivers that are discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
All the cases had innovative concepts that had potential as disruptive impacts. Howev-
er, the companies’ own business models were not disruptive. Their solutions enabled 
better planning and productivity leaps in operations, but their own business models to 
capitalize on these concepts were similar to the B2B software industry: a developer 
sells licenses to users. Many software products have become de facto platforms, like 
SAP in ERPs or Google in search engines. It appears that disruptive innovation can, at 
least in the beginning, be applied with an old business model such as the example of 
Google and a newspaper business model (Huberty, 2015). Even actors are bypassed 
in Enevo’s and XVELA’s cases; the user can use the solutions to develop new busi-
ness models. Shipping lines can use performance-based pricing enabled by XVELA 
the same way as waste-handling companies can pass part of the savings from the 
Enevo solution on to its customers with performance-based contracts, and thereby 
change the rules of the waste business. Actors can also utilize the Trimble platform and 
offer performance-based contracts for users. 
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Free comments from the Delphi interviews supported the nature of the disruption in 
business models being close to the view of Outcome Economy (Figure 5) or moving up 
in systems (Figure 14), or the Systems of Systems (Porter & Heppelman, 2014). Busi-
ness model innovation (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010) itself can be also a small step; 
the only element of the Business Model Canvas in Figure 9 that opens the door to Out-
come Economy is the value proposition. 
5.1.2 Drivers  
What factors, enabled by digitalization, drive disruption in the machine-building industry 
serving global container handling? 
The empirical input to the question is primarily originating from the results of the Delphi 
interview round two. The role of the survey was triangulation of the drivers. Technologi-
cal drivers were the same as in the Delphi interviews, but economic/ strategic man-
agement drivers were reduced to two and simplified to Industrial Internet and Open 
Innovation. Reduction was based on a judgment that it would have been hard to judge 
seven economic/ strategic management concepts on top of six technological concepts 
in a short time. The selected two were based on literature concepts that have specifi-
cally attached to digital technologies. Both technological and economic/ strategic man-
agement drivers were also present in the cases, but in the discussion those will be only 
observations.  
The logic of discussion is to group drivers as strong, medium, weak, and interrelated 
based on the results from the Delphi round two. Results are presented based on Delphi 
results, but are discussed using the other methods and literature. Part of the discussion 
concerns the sub-drivers that either inhibit or accelerate the impact of the driver. 
Strong drivers 
The results in sub-chapter 4.2.2 were based on rank ordering of the top three techno-
logical and economic/ strategic management drivers. In both categories, the top rank-
ing was clear, and thereafter the consensus decreased. The strongest technological 
driver was Big Data/ Artificial Intelligence and strongest economic/ strategic manage-
ment driver was Networks, Crowds, Platforms. The clear observation is that further 
development in both of these areas is beyond the machine-building industry, let alone 
individual players. That also suggests that some degree of Convergence of Industries 
is ongoing, even though it ranked in the economic drivers. Porter and Heppelman 
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(2014) also highlighted that smart connected products pose a question: “What Busi-
ness am I in?” 
Big Data/Artificial Intelligence 
Big Data in the context of sense-making has, in this dissertation, been perceived as 
one development towards Artificial Intelligence when a vast amount of real-time sensor 
data is combined with other types of data to draw relevant business conclusions. That 
type of analytics is also a core enabler to Industrial Internet (Evans and Annunziata, 
2012), which in this dissertation was later defined more generically as one Digital Busi-
ness Model. The further acceleration of AI is driven by its business opportunities. 
Manyika et al. (2013) estimated the potential impact of automation of knowledge work 
in 2025 to be between $5.2-6.7 trillion annually. This type of relationship between tech-
nology advancement (push) and immediate market growth (pull) creates trajectories 
that impact industry structures, as Dosi (1982) suggested. Big Data/AI is also well-
aligned with what Dussauge et al. (1992) discussed about generic technologies. 
Is Big Data/AI also an enabler in strategic management concepts? As it touches the 
very principles of knowledge creation, one can easily conclude that it does have an 
impact on strategic thinking.  I would, however, from the disruption perspective identify 
three particular concepts in strategic thinking: Business redefinition, Dominant Logic, 
and Core Competence. An argument for business redefinition is that Big Data/AI offers 
new sources of knowledge with which to redefine businesses. The concept is partly 
related to Design, Cognitive and Learning schools by Minzberg et al. (1988), with a 
strong entrepreneurial angle. It has links to earlier scholars’ creative thinking (e.g. Ha-
mel, 1996; Kim and Mauborgne, 2005) in strategy formation, which in today’s language 
most often is referred to as business model innovation (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 
2010). Business model change was also often mentioned in the free comments of Del-
phi round two as a prerequisite for technology to be disruptive. Link to Dominant Logic 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or Industry Recipes (Spender, 1989) is attached to the 
suggestion from Delphi round two comments that all businesses are becoming data-
centric, as enabled by Big Data and advancement in AI. The logic for Core Compe-
tence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) is that if the previous thinking is correct—or if it is 
correct in machine-building—one could build a competitive advantage using a company 
based on core competence in data science, which Evans and Annuziata (2013) sug-
gest as vital future competence. This logic is also similar to the view of Conner and 
Prahalad (1996) about the strength of knowledge-based choice versus opportunity-
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based choice. Big Data/AI, in that context, can be perceived as an amplifier of 
knowledge creation. 
From this data-centric perspective, it is plausible that inertia for Big Data/AI expansion 
is related to data attributes (e.g., confusion and conflicts in data ownership and con-
cerns of data security). Competence is not currently seen as an advantage, but rather 
an inhibitor, in building data-centric businesses. The single most important inertia was, 
however, the set of management and industry beliefs; there was consensus on that 
importance among enablers, actors, and users.  Management beliefs are linked in 
Chapter two to Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),  Bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1979) , and Absorptive Capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), whereas indus-
try beliefs are more tied with current Dominant Logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and 
Industry recipe (Spender, 1989) . The sources of Dominant Logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986) in Figure 8 also explain components that create industry beliefs’ inertia. Trans-
formation to data-centric business is also a large management challenge even if there 
would be no specific beliefs inhibiting as suggested by McAfee and Brynjolfsson 
(2012). 
Sub-drivers that accelerate Big Data/AI were not so much linked to strategic manage-
ment theory; rather, they had more the logic of enabling, benefit, or improvement. The 
top five sub-drivers in rank order were: prescriptive potential, knowledge scalability, 
process productivity, users opening their data, and advancement in cognitive compu-
ting. Big Data/AI was also the most disruptive driver in the survey, with the second low-
est variance. It also clustered with Cloud and IoT, and correlated with disruption objects 
(enablers). All cases had Big Data/AI-based knowledge creation at the core of their 
business values.  
Networks, Crowds, Platforms 
This concept was judged to be the most disruptive digitally enabled economic/strategic 
management driver. It relates to network economy theories (including sharing), as well 
as to Open Innovation (Chesbrough, 2006) and various platform strategies presented 
in Chapter 2. The concepts also are interlinked. When Häcki and Lighton (2001) dis-
cussed the network effect they discussed the importance of platforms even before the 
rise of Cloud computing. Sharing is built on using platforms like Uber, but the paradigm 
question is also related to ownership (Belk, 2010;  Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Nicholas, 
2012). 
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Open Innovation (Crowds) and Platforms are interlinked (e.g., in the discussion of in-
termediaries’ roles) (Chesbrough, 2006). The same way to link to AI and Networks is 
present in the collective intelligence discussion by Malone et al. (2010). A prominent 
finding in the free comments from the Delphi round two was that open systems at large 
already gain market share with their own force, and they need platforms; at the same 
time, emergence of new platforms will further speed network usage. The other similar 
fundamental view was that Five Forces (Porter, 1979) does not well explain the sys-
temic transitions in business and does not recognize platforms as players in that theory.  
Just as with Big Data/AI, management beliefs were the major inertia for network econ-
omy to expand. The theories for the beliefs are the same, but the interpretations are 
most likely different. Big Data/AI has more understanding and belief questions related 
to its importance. Networks, Crowds, Platform also has beliefs that have undesirable 
attributes to management, as it challenges structures, culture, ways to operate, and 
management capabilities; that was the second-ranked inertia. The third-ranked inhib-
itive sub-drive, current systems and processes, is often the most used as it is based on 
facts. If a company has built its processes according to a traditional value chain and 
invested into IT systems accordingly, this poses an implementation dilemma even as 
the company would like to shift its operating mode towards network style. Emergence 
of platforms is the main accelerator of Networks, Crowds, Platforms. A secondary ac-
celerator, flexibility with capacity and lower cost, is a normal, rational argument in any 
investment calculation.  
Open Innovation was measured in the survey and it ended up higher than most of the 
technological drivers in the average rating. It got most very disruptive views (Figure 25) 
and at the same also more very weak disrupting views indicating a polarized view of 
the population. Open innovation is also perceived as a generic disruptor (impacting 
products, services, operations, and business models), the same way as Big Data/AI 
based on the correlation analysis. 
All case firms had networks and platforms as integral part of their business. Trimble’s 
ConnectedFarm concept needs the ecosystem to contribute data for Trimble to provide 
better crop output services. Enevo needs users to join its platform to raise the effec-
tiveness of waste management. XVELA is a real-time cargo information platform whose 
value is partly based on the Metcalfe’s logic (2013) of how many users the network is 
able to attract. 
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Medium drivers 
IoT, MBSE, and Robotics were medium technology drivers. IoT was the second-ranked 
driver, and was closest to a phenomenon by the view of panelists with logic that device 
connectivity is increasingly enabled by multiple drivers like described by Bradley et al. 
(2013), and the growth takes place already, independent of individual industry or com-
pany barriers. Why IoT was clearly higher than Cloud may be because Cloud compu-
ting is more independent from firms, whereas in IoT, firms have an important role in 
designing the sensoring and connectivity, but even they cannot stop the logarithmic 
growth of connected devices. If Big Data/AI can create new knowledge, MBSE was 
seen as a tool to model both existing and new knowledge. MBSE was slowed by man-
agement beliefs which were explained by lack of systemic understanding as well as the 
benefits of the technology. Legacy systems were factual inertia. As such, MBSE did not 
have strong linkage to any theory, but it was rather a rational management choice of 
perceived value by investing in a given technology. It appeared that the judgment on 
robotics was connected to AI. The importance of robotics appeared to be linked to 
whether the panelist judged the intelligence to be in the upper systems or in the robot 
itself. If the view was that intelligence was in the upper systems, then the arguments 
were built into Big Data/AI and, in the case of robotics, also into machine-learning. The 
societal impact of unemployment in autonomous operations was also present as de-
scribed by Frey & Osborne (2013) and Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2012). 
IoT was the second most powerful technology driver in the survey. It was also cluster-
ing with Big Data/AI and Cloud. Trimble and Enevo platforms were based on the con-
nected devices but XVELA source was more aligned with the planning systems. 
Digital Business Models, Industry Convergence and Radical Innovation were medium 
disruptive economic/strategic management drivers. Digital Business Models was close 
to Crowds, Networks, Platforms in ranking and also had the same small variance in the 
second Delphi interview round. In the free comments, it was obvious that in machine-
building, the most popular Digital Business Model is that introduced by GE as Industrial 
Internet (Evans & Annunziata, 2012) which was generally understood by the panelists 
as harvesting data from intelligent fleet of machines, processing that data into 
knowledge which is developed as a valuable algorithm (productivity, cost saving, safety 
etc.), packaging it as a piece of software, and delivering it as a service where the value 
is shared between the developer and user. This development was perceived to be in-
hibited by industry barriers, legacy systems, and the data itself (i.e., ownership and 
security). Digital Business Model innovation appeared to follow Rogers’s (2003) Diffu-
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sion of Innovation theory, indicating the importance of use cases.  Convergence theory 
in Chapter 2 was predominantly discussed as the merger of the ICT industry to other 
industries like media or health care. Attributes like clock speed, ecosystems, or diffu-
sion of business models were also present in the free comments and discussion. More 
emphasis was, however, given to the convergence of machine-building and service 
industries when concepts like Service of Everything (Zysman et al., 2015) combine 
physical products, services, and business models, and whose transformation is ICT-
enabled. Radical Innovation was medium high as a disruptive driver. The argumenta-
tion for it was more towards “Black Swan” (as the likelihood of inventing something as 
transformational as a container that was described in Chapter 4.1 is unlikely). The en-
deavors for Radical Innovation were often perceived to lead to quantum leap innova-
tions that change market positions between existing players. To accelerate this exper-
iment culture was perceived as a prerequisite. 
Industrial Internet was used as a concept to illustrate Digital Business Models in the 
survey. It was perceived to be almost as disruptive as Networks, Crowds, Platforms, 
which meant it ranked higher than most of the technological concepts. As there were 
only two economic/ strategic management concepts in the survey, more conclusions on 
the ranking cannot be made. In the case descriptions, it can be argued that Trimble 
and Enevo are in the domain of Industrial Internet, whereas XVELA is a marketplace of 
knowledge, based on the real-time data.  
Weak drivers 
Weak drivers did not necessarily have weak correlations to company success, but 
based on the Delphi interviews they had weak explanation power as stand-alone to 
industrial disruption. According to this logic, Cloud was perceived to be the weakest 
technology; based on free comments by the panelists, it has become the de facto 
standard of modern computing, but also has been commoditized. If Radical Innovation 
was judged as a source of unexpected results, Black Swan’s (Taleb, 2010) AM/3D 
printing received similar comments as a technology. This most likely explains why it 
ranked as the second weakest disruption driver. 
Cloud was also weak in the survey, but it clustered with Big Data/AI and IoT. MBSE 
was a medium driver in the Delphi interviews but ended up as weak in the survey as 
Cloud. In the Delphi discussions, the panelists appeared to approach MBSE from the 
concept of power of modeling, whereas it might be that in the survey the experts were 
judging it as a tool.  
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Weak economic drivers of disruption in reverse rank order were: Risk Capital, 6 Forces 
(Five Forces added with stakeholders) and Firm, Strategy, Leadership. The panel had 
very high consensus that Risk Capital does not cause disruption but is a powerful cata-
lyst in the beginning to speed up disruptions. Six Forces was recognized as one of the 
fundamental theories of the industry dynamics as well as a practical tool in portfolio 
development.  It was ranked sixth out of seven, but with higher variance than Risk Cap-
ital. The free comments highlighted its static nature, lack of platform, and eco-systems. 
Firm, Strategy, Management might have been ranked number one if the question 
would have been about innovation-based competitive advantage. Visionary leadership 
and experiment culture like those described by Ries (2011) were perceived to be tools 
to avoid strong industry beliefs or Innovators Dilemma (Christensen, 2011); the same 
way as they were prerequisites for Radical Innovation. 
The relationship between weak drivers and the three cases is that originally the busi-
nesses had been startups, where experiment culture and visionary leadership of the 
firm played important roles in the beginning. 
Interrelated sub-drivers 
Delphi interviews were the only sources for sub-drivers. Inertia sub-drivers indicated 
why panelists do not believe that a technology or economic/strategic management 
concept is disruptive or why disruption is slower than it could be or what specifically 
slows it down. Accelerative sub-drivers did the opposite. Interrelated sub-driver is sub-
driver that has been suggested to explain behavior of more than one driver. The top 
three technological interrelated inertia sub-drivers were: competence/understanding, 
data (security, quality, availability, and ownership), and beliefs (management and in-
dustry). Competence and understanding were related to Absorptive Capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). Data issues are logical and rational issues to be solved, but data 
ownership disputes reflect also a lack of understanding about how different parties cap-
ture the value from more open data-sharing. Various beliefs have already been dis-
cussed as part of theories related to management cognition and behavior. 
Productivity, new insight, and new business models were the three most important 
technological interrelated sub-drivers that accelerate the digital disruption. Productivity 
and new business model are discussed, but insight has not been highlighted yet. In-
sight was discussed in the context of how IoT-based machine, operation, and environ-
ment data creates new engineering insights. Digitalization was also referenced to cre-
ate new insight based on people being connected. 
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Some of the inhibiting sub-drivers of the economic/strategic management drivers were 
the same as with the technology. Top three interrelated inhibitive sub-drivers were: 
management/owner beliefs and culture, legacy (systems, processes, and structure), 
and industry structures. The culture aspect was somewhat stronger to complement the 
beliefs, but competence was clearly shared with technological sub-drivers. Industry 
structure (e.g., oligopolistic, old stakeholder organizations, established value chain) 
was referred to as natural inertia, but also acknowledged as a politically correct excuse 
to focus on continuous improvement. Some panelists linked this to Innovator’s Dilem-
ma (Christensen, 2011), as doing what the customers want and doing it a bit better 
than last time still pays off. 
New business models, productivity/cost, and platforms were perceived as top interre-
lated sub-drivers explaining acceleration of the economic/ strategic management driv-
ers. Overall, it appeared that Facebook, Apple, Uber, and Airbnb have made business 
model innovation a popular term. Productivity and cost represented the hard metrics 
that management is used to when making investment calculations.  If industry struc-
tures were highlighted in inertia, platforms were one of the main topics breaking it. Plat-
form emergence was perceived far more powerful than disruption by startup types of 
new entrants. That might also be a chicken or egg question (i.e., emergence of plat-
forms allows startups to join as complementors), as Gawer and Cusamo suggest 
(2002). 
 
5.1.3 Value chain 
Does the view on drivers differ depending on where the company is in the value chain? 
The data for comparison comes from Delphi round two and the survey.  The technolog-
ical drivers to compare are: AM/3D printing, Big Data/AI, Cloud, IoT, MBSE, Robotiza-
tion, and economic drivers of Network, Crowds, Platforms and Digital Business Models. 
Sub-drivers were presented in the Delphi results, but there is no comparison data from 
the survey. The discussion is categorized into consensus or disagreement and is pre-
sented in order of ranking of the Delphi interviews. Context for the discussion is al-
ready-reviewed literature and the container handling industry.  One factor that did not 
relate to any specific driver was the difference in the preparedness for digital disruption 
that was presented in Figure 26, which showed that enablers were best prepared, us-
ers worst, and actors in between.  
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Consensus 
Big Data/AI was ranked the top technical driver in the Delphi interview, and tied for the 
top spot in the survey results with IoT. The averages were close with all the value chain 
members, and the variance was low with the exception of users in the survey. This 
result suggests that the machine-building industry serving global container handling is 
becoming data-centric, which enables disruption in the industry.  
Network, Crowds, Platforms had equal position in the economic/strategic management 
drivers. In the Delphi interviews, it was the top economic/strategic management driver, 
with low variance and consensus in the value chain. Open innovation had a slightly 
lower average than Industrial Internet, but it attracted more than twice the number of 
very strong disruption views in the survey. There was a consensus on the position, but 
with higher variance than the other four top rankings. The empirical results and earlier 
literature on platforms (e.g., Cusamo & Gawer, 2002) or innomediaries (Roijakkers et 
al., 2014) suggest that platforms play a critical role in disruption, and they enable the 
power of Big Data/AI, using IoT based data or judgement from humans attached to 
Open Innovation or Crowd concept. 
Internet of Things or connectivity was the second-highest technological driver in the 
Delphi interviews, but it had also low variance and consensus in the value chain. The 
survey judged its importance even slightly higher, with medium variance and medium 
consensus; users rated this slightly lower than enablers and actors. The small differ-
ence with users might explain that users perceive that they might already have some of 
the data by old-fashioned means like maintenance records. The conclusion of IoT, 
however, appears to be that it creates a new type of real-time data that has not been 
available earlier. 
Digital Business Models ranked second in the Delphi interviews; it also had consensus 
for this position and a low variance. In the survey, it was almost ranked first, with a 
consensus in the value chain and low variance apart from the users. The interpretation 
with the users might be that their benefit from Industrial Internet is indirect. It depends 
on how the actor can translate the new data from IoT to knowledge, and how the bene-
fit is divided. The lack of current supply did show in the accelerative sub-driver, Early 
Adopters (Rogers, 2003) with an interpretation that users whose existing purchasing 
patterns had been based on ample supply, faced in the introduction phase the opposite 
problem, and they might fear not having enough alternatives or being locked in the in-
troduction phase of the new business model. The strong consensus on Digital Busi-
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ness Models indicates that the value chain is expecting that value will be divided with 
the players in the value chain differently than before, and that logic fits into the defini-
tion of a Digital Business Model. 
The judgment of Cloud can be summarized that it is the new way of computing, but on 
a stand-alone basis—not as an explanation of disruption. This view had a consensus 
with the Delphi interviews and the survey. 
Disagreement 
The disagreement with the value chain was with MBSE, AM/3D printing, and robotics. 
In the Delphi interviews, MBSE was held to be the third most important driver for dis-
ruption; there was a consensus on this, but users judged it less critical as seen in Fig-
ure 16. The disagreement was smaller in the survey as seen in Appendix 9. There was, 
however, a disagreement between methods: the Delphi panel ranked MBSE clearly 
higher than did the experts who participated in the survey. The disagreement in the 
value chain is, perhaps, that MBSE as a tool for modeling complex things is more famil-
iar with enablers, for whom it could be a business, and for actors that get a direct bene-
fit from it. The difference in methods might be explained by the fact that in the interview, 
the panelists elaborated on the criticality of modeling, but it might be that in the survey, 
the tool shadowed the fundamental feature behind it.  
Robotization also caused a disagreement in the value chain, but the pattern was the 
same by both methods. Enablers did not see it as disruptive, actors perceived it as a 
quantum leap, and users saw it as disruptive. The likely explanation for this is that the 
enablers are suppliers across the industries, and automatization is nothing new. Actors 
might also have supplied automation (e.g., to the processing industry) or even had their 
first references to unmanned operations in ports and terminals, and therefore see it as 
evolution. Actors seem to acknowledge that when a manned industry transforms to 
unmanned, suppliers’ market shares will be divided with a new way. Robotization ap-
pears to be a paradigm change in the eyes of the users. As described in sub-chapter 
4.1, the labor in port operations is a central role. It is a powerful stakeholder; the 
productivity of the port has a lot to do with the operator’s judgment, and the compe-
tences both in the field and at the office support a manned paradigm. 
Additive Manufacturing/3D printing got a weak rating as a disruptive driver. This view 
was consistent between the two methodologies; actors and users perceived it higher 
than did enablers. The weakness was elaborated on in the Delphi interviews (e.g., the 
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concept is highly disruptive but the technological obstacles are high for the size and 
material used in the machine-building). Enablers’ weaker view can be explained that, 
for them, it is a promising technology, and if it breaks through they still continue to de-
liver similar services to actors and users who will get the benefit of the technology. Ac-
tors’ perspectives depend on the progress of the technology; if speed, material cover-
age, and cost can be solved, AM/3D printing can change both the design paradigm as 
well the production paradigm. Users who rated AM/3D printing highest see both evolu-
tionary and disruptive benefits. How machines that handle containers are manufactured 
is not their direct concern.  
Printing spare parts would change the dynamics, as argued in the industry sub-chapter; 
spare parts are the most profitable single component in the actors’ offering. Global con-
tainer ports and terminals are driven by consumer behavior (i.e., by goods that are in 
the containers), and an innovation which could make it possible to traverse the long 
distances by Internet in the form of printing code would disrupt transportation, if the 
speed of printers would be changed on an industrial scale. The conclusion for AM/3D is 
that it was the only technological driver that can become a Black Swan (Taleb, 2010) in 
a form that is still unclear today. 
5.1.4 The systemic impact 
How are disruptive drivers related to each other in the machine-building industry serv-
ing global container handling? 
The process evaluated potential disruption drivers separately in the Delphi interviews 
and in the survey. The Delphi interviews with iteration ranked sub-drivers that inhibit or 
accelerate disruptive technological and economic/strategic management drivers. The 
case studies illustrated how there is already ongoing business, within the limits of this 
dissertation that contains some of the characteristics of disruption that is being investi-
gated. The strength of mixed methods was applied in the previous sub-chapter where 
both consensuses with the methods and the value chain were used when the final 
ranking order was discussed.  
The whole dissertation has assumed that the studied phenomenon is systemic, which 
was the perspective also expressed by many panelists. In order to increase the under-
standing about the systemic impact, the last phase of discussion uses system dynam-
ics. This will be done by applying a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) (Sterman, 2000). The 
CLD is a tool to represent the time delays and causal relationships between taking a 
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decision and its effects on the system. The CLD visualize how causalities and delays 
build up the feedbacks and dynamics in a system level. 
The illustration is based on the most critical conclusions from the results: 
 Big Data/AI is the disruptive technology that enables new knowledge creation; 
 Platforms accelerate the use of external knowledge; 
 IoT feeds new engineering knowledge to Big Data/AI; 
 Crowd and Open Innovation enable new judgmental knowledge. 
Several causal relationships can be detected between aforementioned drivers. By rep-
resenting these causalities in a single CLD it is seen that causalities form feedback 
loops. In the loop the decision is defined as investment in capabilities which were found 
critical in the research. The output is new product features, advanced services, effi-
ciency of operations, or new business models. The dynamics between decisions and 
its output is affected by delay. In the model, the dependencies that might impact with a 
delay are marked with ǁ. The inhibitive or accelerative sub-drivers are added to CLD 
from Figures 17 and 21. The model can be seen in Figure 27, which can be defined as 
a heuristic system model explaining the characteristics of digitally enabled disruption in 
machine-building serving global container handling.    
 
 
Figure 27. Big Data /AI and Networks, Crowds, Platforms described by CLD 
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Figure 27 reveals two loops that impact the firms’ ability to create value. The measura-
ble factors are utilization of Big Data/AI, which here predominantly present the growing 
IoT-based data and Platforms that bring the human network effect. Both factors are 
slowed down by management beliefs based on the results of the study. Management 
beliefs’ concrete impact in this context is investment in capacity, which can be assets 
(e.g., licenses, servers, sensoring), and data competencies (e.g., training, recruitment 
of data scientists, subcontracting) in an IoT context. In a human network context, the 
investment is in orchestration capability based on the results of the study. 
In IoT loops, there are delays (marked ǁ) in the loops, as some loops have time ele-
ments that are very difficult to shorten. Adding sensors increases history data very 
slowly. But with that logic, adding sensors now is a no-risk decision if believes that data 
is the core essence of competitiveness in the future, even you the business case in not 
known today.  Management beliefs are impacted by the success of own use cases as 
well as use cases of own industry and other industries. Based on theory and results of 
the dissertation, management beliefs are driven also by other external factors. The 
combination of IoT (marked green) and human loops (marked red) drives the value 
creation in products, services, operations, and business models. Success has a strong 
but delayed impact on management beliefs, meaning that in order to lead the develop-
ment, management has to first act based on a positive belief. 
The human loop is more outside firm or industry control. Platform supply has already 
emerged, and it is accelerating through new innovation, both in disciplines (e.g., soft-
ware engineering) and industrially (e.g., health care), as well as by multinational tech-
nology companies and startups in narrower spaces. At the same time, platforms attract 
small and large incorporated complementors, as well as knowledge workers who wish 
to be independent entrepreneurs. This exact impact of this development is more diffi-
cult to forecast than the impact of sensors. 
 Conclusions 5.2
The dissertation investigated the research question from a hermeneutic perspective in 
the philosophy of science, and used mixed methods. The main method was Delphi 
interviews. Delphi Round one validated six technological and two economic drivers that 
can enable disruption in the machine-building industry, which is serving global contain-
er terminals.  It also, together with literature, yielded sub-drivers that either inhibit or 
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accelerate development. The Delphi round two ranked the six technological drivers 
together with the original two economic drivers and an additional five economic drivers 
that came from the literature and were supported with comments in the Delphi round 
one. New sub-drivers were also added in the Delphi round two, and based on the satu-
ration and pattern their significance was analyzed as if they would have been consid-
ered from the beginning. The survey investigated the object and timing of the potential 
disruption and triangulated the rank order results of the drivers from the Delphi round 
two. The logic of the Delphi and survey methodology was based on the value chain. 
The survey also increased understanding of the preparedness of the value chain mem-
bers for the potential disruption. The third method in the enquiry was analysis of three 
short case descriptions. Their role was to illustrate that there are already ongoing dis-
ruptions whose mechanisms are under investigation. The critical conclusions were also 
illustrated in a heuristic CLD model. 
The conclusions are based on the findings where the three methods have found simi-
larities and consensus. As the survey expanded the methodology, some of its strongest 
findings are also presented as conclusions if they were supported by the literature. The 
conclusions are presented both for their theoretical contributions as well as their rele-
vance to practitioners. In practitioners sub-chapter issues that had disagreement has 
more importance as it might indicate industry specific circumstances. The conclusions 
in chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are written in italics. 
 
5.2.1 Industry evolution, strategy formation 
Seminal theories within industry dynamics such as Industry Forces (Porter, 1979), S-
Curves (Foster, 1987), Technological Trajectories (Dosi, 1982), Disruptive Technolo-
gies (Bower and Christensen, 1995), and Diffusion of Innovations (Roger, 2003) ex-
plain well how the dynamics work in established industries. Industrial Convergence is a 
prominent area that addresses how mechanisms that are familiar in ICT industry dif-
fuse into other industries and sometimes form new industries.  Business model innova-
tion, used in this dissertation in the context of Digital Business Models, appears to work 
both in industry dynamics and as a factor in industry convergence. 
The conclusions based on the empirical findings suggest the following three attributes 
to explain the potential disruption. 
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1. New powerful technologies in knowledge creation (Big Data, AI, machine learn-
ing) and unpresented flow of data by connected devices (IoT) enable the move 
to higher levels of optimization like those described in the World Economic Fo-
rum about Outcome Economy (2015). 
2. Industrial and discipline-based platforms emerge as new disruptive elements in 
value creation. 
3. Platforms decouple old value chains that transform into networks, which are 
joined by startups and crowds. 
If the three attributes above are centric in the investigated disruption, then the empirical 
findings that inhibit or accelerate the development will have a focal role in strategy for-
mation. Those drivers were similar in technological and economic / strategic manage-
ment drivers, but in order to focus on the most critical ones as conclusions, those that 
have same types of meaning are combined. The acceleration in firms is based on in-
vestments, and productivity/cost was number one reason to do that. Investing in digital 
disruption led to the new Digital Business Models as the second most important expla-
nation. New insight was the third most important reason (second as to technical drivers 
and fourth as to the economic/strategic management drivers), and recognizing the 
emergence of platforms was the fourth most powerful explanation (third with economic 
drivers and fourth with technological drivers). 
Management/owners’ beliefs constituted the most powerful explanation that inhibits the 
preparation for the digital disruption. The second most powerful explanation is industry 
barriers that include not only the structure of the industry but also the collective beliefs 
within the industry. The third strongest explanation was lack of competencies, including 
the lack of understanding of the systemic nature of the potential disruption. The two 
next most important sub-drivers explaining the inertia were legacy (e.g., systems, pro-
cesses and structure) and data (e.g., ownership and security).   
Redefining the language to be compatible with the strategy formation, the earlier re-
sults can be summarized as four statements. Decisions to invest are based on meas-
urable rational economic factors. It has been recognized that digitalization contains 
new critical elements in the strategy formation (e.g., Digital Business Models, new in-
sight and Platforms). Decisions not to invest appear to be based more on beliefs (man-
agement or industry) than measurable factors (cost of changing systems, cost of data 
security). Lack of understanding the characteristics of the systemic change and lack of 
competencies that it requires slows down the transformation. 
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Strategy formation literature was reviewed using the ten strategic schools by Minzberg 
et al. (2010). The first conclusion is that any of those strategic schools do not, alone, 
offer guidance through potential disruption. Using Minzberg et al.’s (1998) own frame-
work in Appendix 1, the empirical results suggest that the external world in digital dis-
ruption is unpredictable and confusing. Both the findings from the research and 
Schumpeterian’s (2008) view of Creative Destruction indicate that in disruption, the 
internal processes are natural that reflect larger societal changes than rational busi-
ness planning is able to capture. Based on these assumptions, there are three sug-
gested conclusions for strategy formation:  
1. Firms have to be able to mitigate the management beliefs in the firm and indus-
trial level to be able to capture the potential of digital disruption. 
It appears that the mechanisms that were present with three interviews in the 
introduction (Chapter 1) or examples like Kodak, do repeat themselves. This 
conclusion is within the Cognitive School. 
2. The change in business environment appears to be systemic and complex, and 
therefore strategy formation by learning is effective. 
This is close to the Learning School or the ideals of the Lean Startup (Ries, 
2011) and it requires either entrepreneurship by a visionary leader and/or a cul-
ture that fosters experimentation. 
3. Digital Business Models, when applied with a network model, are a major 
change in traditional industries, and they challenge firms’ current capabilities. 
This implies that apart from learning, a major competitive advantage can be ob-
tained if, during the transformation, unique capabilities can be created, which is 
along the lines of resourced-based theory in strategy formation (Conner & Pra-
halad, 1990). 
 
5.2.2 Practitioners in machine-building industry 
The conclusions from a practical perspective are validated in the machine-building in-
dustry that is serving global container operators. It does not exclude learnings that are 
applicable also to machine-builders that have other types of users whose business 
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environments have similar characteristics. The previous chapter had conclusions about 
the mechanisms of disruption where the value chain members were in consensus. 
Those conclusions can well be used also as guidance for practical strategy work. The 
specific conclusions here are related to issues of the object of disruption that were 
studied only in the survey and elaborated on by the case descriptions, or by such re-
sults that had disagreement in the value chain. Conclusions are written in the perspec-
tive of the actor in italics. 
1. Service is the most relevant object of the disruptive impact of digitalization within 
the limits of this enquiry. 
Service can be viewed from two perspectives: major growth opportunity and source of 
competitive advantage (quantum leap) and service that changes the need to be satis-
fied into higher systemic levels as described in the Outcome Economy by World Eco-
nomic Forum (2015), which is a source of industrial disruption.  
The first perspective can be categorized in the same way as what GE calls Industrial 
Internet (Evans and Annunziata, 2012), which is one Digital Business Model. Based on 
the results, users are ready for it but somewhat reluctant to open their data, which is 
needed for the business model to emerge.  Some users do open their data, which cre-
ates new use cases, which impact management beliefs; then, after the innovator and 
Early Adaptor users, the Early Majority also gets interested (Rogers, 2003). The new 
business model also opens the door for new entrants like the component suppliers, 
system suppliers like ABB, or digital enablers like Trimble to enter the business as 
seen in the precision farming example.  
The second perspective relates to a new upper level service that makes the whole low-
er level operation or process dramatically more effective. This implies that growth in 
services with the new business model is a prerequisite for the incumbents to grow as 
companies as the systemic productivity leap in assets reduce the growth rates of ma-
chines as long as a new equilibrium has been reached. All three cases were character-
ized by this perspective. 
Compared to literature and findings in the empirical research, it can be argued that 
actors’ business environments have been more stable in the past than ongoing digital 
transformation enables it to be changed. This is the logical reason why Porter’s Five 
Forces (1985) in the industry dynamics, or Positioning and Design School of Minzberg 
et al. (1998) in the strategy formation, have had such a central role. Cognitive School is 
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seldom used, as trained professionals are assumed to make rational decisions. In 
those industries where the digital disruption has already taken place, the disruptors 
seemed to be visionary leaders with entrepreneurial ways of operating, like Steve Jobs, 
Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk have demonstrated. This leads to a second practical 
conclusion: 
2. If the actor wishes to adapt to digital disruption or be a disruptor, it is beneficial 
to use learning as a core element in the strategy formation. 
Prerequisite for the importance of learning in strategy formation is understanding that 
ongoing systemic change is complex and that the current capabilities are not adequate 
for winning.  It is also builds on a notion that the chances to design or plan are less 
effective than experimenting and adjusting. The literature offers multiple choices to 
organize disruptive activities related to digitalization, such as stand-alone business 
units, centers of excellence, or cross-business-unit steering as suggested by Porter 
and Heppelman (2015). The objective of the learning is not only strategy formation, but 
also building unique capabilities, which can be translated to the third practical conclu-
sion: 
3. Competence in digital technologies with strong machine-building and industry 
knowledge can be combined as a core competitive capability. 
The essence of the conclusions is grasped by two quotes: “Unlike physical assets, 
competencies do not deteriorate as they applied or shared” (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) 
and “The only way to win is to learn faster than anyone else” (Ries, 2011). Based on 
the empirical results, orchestration of the network is one of the needed capabilities as 
well the leadership skills to lead the transformation; both skills are needed by the in-
cumbents. 
MBSE and Robotization were the two drivers where there was a disagreement in the 
value chain. Enablers saw both as a business opportunity. Actors saw MBSE as a 
powerful thinking tool and a tool to change business, whereas users saw it as an op-
portunity to communicate their needs better to actors. Users saw Robotization as a 
change of paradigm in how to run a terminal business, but actors saw it as an evolution 
of smart machines. From an actor’s perspective this finding can be translated to action 
planning that takes into consideration concerns of both sides. 
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4. Diagnostics on understanding the differences on views of business environment 
changes in the value chain can be developed as new kinds of tools for business 
planning. 
 
Many of the earlier practical conclusions have the lack of systemic understanding as 
one of the root causes and therefore the fifth practical conclusion is: 
 
5. System thinking or CLD as a specific tool has a lot to offer in strategy formation 
in machine-building, where it normally is only applied in control systems engi-
neering. 
 Validity and reliability 5.3
This dissertation has used mixed methods that have been applied conceptually as 
seen in Figure 12. All three methods have different issues in their validity and reliability, 
and they will be reviewed separately. The Delphi interviews and case descriptions are 
grouped under qualitative methods and the survey under quantitative methods. Validity 
and reliability will be concluded by considering the use of three separate methods as 
one mixed method at the end. 
Qualitative methods 
Both validity and reliability are originally concepts of positivistic worldview and have an 
assumption that a hypothesis can be verified, and the result is not depending on the 
researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In the Delphi interviews, there was an interaction 
between the researcher and experts, which implies that the results may differ if the 
investigation would have been done by another researcher.  
To mitigate this inherent issue between positivism and hermeneutics, several ap-
proaches have been developed. Lincoln and Guba (1985) constructed a concept of 
trustworthiness that included Credibility (Is the right thing investigated?), Transferability 
(Is right also right in other contexts?), Dependability (In what conditions are findings 
consistent?), and Confirmability (How neutral are the results from the researcher?). 
Stenbacka (2001) argued that reliability in the traditional sense does not apply in quali-
tative research, but the quality can be judged by validity, generalizability, and careful-
ness as a whole. This requires that informants are correctly chosen, they are able to 
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express their knowledge, and there is a systematic and careful description of the pro-
cess. 
The sample strategies have been described previously and the research design and 
process descriptions have been integral parts of the methodology in Chapter 3. How-
ever, there are specific quality issues related to the Delphi technique and case studies. 
Linstone (2002) summarized the quality issues in eight pitfalls of the Delphi methodolo-
gy, which framework is used below to judge the quality concerns. 
1. Discounting the Future 
This implies overweighting the short term, an issue also discussed in the management 
cognition. The main mitigation for the issue was the design of how panelists were cho-
sen (i.e., three different roles of future) (Kuusi, 1999). It is fair to argue that all three 
groups have to deal with the long term, but at least one can assume that scientists are 
familiar with the speed at which technology progresses. 
2. The Prediction Urge 
 
Humans dislike uncertainty, which leads to prediction even when the expert does not 
possess the knowledge on which the judgment should be based. The design of the 
dissertation was not trying to achieve a force consensus, thereby easing part of the 
pressure and urge to predict. The other quality measure was that order ranking the 
disruptive drivers was not possible without argument of inhibitive or accelerative factors 
(sub-drivers). That philosophy was derived from the Argumentative Delphi from Kuusi 
(1999), but it also served as an indication of expertise. 
 
3. The Simplification Urge 
The trap, according to Linstone (2002), is when a reductionist approach is applied to 
social/behavioral systems in order to get more simple explanations. This enquiry was 
about a complex, systemic phenomenon. Therefore, the PEST approach (Aguilar, 1967) 
was used in order to take both technological and economic factors into consideration. 
Participants were also using societal and political factors when they judged the devel-
opment of inhibitive or accelerative sub-drivers. The second way to avoid simplification 
was the use of free comments in the enquiry. It also served the purpose of acknowl-
edging that the panelists could have views that are not captured by the research design. 
The third element of avoiding oversimplification was the construction of the CLD model. 
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It was not, however, tested with a third Delphi round, but in constructing the survey 
results and the case descriptions it gave some support. 
4. Illusory Expertise 
The illusory refers the expertise to forecast outside the own domain expertise. The 
means to obtain the relevant expertise relates in this dissertation to panel structure, 
and individual members in relation to the research question. One section of the re-
search question relates to the value chain, which implies that there was equal participa-
tion from enablers, actors, and users in the panel. The depth of expertise was as-
sessed by using Kuusi’s (1999) definition on expertise on future: decision-makers, syn-
thesizers, and scientists. The majority of panelist were senior professionals and pos-
sessed true expertise in more than one role, even when they were asked to approach 
the questions based on the designated role. This was further utilized in some of the 
analysis when the perspective was formed by using the expertise of the group of 36 
individuals. The panel was underrepresented with Asians, females, and persons 
younger than 30. The open versus closed society has issues related to cultural differ-
ences (Hofstede et al., 2010). The enquiry did not investigate how differences in cultur-
al background impact the view of how digitalization disrupts the machine-building in-
dustry. However, in some individual disruption sub-drivers’ culture was present, and 
was not found to be a strong contributor. There were some remarks on national cul-
tures in the free comments. 
5. Sloppy Execution 
Linstone (2002) refers to sloppy execution, both for the panelist and by the Delphi 
manager. Panelist sloppiness relates to Stenbacka’s (2001) question whether the in-
formants are able to express their knowledge properly. Sloppy execution can also re-
late to choosing panels based on friendship or such recommendations that lead to 
group thinking. The issue with the Delphi manager relates to expertise in relation to the 
panelists, which can impact both what knowledge is shared and the capability to inter-
pret it. The peer relationship most likely is optimal, so that neither one in the interaction 
takes on the role of lecturing. The process of searching for the panelists was that the 
Delphi manager created a list of potential companies or universities that fit the study’s 
purpose, and then searched roles and persons. The selection of decision-makers was 
based on titles (e.g., owner, chairman of the board, CEO, director,  executive vice pres-
ident) relative to the company where they came from. The introduction was done either 
directly or by someone that the Delphi manager knew who was likely to know the per-
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son identified. The end result was that 28 out of 36 of the panelists in the Delphi round 
two had no prior relationship to the Delphi manager. The logic of the interview was also 
based on the time being spent on those drivers that the panelist judged relevant as 
described both in Chapters 3 and 4. There were also a couple of test interviews prior to 
the Delphi rounds in order to refine the process. The Delphi manager (i.e. the re-
searcher of the dissertation) was assumed -based on his education and industry back-
ground- to be qualified to conduct the interview as well to interpret the free comments, 
but obviously it is a biased judgment. The other interpretation issue was not recording 
the interviews, which was a tradeoff decision as described in the methodology sub-
chapter 3.1.2.  
In the Delphi round two, there was a qualitative self-judgment measure after each in-
terview. In the self-judgment, the session was ranked with four parameters and scale of 
one to five, where five was an acknowledged international expert and one was some-
one not adequate for the purpose of the research. The parameters assessed were ad-
equacy of the time, substance knowledge (technology and economic/ strategic man-
agement), ability to apply the expertise to the research question, and the average of 
first three parameters, which was a quality measurement of the interview based on how 
the researcher judged the interview’s success. In order to count in the results, the 
quality needed to be at least 3 out of 5 points; otherwise, the interview would be con-
tinued. Two interviews were continued within a week from interruption, and one was 
replaced by a new interview with an expert with the same position in 3x3 matrix. 
6. Optimism – Pessimism Bias 
This trap is related to the earlier comment of over-optimism in the short term and over-
pessimism in the long term. The other perspective of Linstone (2002) is that optimism 
and pessimism are also personal character traits. Availability Heuristics (Kahneman, 
2003) also is an issue (e.g., management consulting companies have actively pub-
lished reports on how digitalization is transforming businesses, which is likely to impact 
the views). The survey is not mitigating this, apart from being a larger sample than the 
Delphi interviews. The analysis of the sub-drivers that inhibit or accelerate development 
reduces some of the concern. Also, the objective of the system model was to illustrate 
the interrelation of the drivers and sub-drivers, which takes another perspective of the 
likely development. 
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7. Overselling 
There are a few traps included in the overselling, over-usage of the method for the 
same question (the same panelists), anonymity, forced consensus, or hidden agendas. 
The researcher was not aware that any of the panelists had previously participated in a 
Delphi panel that was investigating the same research problem. Also, as referenced 
earlier, there was no forced consensus in the process. Anonymity was maintained dur-
ing the interviews, but the participants were aware of what type of companies or uni-
versities were in the panel and what types of experts the other panelists were. The hid-
den agenda suggests that there would be a vested interest either by the panelist or the 
Delphi manager to get a certain type of result. This issue most probably was most 
problematic with enablers, as they were also suppliers to actors and enablers. However, 
their coverage in digital technologies was not based on a single technology such as 3D 
printing, and therefore it is fair to assume that they did not push any particular conclu-
sion to be formed. For the researcher, the intent was the right answer, as false but 
pleasant results would logically not lead to a useful strategy for the background organi-
zation of the researcher. 
8. Deception 
Deception is related both to manipulation and integrity. Manipulation can be regarded 
as the more severe form of hidden agenda that was reviewed in the previous para-
graph. A researcher cannot objectively judge his or her own honesty apart from the 
logic that there is no motive to promote a specific picture of future development other 
than being as truthful as possible. 
As described in the motivation (sub-chapter 1.1) the Delphi manager is himself a ma-
chine-builder and consequently has a dual role as a researcher and stakeholder. From 
validity perspective this poses an objectivity issue for Information Policy (Kuusi 1999) of 
the interviewees and for interpreting the results by the Delphi manager. The magnitude 
of drivers, sub-drivers, their abstraction level, industry level perspective and time hori-
zon that is beyond ordinary business transactions most likely has mitigated partly the 
issue of objectivity. 
Case descriptions 
The case descriptions were brief and not strong enough to form an individual research 
method. Their application was to describe, from adjacent industries, examples that 
possess disruptive features of digitalization according to the literature. Cases were tak-
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en from public sources, but they were validated by experts who knew the cases, indus-
tries, and the uses of digital technologies. Suitability of the cases were related to Out-
come Economy (World Economic Forum 2015), the preliminary finding on systemic 
characteristics of disruption (Figure 14) from the Delphi round one, and the concept of 
Systems of Systems by Porter and Heppelman (2015). Therefore, it can be argued that 
the issues of validity and reliability have connection to theory building from the cases. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) were discussing part of the problem with the thought: 
“Better stories versus better theories.” They opinioned that particularly with thin stories, 
like the short descriptions in this dissertation, tables are practical tools to highlight the 
essence of the constructs. Table 14 where the cases were summarized was an attempt 
to do that.  
Quantitative methods 
The use of quantitative methods in triangulation and expansion does not take the ethos 
of the research away from Hermeneutics. There are, however, different types of validity 
and reliability issues in quantitative methods. Reliability, according to Olkkonen (1994) 
is particularly relevant in statistical analysis, as statistical criteria can tell the probability 
that the results are reliable and indirectly also if the same result can be achieved by 
repeating the study. The statistical criterion was integrated in the results in sub-chapter 
4.3. Repeatability of the results is still most likely hard to obtain for two reasons con-
cerning temporality. First, the publicity of digitalization appears to have grown since the 
experiment was done, which most likely will have an impact on the judgment of poten-
tial participants. The second, more factual reason is that the related technology ad-
vances quickly, as well as does the number of cases applying it.  
Validity in quantitative research according to Creswell (2013) is whether one can draw 
meaningful and useful inferences from scores on the instruments, which can be further 
split into: 
 Content Validity (Do the items measure the content they were intended to 
measure?) 
 Predictive or Concurrent Validity (Do scores predict a criterion measure? Or 
do results correlate with other results?) 
 Construct Validity (Do items measure hypothetical constructs or concepts?) 
The basic questions in the survey were simple in their nature. How strong is an impact, 
to an object, and how strong are drivers? Logically, the main Content Validity concern 
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was whether the respondents understood the meaning of the objects and drivers, and if 
they understood them in the same way.  
The format of the process, which included introduction of the concepts, was chosen to 
mitigate the issue of respondents’ understanding of the variables.  The formatted intro-
duction created a burden to the researcher, who had to conduct the introduction every 
time in the same way. To accomplish this, the researcher created a script specifying 
how the concepts were introduced orally apart from the text that the audience saw, in 
order to improve the consistency. 
Predictive Validity appeared to have some issues beyond triangulation. The sample 
population using the 3x3 matrix should have been quite a bit larger than 305, in order 
to increase the potential to generalize the results (e.g., to other industries). High vari-
ance in the raw data might also have originated from the fact that it is truly difficult to 
judge the systemic impact of digitalization, and there is confusion on the issue. Concur-
rent validity was not possible to check, as the research was not using a method that 
would have applied in comparable research questions including the same criterion. 
Was the construct valid (i.e., were the drivers in the survey the right ones for measuring 
digital disruption)? The process of picking the original drivers was based on recent re-
search reports of commercial research institutes that either specialized in digital tech-
nologies (e.g., Gartner, Cisco, Accenture and IBM) or more generic institutions that 
were also researching digitalization from a perspective of strategic management (e.g., 
McKinsey & Co).  Delphi round one interviews also served the purpose of validating 
this.  
 
Mixed methods 
The use of mixed design was based on an assumption that disruption enabled by digi-
tal technologies or economic concepts is a systemic phenomenon, and it is difficult to 
form full understanding of the research question. The use of several methods expand-
ed the coverage as illustrated in Figure 12.  In the same figure, one can see that the 
Delphi one interview validated also the survey (drivers) design, validated Delphi round 
two drivers, and suggested sub-drivers as well. Delphi round one results were also 
used in the case design.  
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Results were presented as stand-alone as well as the judgment on validity. In the dis-
cussion and conclusion phases, the second strength of mixed methods came through 
triangulation. Both the survey results and case description were used to validate find-
ings from the Delphi round two interviews. 
 Future research avenues 5.4
The components in this dissertation related to industry evolution, strategy formation, 
and digitalization as a systemic phenomenon that could have disruptive impact on the 
machine-building industry serving global container terminals. The research design uti-
lized mixed methods. It also appears that development of digital technologies and their 
applications in business is moving quickly. These premises open the first two natural 
research avenues: (1) First, to repeat the study with the methodology in an adjacent 
industry that meets the same criterion as described in the sub-chapter 1.2. This avenue 
would create comparison data to draw conclusion whether the disruption and its mech-
anisms have similarities between industries.  (2) Second, another plausible way is us-
ing exactly the same design; and repeating the study in the global container handling 
industry. The purpose of that alternative would be justified with the assumption that the 
topic is moving quickly, and that some of the conclusions of this study could be tem-
poral. 
Different perspectives of future research could be derived from the main conclusions: 
Big Data/AI and Networks, Crowds, Platforms. The logical direction would be to delve 
deeper into the mechanisms. It could be done either by continuing the study in global 
container handling or by constructing a multi-industry design. One attractive method 
could be a case study with an objective to construct a more detailed framework of the 
disruption mechanisms.  The other alternative of building from the conclusions would 
be an extensive literature review of how the conclusion would be able to contribute 
generically to the gap that industry dynamics by Five Forces or various innovation 
based trajectories have when platforms and ecosystems emerge into capital intensive 
industries. Deeper or wider approaches based on the conclusion would work also in the 
strategy formation. A theoretical approach there could be an analysis of the impact of 
platforms and open systems on existing strategy schools. 
The third set of further research avenues relate to the methodology. This dissertation 
did find Kuusi’s Argumentative Delphi useful when it was applied with rank ordering 
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together with inhibitive and accelerative sub-drivers that impacted future development. 
This was triangulated with a survey. An interesting alternative would be developing the 
methodology into online Delphi, where those two methods would be merged. That 
would require special attention to user interface in order to motivate the panelists. That 
could also incorporate use of visual illustrations (Adelson & Aroni, 2002) to decrease 
the variance in understanding the arguments. Pre-programmed analytics could further 
enable instant feedback to the panel, maybe even shown as a system dynamic model. 
The use of scenarios based on the Delphi findings as suggested by Mannermaa (1999) 
or applying the futures Map (Kuusi et al. 2015) could be methodologically also an inter-
esting direction to continue the research. One of the most suitable technologies as a 
research object is Additive Manufacturing / 3D printing as it got quite polarized re-
sponses, and also got several suggestions of being a wild card or Black Swan. 
The last set of research possibilities centers around management. If the conclusions 
are correct, what does it imply in day-to-day strategic management? Does the firm truly 
have a chance to disrupt the industry, or is the development such that it is beyond the 
incumbents of traditional industries? Even so, based on the findings of this research, 
business model innovation and experimental culture are advantageous in achieving 
quantum leaps in competiveness.  Also, a practical checklist of choices, like the one 
Porter and Heppelman (2014) suggest, are useful, and one could study the conditions 
that impact how to make those choices.   
If the assumption in the beginning of this dissertation is true -that the ability to trans-
form any kind of data, observations, events and so on to a digital form, by processing it, 
storing it, and sharing it, economically, globally, and in real time -has the same kind of 
systemic characteristics as the invention of writing or printing, the theme will stay a rich 
source of further research for years to come.   
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Appendix 1. Mapping strategic schools related to strategy formation (Minzberg et al. 
1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rational Natural 
Internal process 
proposed as 
Comprehensible, 
controllable 
Unpredictable, 
confusing 
External world 
seen as 
Entrepreneurial Design Positioning 
Planning 
Environmental Cognitive 
Learning 
evolutionary and chaos theory 
Power 
(micro) 
Cultural 
Configuration Power 
(macro) 
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Appendix 2. Delphi round two interview framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research question 
 
 
 
It is likely that digitalization is a major systemic enabler for 
future competitive advantages of the machine-building in-
dustry, and in some phase of the value creation, it is or will 
be disruptive within the next 10 years. 
 
 
Which drivers enabled by digitalization accelerate or inhibit 
disruption in a machine-building industry that serves global 
container handling? 
 
Do the enablers, actors and users have different views on 
the drivers or sub-drivers that either accelerate or inhibit the 
disruptive development? 
 
How are disruptive drivers related to each other in a ma-
chine-building industry that serves global container han-
dling? 
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Products 
Services 
Object of a potential impact 
Operations 
Business models 
Business model change can 
also be integrated into prod-
ucts, services or operations 
and there is ongoing diffu-
sion of all of the elements 
like service of everything 
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Continuous improve-
ment 
Quantum leap 
Disruption 
Staying where you are 
- This is housekeeping 
Change of positions 
- Innovation gets you here 
Change of rules 
- Transformation gets you 
here 
Nature of the potential impact 
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Industry 
 Evolution 
Economics 
Strategy formation 
Top Management 
Digitalization  3 Cases 
Survey  
Delphi I 
Inter-
view 
Delphi II 
Inter-
view 
System 
model 
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Panel composition 
4 4 4 
4 4 4 
4 4 4 
Enabler Actor User 
Decision maker 
Synthesizer 
Scientist 
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Interview process 
Intro Technology 
rating 
Economy 
Rating 
Factor rating with 
Argumentation 
Factor rating with 
argumentation 
In order of importance (1-6) 
from your perspective and 
view what is their potential to 
cause disruption  
In order of importance 
(1-7) from your per-
spective and view what 
is their potential to 
cause disruption  
What accelerates? 
What slows down? 
What accelerates? 
What slows down? 
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Sub-driver analysis 
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Appendix 3. Survey form 
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Appendix 4. Participants in the Delphi round one and/or two 
Dr. Erkki Ahola, Vice President, VTT Ltd (former Vice President, R&D, Sandvik Mining 
and Construction); (A) 
Mr. Kimmo Alkio, President and CEO, Tieto Corporation; (E) 
Mr. Timo Antila, former Managing Director, Packaging Industry of M-real (Metsä-
Group); (U) 
Mr. Andrew Barrons, Senior Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer, Navis LLC.;(E) 
Mr. Philippe Bartissol, Vice President, Industrial Equipment, Dassault Systems SE; (E) 
Mr. Alex Duca, Director, Head of Design and Automation, APM Terminals; (U) 
Mr. Rob van Eijndhoven, former Managing Director, ECT-DELTA Container Division; 
(U)  
Professor Kalevi Ekman, Aalto University; (A) 
Mr. Sauli Eloranta, Senior Vice President, Technology Management & Innovation, Rolls 
Royce Marine; (A) 
Chancellor Emeritus Jarl-Thore Eriksson, Åbo Akademi; (E) 
Professor Stuart Evans, Carnegie Mellon University; (E) 
Mr. Greg Franklin, Co-founder, Intellect Partners; (E) 
Mr. Max Furmanov, Managing Director, Accenture Technology; (E) 
Mr. Christer Granskog, Chairman of the Board, Patria Corporation; (A) 
Mrs. Jena Holtberg-Benge, Director, John Deere WorkSight™, Deere & Co.; (A) 
Mr. Robert Inchausti, CTO, XVELA; (E) 
Mr. Juhani Jantunen, Technical Director, Dassault Systems; (E) 
Mr. Jouko Jokinen, Editor-In-Chief, Aamulehti; (U) 
Mr. Pete Karns, Vice President, Internet of Things, IBM: (E) 
Dr. Antti Kaunonen, President, Kalmar; (A) 
Professor Martin Kenney, UC Davis; (U) 
Mr. Frank Kho, former Head of HNN Container Division, PSA; (U) 
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Kluge; (A) 
Mr. Glen Koskela, CTO, Fujitsu Nordic; (E) 
Mr. Mikko Kuitunen, Founder, Vincit Oy; (E) 
Dr. Harri Kulmala, CEO, Fimecc Oy; (A) 
Mr. Tommi Lehtonen, Senior Vice President, Crushing and Screening Business Line, 
Metso Corporation; (A) 
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Mr. Edmond Leung, CIO & Head of Operations Development and Technology, 
Hutchison Port Holdings; (U) 
Dr. Raymond E. Levitt, Kumagai Professor of Engineering, Stanford University; (U) 
Mr. Perttu Louhiluoto, President, Services, Metso Corporation; (A) 
Mr. Harri Luuppala, Co-founder, Open Invest (former Senior Vice President, Tieto Cor-
poration); (U) 
Mr. Anthony Marshall, Research Director and Strategy Leader, IBM Institute for Busi-
ness Value; (E) 
Professor Jeff Martin, Chung-Ang University; (U) 
Mr. Brendan McDonnell, General Manager, Technology & Engineering, Patrick; (U) 
Professor Lasse Mitronen, Aalto University; (U) 
Professor Martti Mäntylä, Aalto University; (E) 
Professor Jorma Mäntynen, Tampere University of Technology; (U) 
Mr. Daniel Navarro, Google for Entrepreneurs; (E) 
Vuorineuvos Dr. Kari Neilimo, Director of EMBA program of University of Tampere and 
Tampere University of Technology (former CEO and Chairman of S Group); (U) 
Dr. Markus Nordberg, Head of IdeaSquare, CERN; (A) 
Mr. Oh Bee Lock, Head of Group Technology (former COO, Singapore Terminals), 
PSA; (U)  
Dr. Tero Ojanperä, Co-founder, Vision+ (former CTO, Nokia); (E) 
Mr. Jari Rautjärvi, Managing Director, Valtra Inc.; (A) 
Dr. Petri Rouvinen, CEO, Etlatieto Oy; (A) 
Mr. Patrick Scaglia, Co-founder CITRIS Foundry accelerator (former CTO, Hewlett-
Packard); (E) 
Professor Emeritus Reijo Tuokko, Tampere University of Technology; (A) 
Mr. Jan Waas, Director, Technology and Engineering, ECT; (U) 
Mr. Bill Walsh, President and CEO, Navis; (E) 
Professor Matti Vilkko, Tampere University of Technology; (A) 
Professor Kim Wikström, Åbo Akademi; (U) 
Professor Emeritus John Zysman, UC Berkeley; (E) 
 
 
Four panelists opted to stay anonymous: 1 Research director from a European re-
search institute (E), 1 Professor from a German university (A), 1 Executive from a 
German machine builder (A) and 1 Executive from Nordic based process industry (U). 
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Appendix 5. Results from Shapiro-Wilk test 
 
 
Whole population
Impact Business
Products Service Operations models
p-value < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No
Technologies 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics
p-value < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 0,000 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No No No No No
By value chain
Impact Business
Enabler Products Service Operations models
p-value 0,000 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 0,000
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No
Business
Actor Products Service Operations models
p-value < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No
Business
User Products Service Operations models
p-value 0,006 0,006 0,029 0,000
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No
Technologies Enabler 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics
p-value < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 0,001 0,000 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 0,000
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No No No No No
Actor 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics
p-value < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001 < 0,0001
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No No No No No
User 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics
p-value 0,001 0,005 0,001 0,050 0,010 0,010 < 0,0001 0,000
alpha 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Normal No No No No No No No No
Test interpretation: H0: The variable from which the sample was extracted follows a Normal distribution.
Ha: The variable from which the sample was extracted does not follow a Normal distribution.
As the computed p-value is lower than the significance level alpha=0,05, one should reject the
null hypothesis H0, and accept the alternative hypothesis Ha.
The risk to reject the null hypothesis H0 while it is true is lower than 0,01%.
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Appendix 6. Interaction effect test 
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Appendix 7. Disruption impact by whole population, unbalanced data 
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Appendix 8. Disruption impact by value chain, balanced data 
 
 
  
228 
 
Appendix 9.Disruptiveness of individual technologies or concepts by value chain,         
balanced data 
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Appendix 10. Correlation matrix (Kendall) with whole population 
 
 
 
 
Balanced data 
           
              
  Impact Technologies 
  
 
Variables Products Service Operations Business models 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics 
Im
p
ac
t 
Products x - - - - - - - - - - - 
Service 0,39 x - - - - - - - - - - 
Operations 0,13 0,19 x - - - - - - - - - 
Business models 0,26 0,28 0,22 x - - - - - - - - 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
 
3D 0,11 0,04 0,10 0,04 x - - - - - - - 
Big Data 0,23 0,33 0,26 0,27 -0,04 x - - - - - - 
Cloud 0,24 0,20 0,16 0,22 -0,12 0,26 x - - - - - 
IoT 0,22 0,25 0,18 0,21 -0,08 0,32 0,29 x - - - - 
II 0,18 0,23 0,11 0,27 -0,08 0,26 0,21 0,44 x - - - 
MBSE 0,00 0,04 0,07 -0,04 0,14 0,06 -0,10 0,03 0,13 x - - 
OI 0,24 0,25 0,07 0,15 0,11 0,18 0,21 0,11 0,13 0,03 x - 
Robotics 0,13 0,05 0,13 0,04 0,18 0,09 0,02 0,05 -0,05 0,05 0,18 x 
 
Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05 
        
              
 
Code  Coefficient 
          
 
   0,2 - 0.29    Low correlation 
         
 
   0,3 - 0,39    Medium correlation 
         
 
            > 0,4    High correlation 
          
Unbalanced data 
          
              
  
Impact Technologies 
  
 
Variables Products Service Operations Business models 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics 
Im
p
ac
t Products x - - - - - - - - - - - 
Service 0,28 x - - - - - - - - - - 
Operations 0,13 0,25 x - - - - - - - - - 
Business models 0,19 0,26 0,20 x - - - - - - - - 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
 
3D 0,11 0,07 0,16 0,04 x - - - - - - - 
Big Data 0,20 0,30 0,15 0,17 -0,06 x - - - - - - 
Cloud 0,15 0,18 0,10 0,13 -0,09 0,30 x - - - - - 
IoT 0,16 0,23 0,12 0,19 -0,01 0,25 0,27 x - - - - 
II 0,19 0,24 0,16 0,29 0,02 0,29 0,19 0,48 x - - - 
MBSE 0,12 0,08 0,09 0,00 0,11 0,09 0,04 0,06 0,10 x - - 
OI 0,22 0,21 0,12 0,19 0,15 0,16 0,11 0,09 0,08 0,14 x - 
Robotics 0,17 0,12 0,08 0,08 0,20 0,05 0,07 0,10 0,03 0,12 0,20 x 
 
Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05 
        
              
 
Code Coefficient 
          
 
     0,2 - 0.29    Low correlation 
         
 
     0,3 - 0,39    Medium correlation 
         
 
             > 0,4    High correlation 
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Appendix 11. Correlation matrix (Kendall) by value chain with balanced data 
 
 
 
 
Enablers 
           
              
  
Areas Technologies 
  
 
Variables Products Service Operations Business models 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics 
A
re
as
 
Products x - - - - - - - - - - - 
Service 0,40 x - - - - - - - - - - 
Operations 0,18 0,23 x - - - - - - - - - 
Business models 0,23 0,21 0,20 x - - - - - - - - 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
 
3D 0,03 0,05 0,08 -0,04 x - - - - - - - 
Big Data 0,36 0,32 0,20 0,26 -0,02 x - - - - - - 
Cloud 0,12 0,15 0,24 0,12 -0,11 0,19 x - - - - - 
IoT 0,20 0,17 0,20 0,18 -0,02 0,34 0,31 x - - - - 
II 0,24 0,21 0,07 0,35 -0,02 0,35 0,27 0,50 x - - - 
MBSE 0,09 0,05 -0,03 -0,14 0,15 -0,03 -0,01 0,02 0,02 x - - 
OI 0,15 0,07 0,03 0,17 0,11 0,15 0,11 0,17 0,26 0,07 x - 
Robotics 0,06 -0,02 -0,15 0,09 0,22 0,08 -0,08 0,06 0,14 0,11 0,17 x 
 
Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05 
        
Actors 
           
              
  
Areas Technologies 
  
 
Variables Products Service Operations Business models 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics 
A
re
as
 
Products x - - - - - - - - - - - 
Service 0,10 x - - - - - - - - - - 
Operations 0,15 0,25 x - - - - - - - - - 
Business models 0,03 0,17 0,20 x - - - - - - - - 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
e
s
 
3D 0,18 0,05 0,22 -0,01 x - - - - - - - 
Big Data 0,07 0,26 0,13 0,04 -0,12 x - - - - - - 
Cloud -0,07 0,17 0,05 0,17 -0,07 0,27 x - - - - - 
IoT 0,03 0,16 0,05 0,21 0,09 0,18 0,24 x - - - - 
II 0,16 0,28 0,16 0,15 0,06 0,36 0,10 0,52 x - - - 
MBSE 0,21 0,27 0,16 0,05 0,08 0,27 0,07 -0,03 0,07 x - - 
OI 0,16 0,24 0,24 0,25 0,25 0,10 0,03 0,09 0,01 0,23 x - 
Robotics 0,08 0,15 0,07 -0,06 0,08 0,02 0,14 0,14 -0,04 0,11 0,26 x 
 
Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05 
        
Users 
 
             
  
Areas Technologies 
  
 
Variables Products Service Operations Business models 3D Big Data Cloud IoT II MBSE OI Robotics 
A
re
as
 
Products x - - - - - - - - - - - 
Service 0,39 x - - - - - - - - - - 
Operations 0,24 0,28 x - - - - - - - - - 
Business models 0,34 0,37 0,28 x - - - - - - - - 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
 
3D 0,14 0,17 0,23 0,11 x - - - - - - - 
Big Data 0,28 0,30 0,17 0,23 0,06 x - - - - - - 
Cloud 0,25 0,21 0,02 0,16 -0,11 0,31 x - - - - - 
IoT 0,28 0,35 0,17 0,39 0,00 0,28 0,24 x - - - - 
II 0,18 0,22 0,21 0,40 0,13 0,15 0,19 0,54 x - - - 
MBSE 0,03 -0,05 0,16 0,00 0,24 0,06 -0,13 0,13 0,17 x - - 
OI 0,28 0,28 0,22 0,19 0,18 0,25 0,12 0,19 0,12 0,19 x - 
Robotics 0,25 0,15 0,23 0,06 0,12 0,02 0,13 0,06 -0,03 0,17 0,17 x 
 
Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05 
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Appendix 12. Variance dependency by ANOVA 
 
Products
Enabler Actor User
3D
Enabler Actor User
Big data
Enabler Actor User
Cloud
Enabler Actor User
IoT
Enabler Actor User
Robotics
Enabler Actor User
Share the 
same opinion
Differentiates 
by being the 
highest value
Differentiates 
by being the 
lowest value
Differentiates 
by being the 
middle value
Stands 
somewhere 
between and 
does not 
differentiate 
clearly from 
the others
Impact
Technologies
Explanation
0,061
0,009
0,006
0,002
0,466
0,259
0,098
0,007
0,186
0,007
0,024
0,894
0,513
0,001
0,008
0,214
0,011
0,130
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